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Identification with a common ingroup has been shown to reduce prejudice against former 
outgroup members who are included in the common ingroup, but some research suggests 
that prejudice reduction interventions, including common ingroup identity, can have a 
“paradoxical” effect on minority group members of reducing their support for social 
change that would improve their group’s situation. These paradoxical effects stand in 
contrast to research on collective action and group consciousness suggesting that 
identification with a disadvantaged group predicts increases in collective action and 
political behavior on behalf of the group. In two 3-wave panel studies, using cross-lagged 
panel models (CLPM) and random-intercepts cross-lagged panel models (RI-CLPM), I 
examined whether identification with a common ingroup that includes Whites (American 
identity) and identification with a common ingroup that does not include Whites (person 
of color, or POC, identity) have different effects on racial minorities’ attitudes toward 
other racial minority groups and policies that benefit racial minority groups. I generally 
found trait-level correlations that were consistent with the literature on common ingroup 
identity, paradoxical effects, collective action, and group consciousness: Among Asian 
(Study 1), Black (Study 2), and Latino (Study 2) Americans, common ingroup identities 
(American and POC) were positively associated with attitudes toward other racial groups 
included in the common ingroup, American identity was generally negatively associated 
with attitudes toward policies that benefit other minority groups, and disadvantaged 
group identities (racial and POC) were generally positively associated with attitudes 
toward policies that benefit minority groups. But except for POC identity and Asian 
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Americans’ stereotype ratings of other minority groups and support for affirmative action 
(Study 1), I did not find consistent cross-lagged effects. Thus, these studies offer little 
support for the theory that identity predicts (and potentially causes) attitude change, at 
least among minority American adults.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction & Literature Review 
As the United States moves toward becoming a “majority minority” nation, 
research on racial attitudes and intergroup relations still tends to focus on the attitudes 
and behaviors of Whites and the impact of these attitudes and behaviors on minorities. 
Relatively little research examines racial minorities as active participants in the social and 
political system. Specifically, only recently have social or political psychologists begun 
to study whether and under what circumstances racial and ethnic minority groups behave 
as if they were part of a unified social or political group (e.g., Craig & Richeson, 2012). 
In this respect, Asian Americans in particular, having been positioned historically as 
“definitively not-black model minorities” (Wu, 2014, p. 149) or “racially triangulated vis-
à-vis Blacks and Whites” (i.e., their status in society is defined in comparison to both 
Whites and Blacks; Kim, 1999, p. 107), might view themselves as separate from other 
minority groups and hold negative attitudes toward those groups. Racial triangulation, 
along with other, less deliberate differences in the historical experiences of different 
minority groups, suggests that racial minority groups might not always (or even usually) 
show solidarity with each other and that patterns of solidarity might differ across 
minority groups. Studying these patterns of solidarity or lack thereof is important to 
understanding what becoming a “majority minority” nation actually means. 
 Until recently, social psychologists studying racial attitudes have tended to focus 
on changing the attitudes of (individual) dominant or majority group1 members in an 
 
1 Although the term “dominant group” refers to group power and the term “majority 
group” refers to group size, and although in some contexts, the dominant group is a 
minority group, my research focuses on racial groups in the United States, where the 
dominant group—Whites—has historically been and currently still is the majority group. 
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effort to reduce prejudice (Dixon et al., 2012; Reicher, 2007). Within this literature, two 
particularly effective interventions for reducing dominant group members’ prejudice 
against subordinate groups have been intergroup contact (Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006) and 
recategorization into a common ingroup identity (e.g., Gaertner & Dovidio, 2005). But 
how do these theories and findings apply to inter-minority attitudes and group relations? 
 Focusing on the common ingroup identity model (CIIM), I posit that identifying 
with a common ingroup has different effects on minority group members depending on 
whether or not the common ingroup includes the majority group (i.e., Whites). 
Accordingly, I examine two forms of common ingroup identity that are available to racial 
minorities in the United States: American identity, which includes other racial minorities 
and Whites, and person of color (POC)2 identity, which includes other racial minorities 
but not Whites. Both forms of common ingroup identity should predict more positive 
attitudes toward other minority groups, who are included in both common ingroups. But 
common ingroups that do and do not include the majority group should have different 
effects on support for social change that challenges the existing group hierarchy. 
Specifically, a recent line of research found that common ingroup identity can have a 
“paradoxical” effect (e.g., Dixon, Durrheim, et al., 2010) of reducing subordinate group 
 
Thus, I use the terms dominant group and majority group interchangeably and the terms 
subordinate group and minority group interchangeably (see Dovidio et al., 2016 for 
similar usage of “majority” and “minority” group labels). 
2 I am aware that “BIPOC” has superseded “POC” in some circles and that different 
labels for racial minority common ingroups (e.g., “POC/BIPOC” vs. “racial minority” vs. 
“nonwhite” vs. “Black and brown”) might have somewhat different implications for who 
self-identifies as a group member and who is perceived as a group member. I chose 
“POC” as a term that had been in common use across racial groups for some time and 
thus would likely be recognized by most respondents. Whether differences in the group 
label affect the identity-attitude relationships I study might be a topic for future research. 
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members’ support for social change that would improve their group’s situation (e.g., 
Ufkes et al., 2016; Dovidio et al., 2016). I hypothesize that these paradoxical effects 
occur only when the dominant group is part of the common ingroup.  
By contrast, research on collective action (e.g., van Zomeren, Postmes, & Spears, 
2008) and group consciousness (e.g., Miller et al., 1981) connects identification with a 
disadvantaged group to increases in collective action and political behavior on behalf of 
the group. As a disadvantaged group identity, a common ingroup identity that does not 
include the dominant group might increase support for social change through similar 
processes. In other words, a common ingroup identity that does not include the dominant 
group could function more like a subgroup identity than a traditional common ingroup 
identity in predicting policy attitudes and support for change. 
 Additionally, most of the existing CIIM research involves experimental 
manipulations of identity salience, but much of the research on political attitudes and 
collective action uses survey measures of identity. To extend the external validity of the 
CIIM and connect it to research on collective action and political attitudes, I use a 3-wave 
panel survey design in which group identification (which theoretically relates to chronic 
identity salience; see, e.g., Wright, 2010), racial attitudes, and support for policies and 
groups that challenge the racial status quo are measured over time. Because these 
dynamics might differ by race as a consequence of the historical experiences of different 
minority racial and ethnic groups, I separately analyze data from Asian (Study 1), Latino 
(Study 2), and Black respondents (Study 2). 
In the rest of this chapter, I review the relevant literature from social and political 
psychology. Chapter 2 provides an overview of my studies and a summary of my 
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hypotheses as applied to each study. Chapters 3 and 4 describe Studies 1 and 2, 
respectively. Chapter 5 discusses my overall findings in the context of the existing 
literature, including theoretical and practical implications, limitations, and future research 
directions. 
This chapter reviews the literature as follows: Section A introduces the prejudice 
reduction framework and the common ingroup identity model, as well as the potential for 
prejudice reduction strategies to have paradoxical effects on subordinate group members. 
Section B discusses theories of collective action, their bases in social identity theory and 
self-categorization theory, and their proposed mechanisms for the relationship between 
group identification and support for collective action. Section C considers group 
consciousness and linked fate as potential mediators of the relationship between group 
identity and political attitudes. Sections D through F lay out my reasoning for my 
proposed measures of identity and potential mediators, the 3-wave panel design, and the 
focus on Asian Americans in my main study (Study 1). Section G integrates the earlier 
sections, as well as observations about what policy areas might be perceived as affecting 
which racial groups, to make specific predictions for Asian, Latino, and African 
American respondents. 
A. Prejudice Reduction and Common Ingroup Identity 
 Questions about the nature and origins of prejudice have been a major theme of 
social psychology since the middle of the twentieth century (see, e.g., Allport, 1954; 
Adorno et al., 1950). Building on Allport’s (1954) ideas, researchers began to focus on 
prejudiced individual members of dominant groups and how to reduce these individuals’ 
prejudice (Reicher, 2007). Prejudice, in this framework, tends to be defined as negative 
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attitudes toward outgroup members (Dixon et al., 2012), with no explicit distinction 
between dominant group members’ attitudes toward subordinate group members and 
subordinate group members’ attitudes toward dominant group members. 
 If prejudiced individuals are the problem, prejudice reduction is the logical goal. 
Thus, social psychologists have studied a myriad of interventions to reduce prejudice 
(Paluck & Green, 2009; see also Lai et al., 2014, for interventions aimed at reducing 
implicit prejudice). One of the most successful prejudice reduction interventions studied 
to date has been intergroup contact (Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006). Intergroup contact would 
ideally take place under four conditions attributed to Allport: equal status in the contact 
situation, shared goals, intergroup cooperation to achieve those goals, and support from 
authorities, but prejudice reduction occurs even when the conditions are not met 
(Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006). 
 However, intergroup contact tends to have smaller effects on minority group 
members than on majority group members (Tropp & Pettigrew, 2005). Additionally, the 
effects of inter-minority group contact are relatively under-studied, and existing research 
suggests that relative status between the minority groups (Bikmen, 2011) and contact 
with the majority group (cf. Glasford & Calcagno, 2012) might moderate these effects. 
1. Social Identity as a Target for Prejudice Reduction 
 Social identity theory (SIT) suggests a potential origin for prejudice that can be 
targeted for prejudice reduction. Studies using the minimal group paradigm showed that 
merely categorizing people into groups can produce behaviors that favor the ingroup over 
the outgroup (e.g., Tajfel et al., 1971). Tajfel and Turner (1979) introduced the concept of 
social identity, defined as “those aspects of an individual’s self-image that derive from 
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the social categories to which he perceives himself as belonging,” to explain these 
findings (p. 40). They proposed that 1) people strive for positive self-concepts and thus 
strive for positive social identities, and 2) the positivity or negativity of social identity 
depends on comparisons with relevant outgroups (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). As a result, if 
an individual identifies with an ingroup and is in a situation that allows comparison with 
a relevant outgroup, they will be motivated to engage in intergroup competition to 
positively distinguish the ingroup from the outgroup (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). To reduce 
the kinds of ingroup bias that are driven by social identity processes, then, one could 
imagine either reducing ingroup identification (or its relevance to the situation) or 
reducing the potential for intergroup comparisons (e.g., by not having a relevant outgroup 
available). 
Decategorization (prompting people to think of themselves as individuals) and 
recategorization (prompting people to think of themselves as part of a common ingroup) 
use these insights, along with the idea from self-categorization theory that the self can be 
defined at multiple levels of inclusiveness (Turner & Reynolds, 2012), to reduce 
prejudice. Decategorization makes ingroup identification irrelevant to the situation and 
thus reduces the positivity of evaluations of ingroup members; recategorization redefines 
outgroup members as part of a common ingroup and thus extends the processes of 
ingroup favoritism to those former outgroup members (Gaertner et al., 1989). 
Recategorization into a common ingroup has been shown to improve attitudes toward 
former outgroup members (Gaertner et al., 1989) and increase willingness to help former 
outgroup members (Dovidio et al., 1997), among other benefits. 
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 Additionally, the common ingroup identity model (CIIM) provides a potential 
mechanism for the prejudice reduction effects of intergroup contact (Dovidio et al., 
2016). According to Dovidio et al. (2016), Allport’s optimal contact conditions tend to 
create feelings of being part of a common group, and stronger one-group feelings in 
intergroup contact studies are associated with reduced bias and intergroup anxiety. For 
example, a recent study involving an “us” or “not us” categorization task provides 
evidence that something like a common ingroup identity (what the authors refer to as a 
“more inclusive social identity”) might underlie the effects of at least intergroup 
friendship (Reimer et al., 2020). 
Common ingroup identity has also been proposed as a mechanism through which 
racial minorities’ experiences of discrimination promote more positive attitudes toward 
other racial minority groups (Craig & Richeson, 2012). Craig and Richeson’s (2012) 
findings suggest that CIIM can apply to inter-minority group relations as well as 
traditional majority-minority group relations. 
2. Paradoxical Effects of Prejudice Reduction 
 Even if prejudice reduction interventions improve intergroup attitudes across the 
board, however, they might have unintended consequences for members of subordinate 
groups. A relatively recent line of research suggests that intergroup contact and common 
ingroup identity can reduce subordinate group members’ recognition of inequality (e.g., 
Tropp et al., 2012; Ufkes et al., 2016) and, consequently, their support for collective 
action or policies that could improve their group’s status (e.g., Saguy et al., 2009; Ufkes 
et al., 2016; Carter et al., 2019). Earlier research on the group-value model of justice 
similarly hinted that superordinate group identification could have a pacifying effect on 
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members of disadvantaged groups by prompting relational evaluations of authorities 
(who represent the superordinate group and tend to be members of the dominant group) 
over instrumental evaluations of outcomes (Huo et al., 1996; Smith & Tyler, 1996). 
Interestingly, although a dual identity manipulation (making both a common ingroup 
identity and a subgroup identity salient) does not appear to undermine support for change 
(Ufkes et al., 2016), strong identification with both the superordinate group and a 
subgroup does appear to promote relational evaluations of authorities (Huo et al., 1996). 
These lines of research suggest that prejudice reduction strategies have the 
potential to help perpetuate more subtle or structural forms of inequality (Dovidio et al., 
2016). Dixon et al. (2012) argue that “it is precisely because contact improves intergroup 
attitudes (prejudice reduction) that it also decreases perceptions of discrimination, 
support for race-targeted policies, and readiness to engage in collective action” (p. 421). 
Indeed, Saguy et al. (2009) provide evidence that attitudes toward the (dominant) 
outgroup form part of the mechanism by which contact reduces support for social change. 
In other words, “harmonious relations” between dominant and subordinate groups might, 
in themselves, be “implicated in the reproduction of injustice” (Dixon, Tropp, Durrheim, 
& Tredoux, 2010, p. 79).  
However, a recent meta-analysis suggests that the paradoxical effects of 
intergroup contact might be small and might depend on the outcomes measured and the 
type of contact (Reimer & Sengupta, 2020). Similarly, Reimer et al. (2020) found that, at 
least among one set of participants (Indian college students), intergroup contact and 
social identity inclusivity (with exclusivity measured through “us” versus “not us” 
judgments of individuals with whom participants share caste, religious, or national group 
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membership) were unrelated to support for a form of affirmative action in higher 
education (though the authors suggested that the lack of effect might be due to 
participants having personally experienced the effects of the affirmative action policy in 
question). It would be valuable, then, to attempt to replicate paradoxical effects, 
especially of common ingroup identity, which has not been examined as thoroughly as 
intergroup contact. 
 If common ingroup identity has these paradoxical effects, an additional question 
is whether the type of common ingroup matters. Do these effects occur when the 
dominant group is not involved? It is plausible that a common ingroup identity that does 
not include the dominant group would not have the same paradoxical effects as a 
common ingroup identity that includes the dominant group because a common minority 
ingroup identity preserves the distinction between the ingroup and the dominant group. 
Furthermore, one study of intergroup contact found that higher quality contact between 
members of different subordinate groups could in fact increase support for policies and 
collective action that benefit the other group (Dixon et al., 2015). And there is some 
evidence that identification as POC, in particular, is associated with support for the Black 
Lives Matter movement among Black, Latino, and Asian Americans (Pérez, 2020). It is 
thus possible that a common minority ingroup identity could increase support for social 
change that benefits other minority groups. 
 Thus, the CIIM and the paradoxical effects literature suggest the following 
hypotheses: 
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 Hypothesis 1: A common ingroup identity that includes the dominant group 
(American identity) predicts more positive attitudes toward other racial minority groups 
(and Whites). 
 Hypothesis 2: A common ingroup identity that does not include the dominant 
group (person of color, or POC, identity) predicts more positive attitudes toward other 
racial minority groups. 
See Figure 1 for an illustration of each of these hypotheses in a 3-wave panel 
model in which identity at an earlier time point predicts racial attitude at a later time 
point, controlling for racial attitude at the earlier time point, and racial attitude at an 
earlier time point predicts identity at a later time point, controlling for identity at the 
earlier time point. The hypothesized effect (identity predicting more positive racial 
attitudes) is shown in bold. 
 Hypothesis 3: A common ingroup identity that includes the dominant group 
(American identity) predicts less support for change. 
Hypothesis 4: A common ingroup identity that does not include the dominant 
group (POC identity) predicts more support for change, especially change that benefits 
other minority groups. 
See Figure 2 for an illustration of these hypotheses in a 3-wave panel model (with 
the hypothesized effects shown in bold as in Figure 1). Although the hypothesized effect 
for POC identity on support for change is again positive, the hypothesized effect for 
American identity is negative, as suggested by the paradoxical effects literature.  
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a.  
b.  
Figure 1. Illustration of Hypothesis 1 (a) and Hypothesis 2 (b) in a 3-wave panel study. 
Hypothesized paths are in bold. Cross-lagged paths from both POC and American 
identity to racial attitudes are expected to be positive. 
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a.  
b.  
Figure 2. Illustration of Hypothesis 3 (a) and Hypothesis 4 (b) in a 3-wave panel study. 
Hypothesized paths are in bold. Cross-lagged paths from POC identity to support for 
change are expected to be positive. Cross-lagged paths from American identity to support 
for change are expected to be negative. 
 
B. Collective Action Theory: How Racial Identity and Person of Color Identity 
Might Increase Support for Change 
 Although the paradoxical effects literature shows how prejudice reduction 
interventions can reduce support for social change, it does not explain how support for 
social change arises in the first place. Dixon et al. (2010b) refer to the collective action 
approach (Wright & Lubensky, 2008) as an alternative to the prejudice reduction 
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approach that focuses on motivating members of disadvantaged groups to challenge the 
status quo. 
1. Social Identity Theory and Predicting Collective Action 
 Collective action theory is heavily influenced by social identity theory (see, e.g., 
Wright, 2010). But whereas the SIT-based concepts of intergroup comparison and 
competition are treated as sources of prejudice in the prejudice reduction literature, Tajfel 
and Turner’s (1979) formulation of SIT conceptualized social competition as a key 
process by which members of low-status groups can achieve a more positive social 
identity. In contrast to prejudice reduction’s tendency to focus on dominant group 
members, SIT “focuses in particular on what happens when a given social identity 
confers negative self-description and/or low social status on an individual” (Oakes, 2002, 
p. 813). Tajfel and Turner (1979) proposed three categories of reactions that members of 
low-status groups can use to buffer their self-esteem: individual mobility, social 
creativity, and social competition. Individual mobility involves attempts to dissociate 
from the low-status group and become part of a higher-status group; social creativity 
involves redefining the intergroup situation by changing the dimension of comparison, 
the values of different attributes on the comparison dimension, or the relevant 
comparison group; social competition involves directly competing with the dominant 
group to attempt to change the status quo (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Thus, social 
competition can lead to intergroup conflict if the relevant comparison dimension involves 
scarce resources; individual mobility and social creativity can reduce intergroup conflict 
but leave the group’s objective disadvantages intact (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Whether 
individuals choose social competition depends on their identification with the subordinate 
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group and their perception of the dominant group as a relevant outgroup for social 
comparisons (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). 
In keeping with these ideas from SIT, then, Dixon et al.’s (2012) argument that 
prejudice reduction strategies undermine exactly the processes that drive subordinate 
group members’ support for social change seems especially plausible when applied to the 
CIIM. By de-emphasizing the basis for social comparison with the dominant group, 
common ingroup identity might suppress intergroup competition processes that underlie 
both prejudice and social change. However, this effect should only occur if the dominant 
group is no longer perceived as a relevant comparison outgroup (i.e., if the dominant 
group is part of the common ingroup). Focusing on the social identity mechanisms behind 
collective action leads to the possibility that a common ingroup identity that does not 
include the dominant group could instead increase social change motivations by 
increasing the relevance of comparison with the dominant group.  
In the SIT framework, collective action is defined as a form of social competition 
(Wright, 2010). Thus, SIT-based theories of collective action begin with the conditions 
that predict choosing individual mobility, social creativity, and social competition as 
identity management strategies. These include subjective identification with the ingroup, 
as well as the perceived existence and strength of barriers to leaving the low-status group, 
security of status differences (i.e., availability of cognitive alternatives to the current 
status differences), and legitimacy of the status differences (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). The 
perceived societal conditions are also referred to as the socio-structural variables of 
perceived permeability of group boundaries, perceived stability of the status quo, and 
perceived legitimacy of the status quo (Wright, 2010). 
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Subjective identification with the ingroup is further defined by self-categorization 
theory (SCT). According to Hogg and Turner (1987) identification occurs when 
individuals “define, describe, and evaluate themselves in terms of the group/category 
label,” and self-categorization is the cognitive process through which identification 
occurs (p. 325). Self-categorization as a group member thus transforms behavior into 
group behavior (Hogg & Turner, 1987), or rather, moves behavior along the continuum 
from more individual to more group-like (Turner & Reynolds, 2012). Group behavior (or 
intergroup behavior) involves the individual perceiving the self and others as members of 
different groups and acting as a representative of the ingroup; collective action is a form 
of group behavior aimed at maintaining or improving the ingroup’s position (Wright, 
2010). SCT also addresses when and how self-categorization occurs through the concepts 
of accessibility and normative and comparative fit (Turner & Reynolds, 2012). 
Because people are motivated to achieve a “positively valued social identity” 
(Ellemers et al., 1988, p. 498), members of low-status groups are motivated to engage in 
various forms of identity enhancement strategies (e.g., Ellemers et al., 1993), including 
both individual mobility and social mobility (Wright, 2010), social creativity 
(Mummendey et al., 1996), and social competition (Haslam & Reicher, 2006). The socio-
structural variables are theorized to predict choices among these strategies and to both 
influence and be influenced by group identification (Wright, 2010). Permeability of 
group boundaries has been found to predict lower identification with the disadvantaged 
group (Ellemers, et al., 1988) and greater preference for individual mobility strategies 
(Wright et al., 1990). Illegitimate group status differences predict higher group 
identification among members of low-status groups, especially when group status is 
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unstable and group boundaries are impermeable (Ellemers, Wilke, & van Knippenberg, 
1993). 
2. Incorporating Relative Deprivation into Collective Action Theory  
But some evidence suggests that the SIT socio-structural variables might better 
predict when people choose individual or social mobility strategies, while variables 
derived from relative deprivation theory (RDT) might better predict when people choose 
social competition strategies (Mummendey, Kessler, Klink, & Mielke, 1999). Using 
structural equation models that included variables from both theories, Mummendey et al. 
(1999) found that the SIT variables stability, legitimacy, and permeability predicted in-
group identification, which in turn directly predicted East Germans’ endorsement of 
mobility and recategorization in the face of their group’s lower status compared to West 
Germans; they found that the RD variable of fraternal resentment directly predicted, and 
mediated the effects of the SIT variables and in-group identification on, endorsement of 
social and realistic competition. Thus, some sense of group-based deprivation seems to be 
important in predicting when members of low-status groups attempt to improve their 
group’s relative status. Indeed, Tajfel and Turner (1979) intended SIT to complement 
other theories, such as realistic conflict theory, in explaining intergroup relations in the 
real world.  
It is also unclear whether group identification mediates the relationships between 
perceived permeability, legitimacy, and stability and collective action (Mummendey, 
Klink, et al., 1999) or if the socio-structural variables should mediate the relationship 
between ingroup identification and collective action. 
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To organize the SIT and RDT predictors of collective action, van Zomeren et al. 
(2008) proposed the social identity model of collective action (SIMCA). Under SIMCA, 
identity predicts collective action both directly and indirectly via injustice and efficacy 
(van Zomeren et al., 2008; see also van Zomeren, Leach, & Spears, 2012). Injustice 
includes both perceptions of unfairness or discrimination and affective reactions (e.g., 
group-based anger), though affective injustice is a stronger predictor of collective action 
(van Zomeren et al., 2008). However, van Zomeren et al. (2008) found that injustice and 
efficacy more strongly predict collective action against what they call incidental 
disadvantages (issue- or situation-specific disadvantages, such as a tax or tuition increase) 
than collective action against structural disadvantages (e.g., long-standing racial 
hierarchies). Identity predicts collective action against both types of disadvantage, but it 
tends to do so directly with regard to structural disadvantage (van Zomeren et al., 2008). 
Van Zomeren et al. (2008) further distinguish between politicized identities (e.g., 
identification with a social movement) and non-politicized identities (i.e., identification 
with the group as a whole), with the former more strongly predicting collective action 
than the latter (see also Klandermans, 2014). 
Using a theoretical framework from the literature on coping, van Zomeren et al. 
(2012) re-conceptualized SIMCA as a dual-process model of emotion-focused and 
problem-focused coping with collective disadvantage. Identity shapes a primary appraisal 
of whether the collective disadvantage is self-relevant (i.e., relevant to the individual’s 
personal or group-based self-concept) (van Zomeren et al., 2012). For the disadvantage to 
be perceived as relevant to the group-based self-concept, the individual must self-
categorize as a group member (van Zomeren et al., 2012). Injustice and efficacy relate to 
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secondary appraisals of blame and coping potential, which drive emotion-focused and 
problem-focused coping, respectively (van Zomeren et al., 2012). The primary appraisal 
of group-based self-relevance increases secondary appraisals of both blame and coping 
potential, and both secondary appraisal pathways can lead to collective action as a form 
of approach coping (van Zomeren et al., 2012). 
The original SIMCA and the dual-pathway coping model differ in a few respects. 
First, although group identification predicts group-based anger and (maybe) efficacy in 
both models, group identification in the dual-pathway model also moderates the effect of 
group efficacy beliefs on collective action, with efficacy having a stronger effect for low 
identifiers (van Zomeren et al., 2012). Second, engaging in collective action can 
strengthen the primary and secondary appraisals in a feedback loop; thus, in the dual-
pathway model, collective action can both be predicted by and predict group 
identification. Third, where SIMCA suggests that the emotion of anger is central to the 
injustice path, the dual-pathway model also draws attention to the judgments that the 
situation is unfair and that an external agent is to blame for it, which drive group-based 
anger (van Zomeren et al., 2012); this suggests that measures of both anger and 
assessments of unfair disadvantage might be relevant. Finally, the original SIMCA 
includes a direct effect of identity on collective action, especially with regard to structural 
disadvantage (van Zomeren et al., 2008); in the dual-pathway model, the effect appears to 
be completely mediated by injustice and efficacy (van Zomeren et al., 2012). 
3. Collective Action Theory and Mechanisms for Paradoxical Effects 
Elements of SIMCA in both its original form and its dual-pathway form can be 
found in the research on the paradoxical effects of prejudice reduction. Ufkes et al. 
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(2016) found that group-based anger and group efficacy beliefs mediated the sedative 
effect of a common ingroup manipulation on collective action intentions and that the 
effect of the common ingroup manipulation on these two mediators was mediated by 
beliefs about whether racial inequality exists. (However, because dual identity did not 
have the same sedative effect, these findings could primarily be a product of the common 
ingroup manipulation reducing subgroup identification.) Belief that racial inequality 
exists could logically be part of the primary self-relevance appraisal (i.e., whether some 
disadvantage the individual is currently experiencing has to do with their racial group 
membership) or part of the secondary blame appraisal (i.e., whether there is an unfair 
racial hierarchy that is not the ingroup’s fault) from van Zomeren et al.’s (2012) dual 
pathway model. Ufkes, Dovidio, and Tel (2015) similarly found that subgroup 
identification (Kurdish) predicted higher collective action intentions via anger and 
efficacy but that superordinate group identification (European) predicted lower collective 
action intentions with regard to structural disadvantage via decreased anger. Combining 
theories of intergroup contact and collective action, Cakal et al. (2011) tested relative 
deprivation (operationalized as recognition of the ingroup’s disadvantage compared to the 
outgroup) and group efficacy as mediators of the effects of disadvantaged group identity 
and intergroup contact on collective action and policy support, finding significant indirect 
effects of contact through both mediators but of disadvantaged group identity only 
through group efficacy. This collection of studies provide evidence that disadvantaged 
subgroup identification can increase support for change via both the anger/perceived 
disadvantage and efficacy pathways and that superordinate group identification can 
decrease support for change at least via the anger/perceived disadvantage pathway. 
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Other studies of intergroup contact appear to have focused primarily on the 
injustice pathway. Saguy et al. (2009) found that positive contact with Jewish Israelis 
predicted decreased support from Arab Israelis for legislation and general social change 
to improve their relative position and that this effect was partially mediated by 
perceptions of the existing inequality as just. Tropp et al. (2012) found, in a longitudinal 
study, that friendships with Whites predicted lower perceived ethnic discrimination 
among Black and Latino college students, which in turn predicted less support for ethnic 
activism among Black students (and marginally predicted less support for ethnic activism 
among Latino students). A more recent study of college students found similar effects of 
friendships with Whites among both minority and White students (Carter et al., 2019). 
These findings and the fact that Carter et al. (2019) refer to their perceived discrimination 
variable as “perceived injustice” suggest that perceived discrimination might reflect a 
similar construct to injustice appraisals or relative deprivation. Together, these studies 
demonstrate that 1) collective action theory can help explain the paradoxical effects of 
prejudice reduction by suggesting relative deprivation and group efficacy as mediators 
and 2) variables related to relative deprivation and group efficacy potentially mediate the 
effects of group identification on policy support as well as collective action (but see 
Tausch et al., 2011, Study 2, for an example in which perceived group disadvantage but 
not anger or efficacy predicted policy support). 
Additionally, Saguy et al. (2009) found that attitudes toward the dominant 
outgroup partially mediated contact effects via perceived outgroup fairness, thus directly 
connecting the prejudice reduction and sedative effects of intergroup contact. The 
perceived outgroup fairness effect, in turn, could relate to research suggesting that hope 
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for harmony (Hasan-Aslih et al., 2019) or belief that injustices will be addressed anyway 
(Stroebe, 2013) can undermine collective action outside of the injustice and efficacy 
pathways. It is also consistent with Mummendey, Klink, et al.’s (1999) finding that in 
some contexts (i.e., when the group’s status is expected to improve under the current 
regime) perceived stability of the status quo (i.e., lack of improvement) is positively 
associated with social competition strategies instead of negatively associated, as SIT 
would predict in most situations. What perceived outgroup fairness and Mummendey, 
Klink, et al.’s (1999) reversal of the stability effect might be capturing is the idea that if 
the dominant outgroup is perceived as being likely to improve the subordinate group’s 
status, subordinate group members might view collective action or political action as 
unnecessary or even counterproductive (i.e., by upsetting the dominant group). The role 
of perceived outgroup fairness also brings to mind findings from the group-value model 
of justice literature that superordinate group identification increases the role of relational 
evaluations (i.e., whether the authority treated them respectfully) over instrumental 
evaluations (i.e., evaluations of outcomes) in the feeling of obligation to obey the law 
(Smith & Tyler, 1996). All of these examples seem to involve a recognition that the 
group is unjustly disadvantaged, paired with a belief that dominant group authorities 
either already are fair (even if they produce unfair outcomes) or will become fairer in the 
future; thus, they could reflect boundary conditions on the injustice pathway. 
In summary, SIMCA predicts that identification with a disadvantaged subgroup 
should be associated with increased support for collective action and potentially other 
forms of social change that benefit the group, and this effect should be mediated by 
increased perceptions of group-based injustice and group efficacy. The paradoxical 
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effects studies incorporating SIMCA suggest that identification with a common ingroup 
that includes the dominant group should decrease support for change via at least the 
perceived injustice pathway. (As discussed above, there is less evidence for an efficacy 
pathway for paradoxical effects.3) 
However, by these same mechanisms, a common ingroup identity that does not 
include the dominant group might increase support for social change. Instead of 
decreasing perceived injustice and efficacy, a common minority ingroup identity could 
increase group efficacy (for example, because it is a larger group with more visibility or 
voting power) and/or recognition of unjust disadvantages compared to the dominant 
group (by making the dominant group a more relevant or salient comparison group). 
Indeed, Dovidio, Gaertner, and Saguy (2009) note that recategorization can increase bias 
toward outgroups that were not included in the common ingroup, which suggests that 
recategorization made comparisons with those outgroups more relevant. If the same 
social identity mechanisms indeed underlie prejudice and social competition, a common 
minority ingroup identity could make comparisons with Whites more relevant and thus 
lead to more negative attitudes toward Whites and increased social competition to address 
inequality with Whites. 
Additionally, building on the dual-pathway model (van Zomeren et al., 2012), if 
the collective disadvantage in question affects a minority outgroup rather than one’s own 
group, identification with a common minority ingroup should increase the appraised self-
 
3 Indeed, when the common ingroup identity is “American,” it is possible that 
identification with this group could be associated with greater efficacy, to the extent that 
being American is associated with citizenship (e.g., among heavily immigrant groups 
such as Latino and Asian Americans) or civic engagement.  
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relevance of that disadvantage (because it affects the common ingroup), and this primary 
appraisal should feed secondary appraisals of injustice and group efficacy, thus 
increasing support for change. This suggests that the effects of POC identity should be 
strongest for policies that are perceived as primarily affecting minority groups other than 
one’s own. 
Restated, these observations form the following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 5: For racial minorities, racial identity predicts more support for 
change, mediated by increases in perceived unjust racial disadvantage (e.g., perceived 
racial discrimination) and perceived racial group efficacy. 
Hypothesis 6: For racial minorities, POC identity predicts more support for 
change, mediated by increases in perceived unjust racial disadvantage (of POC generally) 
and perceived POC efficacy. These effects should be strongest for policies that primarily 
affect other minority groups. 
Hypothesis 7: For racial minorities, American identity predicts less support for 
change, mediated by decreases in perceived unjust racial disadvantage (of one’s own 
group and POC generally). Because evidence for an efficacy pathway in the existing 
literature is weaker, I did not predict that efficacy would mediate the effect of American 
identity. 
C. Group Consciousness as a Pathway to Support for Change 
Political psychologists have also examined the effects of group membership on 
political behavior. But much of the political behavior research has done so without 
delving into the process behind this link (Lee, T., 2008). To the extent that explanations 
were sought for group differences, theorists tended to turn to resource availability (Miller 
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et al., 1981). Nonetheless, subjective identification explanations have been developed for 
when group membership translates into political attitudes and behavior (e.g., Conover, 
1984; Miller et al., 1981).  
This literature on group identity and political behavior suggests different sets of 
mechanisms for the identity-behavior relationship from those proposed by social 
psychologists studying collective action. Social identity theory has been less influential in 
political science than it has been in psychology, perhaps in part because it has been 
perceived as less relevant to political behavior in the real world (Huddy, 2001) and in part 
because SIT was relatively new (see Tajfel & Turner, 1979) and SCT had not been 
established (see Turner et al., 1987) when identity theories of politics were being 
developed (e.g., Gurin, Miller, & Gurin, 1980; Conover, 1984). Conover’s (1984) 
concept of self-schemas resembles self-categorization except that self-schemas appear to 
be more stable, and thus, a political psychology of group identification could have 
resembled collective action theory. However, although Conover (1984) found that 
subjective group identification could predict issue positions consistently with a self-
schema account, other political behavior researchers were interested in predicting 
political participation, which group identification predicted less well. To predict 
participation, some political science and public opinion researchers turned to Marx’s 
concept of class consciousness to develop a theory of group consciousness (Gurin, Miller, 
& Gurin, 1980). 
1. Group Consciousness Theory 
According to Gurin et al. (1980), consciousness is distinct from identification 
because identification consists of awareness of similarity to other group members while 
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“[c]onsciousness refers to a set of political beliefs and action orientations arising out of 
this awareness of similarity” (p. 30), specifically beliefs and action orientations related to 
the group’s position in society compared to other groups. Transformation of identification 
into consciousness is proposed as the process connecting identity to political behavior 
(Miller et al., 1981), which implicitly suggests that consciousness could be a mediator 
between identification and political behavior. By emphasizing the role of conflict and 
structural factors in this transformation, Gurin et al. (1980) distinguished their theory 
from social identity theory and tied it more to realistic conflict theory and relative 
deprivation theory. 
In its original form, group consciousness consisted of four hypothesized 
dimensions: identification, power discontent (i.e., the sense that one’s group has too little 
influence in society), rejection of the legitimacy of group status differentials (i.e., 
blaming the system for these differentials), and collectivist orientation (i.e., belief that 
people should use collective action over individual action to pursue the group’s interests) 
(Gurin et al., 1980). Another version omits collectivist orientation, replaces power 
discontent with polar power (which includes both feeling that one’s own group has too 
little influence and feeling that an outgroup has too much influence), and adds polar 
affect (i.e., differential affect for the ingroup and outgroup) (Miller et al., 1981). Miller et 
al. (1981) also define identification in a way that emphasizes shared interests with the 
ingroup rather than general similarity. And they found that the interaction among 
identification, polar power, and system blame predicted turnout in Presidential elections 
(Miller et al., 1981). 
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In addition to predicting political behavior, group consciousness is relevant to a 
theory of group identity and support for change because it potentially overlaps with 
variables from collective action theory and is affected by intra- and intergroup contact. 
Indeed, one might expect overlap between group consciousness and the relative 
deprivation elements of collective action theory because group consciousness theory was 
partially influenced by relative deprivation theory (see Gurin et al., 1980). Polar power 
and system blame, on their face, resemble unfairness and blame appraisals, respectively, 
from van Zomeren et al.’s (2012) dual-pathway model. Polar power has also been 
referred to as deprivation (Lien, 1994), further suggesting overlap with the relative 
deprivation concepts that became the injustice pathway in SIMCA. System blame has 
been operationalized as perceived discrimination or awareness of discrimination against 
the ingroup or against oneself as a member of the group (Lien, 1994; Rodriguez & Gurin, 
1990), potentially connecting the group consciousness literature to Tropp et al.’s (2012) 
intergroup contact study. Furthermore, Rodriguez and Gurin (1990) found that while 
ingroup contact predicts power discontent, perceived illegitimacy of subordination (i.e., 
system blame), and support for group-based political action among Mexican Americans, 
contact with Whites predicts lower perceived illegitimacy of subordination. This finding 
suggests that the system blame element of group consciousness could partially explain 
the paradoxical effects of contact, consistent with Tropp et al.’s (2012) findings. 
Additionally, contact with members of other minority groups (other Latinos, Blacks, 
Asians, and Native Americans) predicted higher perceived illegitimacy of subordination 
and support for group-based political action (Rodriguez & Gurin, 1990), suggesting a 
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possible mechanism (through awareness of discrimination) by which POC identity might 
increase support for change. 
System blame also brings to mind the social psychological concept of system 
justification (i.e., the motivation to justify or bolster the status quo), which has been 
proposed as an additional (negative) predictor of collective action (Jost et al., 2017). One 
way in which system justification has been operationalized is as endorsement of status-
legitimizing ideologies, i.e., widespread beliefs within a culture that justify inequalities 
between groups (Major et al., 2002; Sengupta & Sibley, 2013). Relatedly, social 
dominance theory predicts that endorsement of hierarchy-enhancing versus hierarchy-
attenuating legitimizing ideologies justify support for policies that increase or decrease 
intergroup inequality, respectively (Levin et al., 1998). Major et al. (2002) found that 
low-status group members who endorsed one such status-legitimizing or hierarchy-
enhancing legitimizing ideology (potential for individual mobility) were less likely to 
attribute rejection by a higher-status group member to discrimination. Attribution to 
discrimination itself resembles system blame, though what is being attributed in Major et 
al.’s (2002) studies is a negative personal outcome rather than a group’s position in 
society.  
Furthermore, although Jost et al. (2017) seem to suggest that system justification 
affects collective action independently of group identification, Jost et al. (2003) proposed 
that identity salience should predict (lower) system justification among members of low-
status groups. Levin et al. (1998) similarly predicted that group identification should be 
negatively associated with endorsement of hierarchy-enhancing legitimizing myths 
among members of low-status groups. Consistent with these predictions, Major et al. 
COMMON INGROUP IDENTITY AND POLITICAL SOLIDARITY 28 
(2002) found that low-status group members’ group identification and belief in individual 
mobility tended to be negatively correlated. Levin et al. (1998) similarly found a negative 
association between racial or ethnic group identification and endorsement of a number of 
hierarchy-enhancing legitimizing myths, including individual mobility, legitimacy of 
racial inequality, and internal attributions for racial differences in poverty, for African 
Americans and Latinos (but not Asian Americans). Identification with a superordinate 
group, on the other hand, has been found to predict increased system justification among 
disadvantaged group members (Jaśko & Kossowska, 2013). And support for meritocracy, 
another system-justifying ideology, has been shown to mediate the relationship between 
positive intergroup contact and reduced support for policies that benefit the 
disadvantaged ingroup (Sengupta & Sibley, 2013). Taken together, these findings suggest 
that system justification and/or endorsement of legitimizing ideologies might mediate the 
relationship between subgroup and/or superordinate group identification and support for 
change.  
It is unclear, however, whether this phenomenon comprises part of relative 
deprivation or group consciousness or whether it independently predicts some part of the 
collective action or political behavior pathways. For example, Jaśko and Kossowska 
(2013) conceptualize system justification as a measure of perceived fairness or 
legitimacy, which suggests connections to perceived legitimacy in SIT, van Zomeren et 
al.’s (2012) appraisals of unfairness and blame, or a combination of the system blame and 
power discontent variables from group consciousness theory. And Levin et al.’s (1998) 
hierarchy-enhancing and hierarchy-attenuating legitimizing myths include SIT-related 
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beliefs about legitimacy and permeability, as well as inequality attributions and perceived 
discrimination, which overlap with the system blame facet of group consciousness.  
2. Linked Fate 
In addition to the Gurin et al. (1980) and Miller et al. (1981) dimensions of group 
consciousness, some group consciousness measures include or even consist of a measure 
of linked fate with the ingroup (Sanchez & Vargas, 2016). However, linked fate was 
initially distinct from group consciousness (Dawson, 1994). Dawson (1994) describes 
linked fate as part of the “black utility heuristic,” which explains African Americans’ 
relatively uniform political behavior as a product of using racial group interests to 
determine individual interests when making political choices. Linked fate measures “the 
degree to which African Americans believe that their own self-interests are linked to the 
interests of the race” (p. 77), typically using two branching items, such as “Do you think 
what happens generally to [group] people in this country will have something to do with 
what happens in your life?” (Dawson, 1994, p. 77) and if yes, “Will it affect you a lot, 
some, or not very much?” (Sanchez & Vargas, 2016). Linked fate and “black economic 
subordination” (whether the individual perceives the economic position of Blacks as 
better than, worse than, or the same as Whites’) jointly predicted African Americans’ 
economic and racial policy preferences (Dawson, 1994).  
Despite Dawson’s (1994) emphasis on the self-interest definition of linked fate, 
he describes it as partly a product of self-categorization as a group member. Furthermore, 
the concept of linked fate recalls Conover’s (1984) idea that group identification and 
development of a group-based self-schema connects group interests to the self, whether 
as a proxy for self-interest or through solidarity with the group that makes its interests 
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directly relevant to the self. Conover (1984) argued that the direct self-relevance of group 
interests was a more likely explanation. Thus, linked fate, which captures the perception 
of group interests as self-relevant, could be a mechanism connecting group identity and 
group-oriented policy preferences. Unlike the aspects of group consciousness that overlap 
with the collective action and paradoxical effects literature, however, linked fate does not 
have an immediately apparent connection to superordinate identities that include the 
dominant group (i.e., American identity). It is possible that identification as American 
might reduce linked fate with one’s racial group or with POC, but the definition and 
operationalization of linked fate suggest that racial and POC linked fate are more directly 
connected to racial and POC identities, respectively, and that American identity need not 
reduce linked fate unless it also reduces subgroup identification. 
3. Disentangling Identification, Linked Fate, and Group Consciousness 
Although linked fate was developed to explain African Americans’ political 
behavior, it has been measured in Asian and Latino Americans as well (e.g., Junn & 
Masuoka, 2008; Lien, Conway, & Wong, 2004; Sanchez & Masuoka, 2010). Similarly, 
studies of Asian and Latino Americans have used some form of group consciousness 
measures (e.g., Lien, 1994; Rodriguez & Gurin, 1990). But the concepts of linked fate 
and group consciousness for different racial and ethnic groups have generally not been 
clearly delineated (see, e.g., Lee, T., 2008). Indeed, it is unclear which dimensions of 
group consciousness define that concept in general: Are identification, collectivist 
orientation, and polar affect part of the concept, or are they antecedents, consequences, or 
related concepts? Lien (1994) seems to suggest that identification is distinct from the 
more political concepts of polar power and system blame. Operationalizing identification 
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as perceiving that there are problems of special concern to ingroup members (which 
seems conceptually similar to linked fate) and system blame as perceived prejudice and 
discrimination, Lien (1994) found identification, system blame (renamed alienation) and 
polar power (renamed deprivation) to be distinct from each other for Mexican and Asian 
Americans. Sanchez and Vargas (2016) examined the factor structure of group 
commonality (i.e., similarity to ingroup and ingroup members), perceived discrimination 
against the ingroup, collective action orientation, and linked fate for White, Black, 
Hispanic, and Asian Americans. They found that a single factor dominated by perceived 
discrimination (followed by linked fate) adequately captured this concept for African 
Americans but that two factors were needed for Asian and Latino Americans (Sanchez & 
Vargas, 2016). For both Latino and Asian Americans, linked fate and perceived 
discrimination load on separate factors, with commonality loading on the same factor as 
linked fate and collective action orientation loading on the same factor as perceived 
discrimination (Sanchez & Vargas, 2016, Table 3).  
Linked fate has been found to predict more support for the Black Lives Matter 
movement (Merseth, 2018) and greater perceived political commonality with African 
Americans (Nicholson, Carter, & Restar, 2020) and Latinos (Lu, 2020) among Asian 
Americans. It has also been found to predict lower endorsement of negative Black 
stereotypes and greater perceived commonality with Blacks over Whites among Latino 
Americans (McClain et al., 2006). For Asian Americans, perceived commonality with 
Blacks and Latinos, in turn, has been found to predict support for a path to citizenship for 
undocumented immigrants (Samson, 2015) and alignment with the Democratic Party 
(Kuo, Malhotra, & Mo, 2014). Findings on the effects of aspects of group consciousness 
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among Latino and Asian Americans, on the other hand, are mixed at best. One study 
found that aspects of Latino group consciousness (commonality with other Latino groups 
and perceived discrimination against Latinos) appear to predict perceived commonality 
with African Americans (Sanchez, 2008), but another study found no such effect of 
perceived discrimination (Kaufmann, 2003), and a third found that experiences of 
discrimination did not predict perceived commonality with Blacks among native-born 
Latinos but predicted less perceived commonality with both Blacks and Whites among 
foreign-born Latinos (Wilkinson, 2014). Alienation (i.e., perceived prejudice and 
discrimination) appears to predict political behavior besides voting for Latinos but not for 
Asians (Lien, 1994). For Asian Americans, there is evidence that perceived cultural, 
racial, economic, and political commonality with other Asian Americans predicts 
perceived commonality with African Americans, but perceived discrimination does not 
(Nicholson et al., 2020). The effects of perceived discrimination on perceived 
commonality with Latinos appears mixed (Lu, 2020). Although perceived discrimination 
against Asian Americans was correlated with support for Black Lives Matter in Merseth’s 
(2018) study, this relationship became non-significant once identity importance, linked 
fate, and perceived anti-Black discrimination were controlled for.4 But Kuo et al. (2014) 
found evidence that experiences of discrimination predict Asian Americans’ 
identification with the Democratic Party over the Republican Party. 
 
4 Racial identity importance was also positively correlated with support for Black Lives 
Matter in Merseth’s (2018) study, but this relationship also became non-significant in the 
multiple regression model. One possible explanation for this observation is that linked 
fate might mediate the effect of identity importance. 
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Based on the Sanchez and Vargas (2016) factor structure and the findings of what 
linked fate and perceived discrimination predict among Latino and Asian Americans, I 
would expect linked fate and possibly perceived discrimination to connect a more 
psychological form of racial or ethnic identification with Asian and Latino Americans’ 
political attitudes. (For African Americans, these two variables might reflect the same 
underlying concept.) Rodriguez and Gurin’s (1990) findings further suggest that a 
perceived discrimination factor of group consciousness could mediate the effects of 
common ingroup identity and common minority ingroup identity on political attitudes. 
On the other hand, as discussed above, the literature on linked fate does not 
appear to connect it to American identity (i.e., there is no evidence that identifying as 
American, by itself, decreases the sense of linked fate with one’s racial or ethnic group). 
Thus, to the extent that identification as American is independent of racial or POC 
identification, I would not expect linked fate to mediate the effects of American identity 
on political attitudes. 
Because group consciousness is theoretically group-specific, I would expect 
versions of these variables pertaining to the racial group and people of color to be distinct 
mediators. However, Rodriguez and Gurin’s (1990) finding that intra-minority group 
contact predicted higher perceived discrimination against people of Mexican descent 
(they did not have a measure perceived discrimination against racial minorities as a 
whole) suggests that measures of perceived discrimination against the racial group and 
against POC might capture the same concept. Among Asian Americans, group 
consciousness and linked fate might cut across levels of group identity: Asian American 
identity was found to relate to perceived commonality with Blacks and Latinos (Cho, 
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2020); linked fate and group consciousness at the racial group level have been found to 
predict perceived commonality with African Americans (Nicholson et al., 2020); and 
linked fate with both Asian Americans and other racial minorities has been found to 
predict support for Black Lives Matter (Merseth, 2018). Thus, while the original theory 
suggests unique pathways for racial and POC versions of linked fate and perceived 
discrimination between identity and political attitudes, the racial and POC measures 
might empirically form a single linked fate pathway and a single perceived discrimination 
pathway. 
Hypothesis 8: Racial identity predicts more support for change, mediated by 
increased linked fate with the racial group and increased perceived discrimination. 
Hypothesis 9: POC identity predicts more support for change, mediated by 
increased linked fate with people of color and increased perceived discrimination. 
Hypothesis 10: American identity predicts less support for change, mediated by 
decreased perceived discrimination. I did not predict that linked fate would mediate the 
effect of American identity. 
D. Identity and Perceived Discrimination/Inequality: What are we measuring? 
1. Identity 
Collective action theory, group consciousness theory, and some of the paradoxical 
effects literature all address the relationship between identity and support for social 
change. But to what extent do these areas of research mean the same thing by “identity”? 
a. Identity manipulations, identity measures, and identity salience. Both the 
minimal group paradigm and the CIIM were developed and initially tested with 
experiments that created new groups in the lab (e.g., Tajfel et al., 1971; Gaertner et al., 
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1989). Manipulating identity in these studies thus involves manipulating 1) the existence 
of particular groups and 2) assignment of participants to these lab-created groups. 
However, group assignment is not sufficient to produce intergroup behavior (Oakes, 
2002); as Tajfel and Turner (1979) emphasized, subjective identification with the group 
is necessary to observe these effects (but see Hong & Ratner, 2020, for an example of 
categorization effects that do not depend on subjective identification in some versions of 
the minimal group paradigm). And identities created in the lab may not inspire the same 
level of subjective identification as many real-world groups. Thus, lab-created 
superordinate identities can be unstable over time and can sometimes be perceived as an 
identity threat, leading to increased bias in favor of the original ingroup rather than 
identification with the superordinate group (Dovidio et al., 2009). To have the intended 
effects, then, identity manipulations need to prime participants to subjectively identify 
with their assigned group in the context in which attitudes or behaviors will be studied.  
More recent descriptions of the CIIM start from the idea of social categorization 
(of self and others) and the fact that people can have multiple group identities at different 
levels of inclusiveness that are available to them in a given situation (e.g., Dovidio et al., 
2009). These levels of identity presumably include both lab-created identities and 
existing real-world identities. Categorization into a particular level depends on one’s past 
experiences and one’s goals and expectations in the current situation (Dovidio et al., 
2009). Accordingly, some studies involving the CIIM have primed the salience of 
existing identities (e.g., Górska & Bilewicz, 2015; Ufkes et al., 2016; White, Schmitt, & 
Langer, 2006, Study 3) or primed a shared experience with another group, presumably to 
make a shared superordinate identity salient (Glasford & Calcagno, 2012; Craig & 
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Richeson, 2012). Priming experiences of discrimination can have different effects 
depending on whether the target group shares a dimension of disadvantage with 
participants’ ingroup: Reminders of racial discrimination can reduce racial minorities’ 
bias against other racial minority groups (Craig & Richeson, 2012), but reminders of 
sexism can increase White women’s racial bias (Craig et al., 2012). These contrasting 
findings suggest that common ingroup identity might be easier to make salient when such 
an identity already exists (e.g., POC or racial minority) than when it is created by the 
salience manipulation (e.g., shared identity as people with a marginalized identity). 
Alternatively, existing common ingroup identities might pose less of an identity threat 
and consequently, trigger less resistance to identifying with them when primed (see 
Dovidio et al., 2009). Either way, CIIM studies that manipulate identity mostly seem to 
prime the salience of a social identity in the experimental context, but with rare 
exceptions (Ellemers, Spears, & Doosje, 1997), researchers have not attempted to 
manipulate the degree of identification with a group. 
By contrast, much of the collective action and group consciousness literature 
involves correlational studies in which identity is measured (e.g., Kessler & 
Mummendey, 2002; Klandermans, 2014; Cakal et al., 2011; Rodriguez & Gurin, 1990; 
Junn & Masuoka, 2008). Similarly, research on the paradoxical effects of prejudice 
reduction tends to be correlational (Reimer & Sengupta, 2020), including measures of 
both intergroup contact (e.g., Tropp et al., 2012; Dixon et al., 2007) and identity (e.g., 
Ufkes et al., 2015; Jaśko & Kossowska, 2013). Highlighting the difference between 
measured identification and manipulated identity salience in political psychology, Huddy 
(2001) criticized SIT in part because situational salience often cannot explain when and 
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how identity predicts political behavior. Furthermore, Transue (2007) demonstrated that 
an identity salience manipulation can have opposite effects on policy attitudes depending 
on whether the participant subjectively identifies with the group that is made salient 
through the manipulation.5 But studying the CIIM in the same context as collective action 
and political behavior requires these two operationalizations of identity to be comparable. 
Self-categorization theory and SIT/SCT-based collective action theories 
potentially connect measured and manipulated group identity via the process of self-
categorization. Collective action on behalf of an ingroup depends on self-categorization 
as a member of that group (Wright, 2010). Self-categorization depends on the relative 
salience of different identities, which in turn depends on the interaction between the 
accessibility and fit of different categories in a particular context (Turner et al., 1994; 
Turner & Reynolds, 2012). Accessibility refers to the individual’s readiness to use a 
particular self-category; fit refers to perceptions of intragroup similarities and intergroup 
differences that are consistent with the individual’s expectations about the groups 
(normative fit) and perception of intergroup differences as larger than intragroup 
differences in the relevant context (comparative fit) (Turner et al., 1994). Thus, priming 
salience in the lab (via perceived fit in the experimental context) is one way to promote 
self-categorization into a particular group in a particular context (e.g., Hogg & Turner, 
 
5 Transue’s (2007) identity salience manipulation differs from other identity salience 
manipulations, however, because the manipulation was the measure of group 
identification. More traditional identity salience manipulations either gave participants a 
group label or prompted them to think about themselves as members of a particular 
group, without giving them an obvious outlet to think about why they would not identify 
with the group. By giving participants a means to think about their non-identification, 
Transue’s (2007) identity manipulation might have made salient whether the participant 
identified with the target group, rather than group identification per se. 
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1987). Having that identity chronically accessible (i.e., high readiness to use that self-
category across contexts) because it is important or central to one’s self concept might be 
another way to promote self-categorization in the same context (see, e.g., Jackson, 1999, 
citing Turner et al., 1987). Similarly, manipulating group involvement (Ellemers et al., 
1997) might promote self-categorization through accessibility, as people who feel more 
involved with the group might show higher readiness to use that self-category across 
contexts. Van Zomeren and colleagues reach a similar conclusion, proposing that both 
situational salience and highly identified group members’ chronic identity salience 
promote the self-categorization necessary to appraise collective disadvantage as self-
relevant (van Zomeren et al., 2012). To the extent that self-categorization in a particular 
context is what matters for predicting support for change, then, priming identity salience 
and measuring chronic salience of that identity should produce similar results. 
Additionally, because I measured identification rather than prompting respondents 
to identify with a group, resistance to recategorization (e.g., Dovidio et al., 2009; Crisp, 
Stone, & Hall, 2006) unlikely to pose a problem; after all, respondents could simply 
indicate that they do not identify with one or more groups. Furthermore, POC and 
American identities exist in the real world, and there is evidence that at least some racial 
minorities identify as American (e.g., Lien et al., 2003; Junn &Masuoka, 2008). There is 
also evidence that, for racial minorities, both American identity (Ufkes et al., 2016) and 
shared identity with other racial minorities (e.g., Craig & Richeson, 2012; Glasford & 
Calcagno, 2012) can be experimentally primed. 
b. The problem of identity stability. However, racial identity, as conceptualized 
in political psychology research, might be especially stable over time (see Huddy, 2001). 
COMMON INGROUP IDENTITY AND POLITICAL SOLIDARITY 39 
To the extent that measured identity shows trait-like stability, it becomes difficult to 
establish causation between it and the other variables of interest, especially if those 
variables also show trait-like stability (cf. Kessler & Mummendey, 2002). On the other 
hand, there is some evidence that identity salience manipulations can shift the self-
reported importance people attach to certain identities, such as national identity (Haslam 
et al., 1999). Similarly, a photograph-based manipulation designed to prime group pride 
was found to shift Asian Americans’ (but not Latino Americans’) self-reported closeness 
to and perceived linked fate with their racial group (Junn & Masuoka, 2008). That lab-
based manipulations can shift measures of identification with real-world groups provides 
evidence that measured identity attributes might display some malleability and suggests 
that they could potentially change over time. 
c. Identity dimensions. A related question is what aspects of group identification 
drive collective action or political behavior. The political psychology literature tends to 
measure identity as perceived closeness or similarity to the ingroup (Conover, 1984; 
Gurin et al., 1980; Sanchez & Vargas, 2016) or even linked fate (Gay & Tate, 1998; 
Simien, 2005). Some collective action researchers, on the other hand, have suggested that 
identity is multi-dimensional. Earlier literature refers to a cognitive component 
(Mummendey, Kessler, et al., 1999; van Zomeren et al., 2008) and/or an affective 
component (Weerd & Klandermans, 1999; van Zomeren et al., 2008). Van Zomeren et al. 
(2008) refer to these components as cognitive centrality (e.g., salience or importance), 
and affective ties to the ingroup (e.g., commitment or attachment). Some of the more 
recent studies use multi-dimensional measures of identity or specific subscales of a multi-
dimensional identity scale, including the Identity subscale of Luthanen and Crocker’s 
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(1992) Collective Self-Esteem Scale or a subset of its items (e.g., Major et al., 2002; 
Cakal et al., 2011) and versions of the Leach et al. (2008) 5-dimensional scale or specific 
subscales thereof (Ufkes et al., 2015; Jaśko & Kossowska, 2013, Study 2; Tran & Curtin, 
2017).  
Leach et al. (2008) proposed that their five identity dimensions—solidarity, 
satisfaction, centrality, individual self-stereotyping, and in-group homogeneity—reflect 
two superordinate factors, self-definition (self-stereotyping and in-group homogeneity) 
and self-investment (solidarity, satisfaction, centrality), which they note do not map onto 
the cognitive/affective distinction suggested in earlier collective action research. The 
Leach et al. (2008) Centrality subscale consists of items that appear similar to Luthanen 
and Crocker’s (1992) Identity subscale, suggesting that studies using these subscales 
should be comparable. Furthermore, Leach et al. (2008) found that their Centrality 
subscale uniquely predicted perceived intergroup threat. Tran and Curtin (2017) found 
that the Solidarity and Centrality subscales (both of which are part of Leach et al.’s, 2008, 
self-investment superordinate factor) predicted Asian Americans’ activism on behalf of 
their racial group. And Sellers and Shelton (2003) found that the Centrality scale of the 
Multidimensional Inventory of Black Identity (MIBI), which correlated with Luthanen 
and Crocker’s (1992) Identity subscale, predicted perceived racial discrimination. These 
findings, along with van Zomeren et al.’s (2008) definition of cognitive centrality as 
including salience, suggest that identity centrality might be the functional component of 
ingroup identification connecting identity and collective action or policy support. 
The collective action literature demonstrates that identity centrality can be 
measured in a variety of ways; however, in keeping with political psychology best 
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practices, I used versions of Huddy, Mason, and Aarøe’s (2015) partisan social identity 
scale, adapted to racial, POC, and American identities. This scale resembles Leach et al.’s 
(2008) Centrality subscale, though the authors refer to it as an identity strength scale. 
Because it incorporates aspects of identity that are commonly measured by political 
psychologists (see Huddy, 2013), using this scale connects my studies to the broader 
political psychology literature. Because it resembles identity centrality, which ties more 
closely to collective action research, using this scale is also preferable to using one of the 
perceived closeness or similarity measures that political psychologists tend to use. The 
Huddy et al. (2015) scale also has the psychometric benefits of being a multi-item scale, 
as opposed to a single item like many of the closeness or similarity measures used in 
political psychology (Huddy, 2013). Additionally, Huddy et al. (2015) explicitly link this 
aspect of identity to collective action motivation. 
2. Perceived Discrimination 
a. Perceived discrimination against self, racial/ethnic group, or POC? Besides 
identity, another concept that needs to be clarified is perceived discrimination. Although 
members of stigmatized groups tend to report less discrimination against themselves 
personally than against the group (e.g., Dixon, Durrheim, et al., 2010), perceived personal 
discrimination and perceived discrimination against the group are often treated as part of 
the same concept (e.g., Tropp et al., 2012; Craig & Richeson, 2012, Study 1a; Lien, 1994; 
Phan & Garcia, 2009). But it is possible that perceived personal and group discrimination 
form distinct parts of a causal chain (Dixon, Durrheim, et al., 2010) or, like individual 
and group relative deprivation, interact in predicting support for change (Foster & 
Matheson, 1995). It is also possible that perceived personal discrimination and perceived 
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group discrimination relate differently to group identification. Branscombe, Schmitt, and 
Harvey (1999) suggest that attribution of personal outcomes to discrimination relates to 
perceived permeability of group boundaries, which, at least according to SIMCA, 
precedes identification (see van Zomeren et al., 2008). Perceived group discrimination, 
on the other hand, appears to resemble some of the injustice or group consciousness 
variables—namely, perceptions/appraisals of inequality, power discontent, and system 
blame—and has in fact substituted for system blame in some studies of group 
consciousness (Rodriguez & Gurin, 1990; Sanchez & Vargas, 2016).  
However, whether perceived discrimination was found to precede or follow from 
identification does not correspond neatly to whether it was measured as personal or group 
discrimination. The ethnic identity development literature includes two competing 
theories: the rejection-identification model, in which experiences of discrimination cause 
the development of a stronger ethnic identity (Branscombe et al., 1999), and the 
identification-attribution model, in which ethnic identity increases awareness of 
discrimination (Gonzales-Backen et al., 2018). Support for both models comes from 
studies using personal discrimination measures (Branscombe et al., 1999; Fuller-Rowell, 
Ong, & Phinney, 2013; Sellers & Shelton, 2003; Gonzales-Backen et al., 2018). 
Attribution of personal outcomes to discrimination can predict ethnic identity 
(Branscombe et al., 1999), but it can also be predicted by ethnic identity (Major et al., 
2002). Thus, there is evidence of processes in both directions with regard to personal 
discrimination, at least among adolescents and college students, though it is unclear 
whether similar processes can be expected in adults. At the same time, group 
discrimination has been used to prime shared identity (Craig & Richeson, 2012, Studies 
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2-5), suggesting that identity need not causally precede perceived discrimination against 
either the individual or the group. Thus, understanding the role of perceived 
discrimination in the relationship between identity and support for change requires 
answers to two questions: 1) whether perceived personal and group discrimination reflect 
the same underlying concept and 2) whether changes in perceived discrimination occur 
before or after changes in group identification. 
Relatedly, at the group level, it is unclear whether perceived discrimination 
against the racial group and perceived discrimination against people of color should 
reflect the same or different concepts. Most of the existing research measures perceived 
discrimination against the racial or ethnic group (e.g., Dixon, Durrheim, et al., 2010; 
Chong & Rogers, 2005; Masuoka, 2006). A few studies have included measures of 
perceived discrimination against or inequality between racial groups in the abstract 
(Ufkes et al., 2016; Saguy et al., 2009; Levin et al., 1998, Study 1) or perceived 
disadvantage compared to Whites (Ufkes et al., 2016). But although Ufkes et al.’s (2016) 
and Levin et al.’s (1998) scale reliabilities suggest that items that mention a specific 
racial group can reasonably be combined with items that ask about racial inequality or 
discrimination in the abstract, these studies do not fully answer the question of whether 
perceived discrimination against ingroups at different levels of inclusiveness reflects a 
single concept. As discussed above, group consciousness is theoretically identity-specific, 
so perceived discrimination against the racial group and against people of color could be 
distinct to the extent that they relate to racial and POC group consciousness, respectively. 
But again, Rodriguez and Gurin’s (1990) finding that contact with other minorities 
predicted perceived discrimination against the ethnic group suggests that perceptions of 
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discrimination against both the subgroup and superordinate group could capture the same 
pathway from disadvantaged ingroup identity to political attitudes. Thus, it is an open 
question whether perceived discrimination against the self, the racial group, and people of 
color should be treated as a single factor or three separate factors. 
b. Perceived discrimination in the collective action, group consciousness, and 
paradoxical effects literatures. Finally, the mechanisms for collective action and 
political behavior proposed in the collective action, group consciousness, and paradoxical 
effects literatures potentially overlap, but the nature and extent of overlap is unclear. For 
example, perceived discrimination measures appear in all three literatures (e.g., Major et 
al., 2002; Masuoka, 2006; Tropp et al., 2012; Dixon, Durrheim, et al., 2010), as do 
variables measuring recognition of the ingroup’s disadvantages compared to a dominant 
outgroup (e.g., Cakal et al., 2011; Dawson, 1994; Ufkes et al., 2016). Some studies in the 
group consciousness tradition measured both perceived discrimination and recognition of 
group inequalities (alienation and deprivation, Lien, 1994; illegitimacy of subordination 
and power discontent, Rodriguez & Gurin, 1990). Tran and Curtin (2017) further 
separated perceived (personal) discrimination and structural awareness, which had been 
used interchangeably as measures of perceived illegitimacy or system blame (compare 
Gurin et al., 1980 and Rodriguez & Gurin, 1990). Levin et al. (1998) also separately 
measured perceived discrimination and external attributions for poverty (cf. Gurin et 
al.’s, 1980, original measure of system blame), though they categorized both as 
hierarchy-attenuating legitimizing myths.  
It is therefore plausible that perceived discrimination, perceived disadvantage, and 
perceived injustice reflect a common underlying concept, but it is also plausible that they 
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reflect two (e.g., perceived disadvantage as power discontent and perceived 
discrimination/injustice as system blame) or three distinct concepts. Additionally, 
collective action and group consciousness theories each suggest that this concept or set of 
concepts is distinct from group efficacy (van Zomeren et al., 2008; Chong & Rogers, 
2005) and linked fate (Sanchez & Vargas, 2016). There also does not appear to be 
existing research that includes both linked fate and group efficacy in the same model. 
Thus, it is worthwhile to test the factor structure of all of these potential mediator 
variables taken together. 
E. Why Use a Panel Study? 
 As mentioned above, most of the existing CIIM research is experimental, but 
much of the collective action, group consciousness, and paradoxical effects research is 
correlational. Within the prejudice reduction literature, the experimental focus of CIIM 
research contrasts with intergroup contact research, the majority of which consists of 
survey and field studies and only a small percentage of which consists of experiments 
(Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006). A correlational study of existing, real-world common ingroup 
identities would both test the CIIM in a more externally valid setting and provide a basis 
of comparison with these other literatures. 
 However, the correlational research to date in these areas tends to be cross-
sectional, with rare exceptions (e.g., Tropp et al., 2012), limiting the ability to draw 
causal inferences. The policy relevance of intergroup contact research has been criticized 
to the extent that correlational studies fail to rule out reverse causation and other 
challenges to causal inference (Paluck, Green, & Green, 2019). Furthermore, a recent 
longitudinal study of intergroup contact failed to find evidence that contact improved 
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outgroup attitudes or vice versa (Bohrer et al, 2019). Together with Kessler and 
Mummendey’s (2002) finding of a lack of within-person cross-lagged effects for most of 
the variables in the social identity and relative deprivation models of identity-
management strategy preferences, this demonstrates the importance of testing these 
theories with longitudinal data. 
Additionally, political psychologists have tended to treat both racial identity and 
racial attitudes as exogenous predictors of political attitudes and behavior, but the 
assumptions that racial identity and racial attitudes are exogenous have rarely been tested 
(see Lee, T., 2008; Englehardt, 2020). Using cross-lagged panel regression, Englehardt 
(2020) demonstrated that not only can racial attitudes influence partisanship, but, 
contrary to assumptions, partisanship can shift racial attitudes. Similarly, a cross-lagged 
panel design makes it possible to examine the relationship over time between identity and 
racial attitudes, as well as between identity and support for change, to identify and 
compare identity-to-attitude and attitude-to-identity effects. This would both test 
assumptions from political psychology that seem at odds with each other (i.e., racial 
identity versus racial attitudes as exogenous predictor variables) and address a key 
weakness known to exist in correlational research on the related topic of intergroup 
contact effects (i.e., reverse causation between contact and intergroup attitudes; Paluck et 
al., 2019). 
But trait-like stability, as one might expect for identity and racial attitude 
variables, can bias effect estimates in traditional cross-lagged panel models (CLPM; 
Hamaker et al., 2015). Indeed, the need to separate the roles of between-person stability 
and within-person change has been identified as a potential problem for intergroup 
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contact research (Sengupta et al., 2020), particularly because the underlying theories 
seem to imply within-person effects (Bohrer et al., 2019). When trait-like stability is 
likely, Hamaker et al. (2015) recommend using a random-intercepts cross-lagged panel 
model (RI-CLPM) to distinguish stable, between-person relationships from cross-lagged 
within-person relationships. However, the traditional CLPM and RI-CLPM answer 
somewhat different questions: The CLPM addresses whether individual differences in 
one variable predict rank-order changes in the other variable between persons;6 the RI-
CLPM addresses whether within-person changes from one’s trait level of one variable 
predict within-person changes in the other variable (Orth et al., 2021). Thus, the CLPM 
would test whether individual differences in identity predict changes (relative to other 
respondents) in an attitude, and the RI-CLPM would test whether shifts from an 
individual’s trait level of identity predict changes in that individual’s attitude. Although 
the within-person effects addressed by the RI-CLPM are key for identifying potential 
intervention targets, the CLPM also provides valuable information, i.e., for whom do 
identities and attitudes change and in what direction. To address identity and attitude 
stability and test cross-lagged relationships at both the between- and within-person levels, 
I use both CLPM and RI-CLPM, as recommended by Hamaker et al. (2015), to test my 
hypotheses about the effects of identity on racial attitudes and support for change. Figure 
3 illustrates using RI-CLPM to test Hypothesis 2; for comparison, part b of Figure 1 
 
6 However, these rank-order changes could reflect both between-person and within-
person shifts in the predicted variable, and the CLPM cannot distinguish between the two 
(see Hamaker et al., 2015). 
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illustrates the CLPM version. (Again, the hypothesized paths—in this case, within-person 
effects of identity on attitudes—are in bold.) 
 
 
Figure 3. RI-CLPM for Hypothesis 2. Hypothesized paths are in bold. 
 
Finally, causal inference from cross-sectional correlational data can be especially 
problematic with mediation models (Maxwell & Cole, 2007). Mediation models pose 
problems for experiments as well, particularly when mediators are measured rather than 
manipulated (e.g., Bullock, Green, & Ha, 2010). To address some of these causal 
inference concerns, I plan to use a 3-wave panel design combined with Cole and 
Maxwell’s (2003) strategy for longitudinal mediation analysis. 
F. Why Asian Americans? 
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 Asian Americans are an under-studied population in social and political 
psychology (see, e.g., Tran & Curtin, 2017). At the same time, as a group that has been 
portrayed as both not White and not Black, with the relative importance of these 
distinctions fluctuating over time (Wu, 2014), Asian Americans could differ from other 
minority groups when it comes to identity, perceived discrimination, and politicization. 
There are reasons to expect Asian Americans to be relatively unlikely to both 
identify strongly as people of color (though this identity is available to them) and 
challenge the status quo. First, Asian Americans may not perceive themselves as part of a 
stigmatized group. Some evidence suggests that Asian and Latino Americans perceive 
race as less of a social problem than African Americans do (Masuoka, 2006) or do not 
connect their experiences of racial discrimination to their political choices (Junn & 
Masuoka, 2008). Others have suggested that some Asian groups in the West (e.g., 
Chinese Canadians) objectively do not experience group-based disadvantage (Goodyear-
Grant & Tolley, 2019). To the extent that shared discrimination is important to POC 
identity (e.g., Craig & Richeson, 2012), Asian Americans who perceive no discrimination 
against their racial group would be less likely to identify as people of color. And if they 
do not see themselves as disadvantaged by the status quo, they are unlikely to be 
motivated to challenge it. 
Second, Asian Americans experience what Kim (1999) terms “racial 
triangulation,” a process by which their status in society is defined in comparison to both 
Whites and Blacks. Relatedly, as part of the struggle to gain acceptance in the 1950s and 
1960s, Japanese and Chinese American leaders contributed to the development of the 
model minority myth, which has since been used to reinforce individual mobility beliefs 
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and shape the racial status hierarchy (Wu, 2014). The model minority myth contrasts 
positive stereotypes of Asian Americans with negative stereotypes of African Americans 
and sometimes Latino Americans (Wu, 2014), and it continues to resurface as a wedge 
between Asian Americans and other people of color. For example, media portrayals of 
the 1992 Los Angeles riots described a conflict between poor Black residents and 
hardworking Korean immigrants (Lee, E., 2015; Wu, 2014), and coverage of the 
aftermath of Hurricane Katrina contrasted Vietnamese residents’ rapid recovery with 
Black residents’ need for assistance (Wu, 2014). These kinds of narratives could make it 
difficult for some Asian Americans to perceive a shared POC identity. Furthermore, even 
if Asian Americans identify as POC, the portion of the model minority myth that depicts 
them as apolitical (in contrast to African Americans) could discourage activism by 
signaling that “Asian Americans have ‘much to lose if they decide to join other politically 
active minority groups.’” (Kim, 1999, p. 119). 
At the same time, Asian Americans have the highest rate, among racial minorities, 
of residential integration with Whites (Lien et al., 2004) and a relatively high rate of 
intermarriage with Whites (Zhou, 2004), and Asian-White biracial children are more 
likely to be classified as White than Black-White biracial children (Bonilla-Silva, 2004). 
These facts have led some to ask whether Asian Americans or a subset of Asian 
Americans are “becoming white” (Zhou, 2004) or becoming part of a new “honorary 
white” group in the American racial hierarchy (Bonilla-Silva, 2004). To the extent that 
Asian American individuals internalize this aspiration to whiteness, the group boundary 
with Whites might seem permeable enough to keep both racial identification and POC 
identification low. 
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Additionally, like Latino Americans, Asian Americans are a culturally 
heterogeneous group with relatively little shared history in the United States, and these 
factors make development of Asian American group consciousness less likely (e.g., 
Masouka, 2006). Furthermore, contrary to the model minority myth, Asian Americans 
“are overrepresented at both ends of the educational and socioeconomic spectrum” (Lee, 
E., 2015, p. 376). This socioeconomic heterogeneity could be a further barrier to Asian 
American linked fate because Asian Americans do not have the shared history of 
economic disadvantage and institutions like Black churches that help reinforce African 
American linked fate in spite of intragroup socioeconomic disparities (Dawson, 1994). In 
fact, Masuoka (2006) found that nearly half of the Asian American respondents in the 
2000 Pilot National Asian American Political Survey perceived no linked fate with other 
groups of Asian Americans. At the same time, nearly half of Asian Americans reported 
no partisan affiliation or indicated that they do not think in terms of political parties 
(Phan & Garcia, 2009; Lien et al., 2004), in contrast to African Americans’ nearly 
universal support for the Democratic party (Dawson, 1994), and this suggests relatively 
low political solidarity in at least this one area of political behavior.  
Asian Americans’ (and Latino Americans’) willingness to express racial group 
attachment or use race in political decision-making might be further constrained by 
relatively widespread endorsement of colorblind ideology (Junn & Masuoka, 2008). 
Similarly, Asian American individuals’ endorsement of the model minority myth has 
been found to predict less own-group activism (Tran & Curtin, 2017). Tran and Curtin 
(2017) theorized that this effect occurs because the model minority myth supports 
individual mobility beliefs, legitimizes the racial status quo, and prompts comparisons 
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with other marginalized groups (presumably rather than prompting comparisons with 
Whites). Endorsement of colorblind ideology could likewise reflect individual mobility 
beliefs and judgments that the status quo is legitimate (cf. Sengupta & Sibley’s, 2013, 
finding that endorsement of meritocracy mediates the relationship between contact with 
the dominant group and reduced support for social change). And endorsement of certain 
status quo-legitimizing ideologies could be positively associated with Asian American 
identification (Levin et al., 1998), further complicating the relationship between identity 
and support for change. Thus, racial and POC identity and the SIT socio-structural factors 
could all be barriers to Asian American activism.  
 Furthermore, key policies addressing racial inequality might seem less relevant to 
Asian Americans or even be framed in ways that exclude them. Affirmative action is one 
such policy area. Asian Americans are classified with Whites rather than with other 
minority groups for at least some equal opportunity programs (Zhou, 2004), even though 
they are a protected group under U.S. Department of Labor guidelines (see Weathers & 
Truxillo, 2008). Perhaps because of this ambiguity of classification and/or the prevalence 
of the model minority myth, both White and Asian Americans tend to perceive Asian 
Americans as not benefitting from affirmative action compared to other minority groups 
(Weathers & Truxillo, 2008). In the context of college admissions, in particular, what 
began as questions about whether universities used quotas on Asian American students to 
maintain their existing proportion of White students became a question of whether 
affirmative action programs benefitting other racial minorities discriminate against Asian 
Americans (Kim, 1999). And the narrative that affirmative action in college admissions 
harms Asian Americans has cropped up in high profile lawsuits (Students for Fair 
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Admissions, 2018), in media coverage of these lawsuits (e.g., Jung, 2018), and in Asian 
Americans’ own conversations about their attitudes toward affirmative action (Inkelas, 
2003). As a result, one might expect highly identified Asian Americans to express 
ambivalence or even opposition to affirmative action, especially if they perceive high 
levels of linked fate with other Asian Americans. On the other hand, Asian Americans 
who perceive more discrimination might have more favorable attitudes toward 
affirmative action (Bell, 1997). And to the extent that support for affirmative action has 
declined among Asian Americans recently, this has primarily been among Chinese 
Americans and in particular, foreign-born Chinese Americans (Leung & Song, 2021). If 
the broader Asian American population tends to support affirmative action, then Asian 
American identity might be positively associated with support for affirmative action 
(though Chinese identity might have the opposite effect). Nonetheless, because of their 
unique position with regard to this issue area, Asian Americans’ attitudes toward 
affirmative action are difficult to predict based on their racial identification alone, and 
they could potentially diverge from other racial minorities’ attitudes. 
 Despite these challenges to Asian American and POC identification and 
solidarity, however, Asian Americans do express pan-ethnic identification (Lien, 
Conway, & Wong, 2003) and linked fate with other Asian Americans (Masuoka, 2006; 
Junn & Masuoka, 2008), though the predictors of Asian American linked fate might 
differ from predictors of African American linked fate (Junn & Masuoka, 2008). 
Furthermore, Asian Americans show relatively high levels of solidarity in policy 
preferences, including—perhaps unexpectedly—support for affirmative action (Lien et 
al., 2004). Despite the model minority myth, Asian Americans have a history of activism, 
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including the adoption of “Asian American” as an identity (Wu, 2014; Lee, E., 2015). 
And much of that history of activism has been coalition-based (Marisol Meraji & Demby, 
2020), as perhaps exemplified by the 1968 San Francisco State College strike, which was 
led by the Third World Liberation Front (comprised of Asian, Chicano, and Native 
American student organization; see Lee, E., 2015) and the Black Student Union (Marisol 
Meraji & Demby, 2019). It is useful, then, to understand when Asian Americans display 
solidarity and activism. 
G. Putting It Together 
 Collective action theory and group consciousness theory already predict that 
racial identity increases support for social change that benefits the racial group. These 
effects should appear in policy areas that have been connected to the racial group in some 
way. Because recent calls for criminal justice reform are intertwined with the issues 
raised by the Black Lives Matter movement (see, e.g., Ghandnoosh, 2015), this should be 
a policy area in which African Americans’ racial identity is a strong predictor. Although 
Latinos are also impacted by racial disparities in criminal justice (e.g., Ghandnoosh, 
2015), the association between criminal justice reform and Black Lives Matter could 
limit the extent to which Latino Americans connect this issue to their own racial group 
and thus the extent to which racial identity predicts their support for criminal justice 
reform. Similarly, the originally intended and prototypical beneficiaries of affirmative 
action are Black (see Capers & Smith, 2016), suggesting that racial identity should 
predict African Americans’ support for affirmative action. However, Latino Americans 
might also perceive their group as benefitting from these policies (which could explain 
Capers and Smith’s, 2016, finding that Latino immigrants report as much support for 
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affirmative action as Afro-Caribbean immigrants do—though less than African 
Americans—and more than Asian immigrants or Whites do). As a result, racial identity 
should also predict Latino Americans’ support for affirmative action. (As discussed in the 
Chapters 2 and 4, however, these two hypotheses are not tested because Study 2, which 
included Black and Latino respondents, did not include questions about affirmative 
action.) Because Latino and Asian Americans are relatively “new” immigrant groups 
(e.g., Masuoka, 2006), immigration policy has the potential to affect individuals in these 
groups or their families or close friends directly, and thus, racial identity should predict 
more liberal immigration attitudes for these groups. The effects of racial identity on own-
group policy attitudes should be mediated by linked fate with the racial group, perceived 
discrimination against the racial group (or perceived discrimination, disadvantage, or 
illegitimacy more generally), and racial group efficacy. 
 The more novel hypothesis is that POC identity increases racial minorities’ 
support for social change that benefits other racial minority groups via the same 
collective action and group consciousness mechanisms. In other words, POC identity can 
increase recognition of inequality with Whites, perception of linked fate with other 
people of color, and POC political efficacy, and as a result, increase support for social 
change that benefits people of color as a whole. As discussed above, Asian Americans’ 
racial identity might predict ambivalence or even opposition to affirmative action, 
especially through the racial group linked fate pathway, to the extent that they perceive 
their group as not benefitting from or even being harmed by affirmative action. POC 
identity, on the other hand, should predict support for affirmative action through the 
linked fate pathway (because it benefits people of color) as well as the perceived 
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discrimination pathway (because it addresses existing and past discrimination against 
POC). Similarly, non-immigrant African Americans tend to hold immigration attitudes 
that are more similar to Whites’ than to Black, Latino, and Asian immigrants’ attitudes 
(Capers & Smith, 2016), suggesting that African Americans’ racial identity should not 
predict more liberal immigration attitudes. But POC identity should predict more liberal 
immigration attitudes to the extent that African Americans perceive immigrants of color 
as part of the superordinate identity. A weaker version of this effect might occur for 
Asian Americans, who have not been as explicit a target of recent immigration policies 
(e.g., the border wall) as Latino Americans have been and thus could potentially shift 
their immigration attitudes in solidarity with Latino immigrants. I also expect POC 
identity to increase Asian and Latino Americans’ support for criminal justice reform, in 
solidarity with African Americans, who are more visibly affected by current racial 
disparities in criminal justice. Thus, POC identity would predict African Americans’ 
support for more liberal immigration policies, Latino and Asian Americans’ support for 
criminal justice reform, and Asian Americans’ support for affirmative action. These 
effects should be mediated by linked fate with people of color, perceived discrimination 
against people of color (and/or perceived illegitimacy of the racial status quo), and POC 
group efficacy. 
 As discussed above, American identity should predict less support for change 
across all three policy areas, but the set of mechanisms should be more limited than those 
for racial and POC identities. To the extent that higher identification as American does 
not correspond to lower racial or POC identification, the existing literature does not 
suggest mediation through racial or POC group efficacy or linked fate. On the other hand, 
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I expect the effects of American identity to be partially mediated by lower perceived 
discrimination, disadvantage, and/or illegitimacy of the racial status quo, as high 
identifiers might make fewer comparisons with Whites or perceive predominantly White 
authorities as fairer than low identifiers do. 
 Combining the collective action hypotheses (Hypotheses 5-7) and the group 
consciousness hypotheses (Hypotheses 8-10) with predictions about what policy areas are 
likely to be perceived as relevant to each racial group leads to specific hypotheses for 
Asian, Black, and Latino Americans. These specific hypotheses are presented in Chapter 
2 in the context of the studies in which I test each hypothesis. 
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Chapter 2: Overview of Studies 
 My research consists of two 3-wave panel studies carried out between October 
and December 2020. The purposes of these studies were as follows: 
1. Test predictions from the common ingroup identity model (CIIM) in a context 
that is novel in at least three respects: 1) I focus on inter-minority group attitudes 
instead of majority group members’ attitudes toward a minority group and 
minority group members’ attitudes toward the majority group. 2) I examine 
common ingroups at two different levels of inclusion (American and POC). 3) I 
measure chronic identity salience (identity importance or identity centrality) over 
time instead of priming identity in a one-time experiment. The longitudinal nature 
of the data also allows me to test for reverse effects (racial attitudes → group 
identification) and trait-like stability among these variables. 
2. Replicate the so-called “paradoxical” effects (e.g., Dixon et al., 2010a) of 
prejudice reduction (i.e., reduced support for social change) with a common 
ingroup identity that includes the dominant group (i.e., American) in a 
longitudinal context. Extend this research by testing whether these effects also 
occur for policies that affect other minority groups. 
3. Replicate findings from collective action theory and group consciousness theory 
that racial identity (e.g., Asian American identity) predicts increased support for 
social change that improves the racial group’s position. Also test potential 
mediators of this effect (drawn from research on collective action, group 
consciousness, and paradoxical effects of prejudice reduction): 1) attitudes toward 
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Whites, 2) attention to inequality (and/or perceived discrimination/group position 
aspects of group consciousness), 3) group efficacy, 4) linked fate. 
4. Test whether stronger identification with a common ingroup that does not include 
the dominant group (i.e., POC) predicts increased support for social change, i.e., 
whether it has the opposite effect of American identity. This effect would indicate 
a boundary condition (whether or not the common ingroup includes the majority 
group) for paradoxical effects and would extend collective action and group 
consciousness theories to a superordinate level of identity. 
5. Test whether the collective action and group consciousness models from point 3 
above explain the effects of POC and American identities on support for social 
change. These mechanisms would more explicitly connect the CIIM and 
paradoxical effects of prejudice reduction to the literatures on disadvantaged 
groups’ support for change. 
 Study 1 focused on Asian Americans and consisted of online surveys given at 3-4 
week intervals between November 9, 2020 (the Monday after the results of the U.S. 
Presidential election were announced in most news outlets) and January 2, 2021 (before 
the January 6th insurrection). This time frame was chosen to capture attitudes during a 
period when politics should have been relatively less salient than they had been leading 
up to the election and political attitudes among the general public should thus have been 
more similar to what they normally are, though this expectation might not have been met 
due to the unique circumstances of the 2020 election and its aftermath. Study 2 used data 
from Black and Latino respondents in the University of Minnesota Center for the Study 
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of Political Psychology’s (CSPP) 2020 Presidential Election Study, a large, multi-
investigator study with data collection at 1- to 2-week intervals before (Wave 1: Oct. 5-
Oct.13; Wave 2: Oct. 26-Nov. 3) and after the election (Wave 3: Nov. 9-16). 
 Because Asian Americans had not been studied as extensively as other groups in 
the literature on prejudice reduction, collective action, or group consciousness, I ran a 
pilot study with Asian American respondents from the same survey platform (Prolific, 
prolific.co) that I would later use for Study 1. The purposes of the pilot study were 1) to 
test the psychometric properties of the identity and policy attitude items I planned to use 
in Study 1 that had not previously been used in surveys of Asian Americans and 2) to 
examine the factor structure of the potential mediator items for Asian Americans. The 
latter was particularly important because of evidence that group consciousness and linked 
fate have different factor structures for Black, Latino, and Asian Americans (Sanchez & 
Vargas, 2016). The pilot study also tested whether certain demographic and political 
variables were associated with the identity and policy variables of interest and, to the 
extent that they were not, allowed me to omit those items from Study 1. The pilot study is 
described in the first part of Chapter 3. 
A. Study 1 
 Study 1 measured racial, POC, and American identities; racial attitudes; attitudes 
toward policies associated with particular racial minority groups; and potential mediator 
variables at three time points. Identities were measured in three ways: 1) an item that 
asked respondents to rank several identities, including the three target identities (Asian 
American, POC, and American), in order of how strongly the respondent identifies with 
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each; 2) a checklist of which identities (again, including the three target identities) 
respondents consider important to who they are; and 3) versions of the 4-item Huddy et 
al. (2015) identity scale, re-written for each of the three target identities. Racial attitudes 
were measured using feeling thermometers and two 7-point stereotype items (lazy-
hardworking and unintelligent-intelligent), with Whites, Blacks, and Hispanics/Latinos as 
the target groups. (Items with Black and Hispanic/Latino target groups were combined 
for analyses into a nonwhite feeling thermometer score and a nonwhite stereotype score.) 
Policy attitude items fell into three policy areas: immigration (3 items), criminal justice 
reform (3 items), and affirmative action (2 items). Potential mediator items included 
group political efficacy (2 items for Asian Americans, 2 items for POC), linked fate with 
Asian Americans and with POC, perceived discrimination (against Asian Americans, 
against POC, and against oneself), and 4 additional items that broadly relate to group-
based relative deprivation. 
 The main purposes of this study were to examine the over-time relationship 
between 1) POC and American identities and racial attitudes (testing and extending the 
CIIM) and 2) racial, POC, and American identities and policy attitudes (testing and 
extending the research on collective action/group consciousness and paradoxical effects 
of prejudice reduction). Because other racial minority groups are included in the POC 
common ingroup, I expected higher POC identification to predict improvements in 
attitudes toward Blacks and Latinos (i.e., increases in feeling thermometer and stereotype 
ratings of these groups). Because other racial minority groups and Whites are included in 
the American common ingroup, I expected higher American identification to predict 
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improvements in attitudes toward Blacks and Latinos and improvements in attitudes 
toward Whites.  
My hypotheses regarding policy attitudes differed for own-group and other-group 
policy areas. As I noted in Chapter 1, I expected Asian Americans to think about 
immigration as an issue affecting their own racial group and to think about criminal 
justice reform and affirmative action as issues affecting other racial minority groups. For 
the own-group issue of immigration, I expected based on the collective action literature 
that racial identity (i.e., identification as Asian American) would predict changes in 
immigration attitudes in favor of more liberal policies. For the other-group issues of 
criminal justice reform and affirmative action, I expected based on the dynamic dual 
pathway model (van Zomeren et al., 2012) that POC identity would make these policy 
areas self-relevant and would therefore predict increases in support for policies that 
benefit other racial minority groups (i.e., increases in support for criminal justice reform 
and affirmative action). I did not expect racial identity to predict attitude changes in these 
two issue areas: To the extent that they are not perceived as relevant to Asian Americans, 
self-categorization as an Asian American would not make these issues self-relevant. On 
the other hand, I expected based on the paradoxical effects literature that American 
identity would predict decreases in support for policies that benefit both respondents’ 
own group and other minority groups to the extent that this common ingroup identity 
increases perceptions of the dominant group and society as a whole as fair or just (see 
Dovidio et al., 2016). 
Thus, the main hypotheses I tested in Study 1 were 
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 Hypothesis 1: A common ingroup identity that includes the dominant group 
(American identity) predicts more positive attitudes toward other racial minority groups 
and toward Whites. 
Hypothesis 2: A common ingroup identity that does not include the dominant 
group (POC identity) predicts more positive attitudes toward other racial minority groups. 
Hypothesis 11: Asian American identity predicts more liberal immigration 
attitudes. 
Hypothesis 12: For Asian Americans, POC identity predicts increased support for 
affirmative action and criminal justice reform. 
Hypothesis 13: American identity predicts less liberal immigration attitudes and 
decreased support for affirmative action and criminal justice reform. 
 To test these hypotheses, I used cross-lagged panel models (CLPM) and random-
intercepts cross-lagged panel models (RI-CLPM) to examine the cross-lagged effects of 
each identity on each measure of racial or policy attitudes at the between-person and 
within-person levels. The CLPM allowed me to test whether between-person differences 
in identity at an earlier time point predict changes in an attitude from the earlier time 
point to a later time point, though as discussed in Chapter 1, cross-lagged coefficients in 
those models reflect a combination of between-person (rank-order) and within-person 
attitude changes. The RI-CLPM allowed me to test whether within-person deviations 
from individuals’ trait levels of identity at an earlier time point predict within-person 
changes in the attitude from the earlier time point to a later time point. As discussed in 
Chapter 1, Figure 1 illustrates the CLPM for Hypotheses 1 and 2; Figure 3 illustrates the 
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RI-CLPM for Hypothesis 2. The models for Hypotheses 11-13 take the same form but 
with different identities and with specific policy attitudes instead of racial attitudes. With 
3 waves of data, I also examined whether the stationarity assumption was justified for 
each identity-attitude pair (see Hamaker et al., 2015) by fitting a model in which each 
lagged or cross-lagged effect from Wave 1 to Wave 2 was constrained to be equal to that 
effect from Wave 2 to Wave 3 and comparing the fit of the constrained and unconstrained 
models. This was done for both the CLPM and the RI-CLPM. 
 I also tested mediation hypotheses based on the collective action, group 
consciousness, and paradoxical effects literatures. As described in more detail in Chapter 
3, I aggregated the potential mediator items into four factor scores: efficacy, linked fate, 
perceived discrimination, and relative deprivation, and I used longitudinal mediation 
models to test the mediation hypotheses. Based on the collective action and group 
consciousness literatures, I expected the effects of racial identity on own-group policy 
attitudes to be mediated by increases in group efficacy, linked fate, perceived 
discrimination, and relative deprivation. Similarly, I expected the effects of POC identity 
on other-group policy attitudes to be mediated by increases in group efficacy, linked fate, 
perceived discrimination, and relative deprivation. Based on the paradoxical effects 
literature, I expected the effects of American identity on both own- and other-group 
policy attitudes to be mediated by decreases in perceived discrimination and relative 
deprivation (which also correspond to the injustice pathway in the SIMCA, van Zomeren 
et al., 2008) and potentially linked fate and group efficacy. However, as discussed in 
Chapter 1, the linked fate and group efficacy pathways are less well-supported 
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empirically and less justifiable theoretically when dual identification is possible. Thus, 
the mediation hypotheses I tested in Study 1 were 
 Hypothesis 14: The effect of Asian American identity on immigration attitudes is 
(partially) mediated by increases in group efficacy, linked fate, perceived discrimination, 
and relative deprivation. 
 Hypothesis 15: The effects of POC identity on attitudes toward criminal justice 
reform and affirmative action are (partially) mediated by increases in group efficacy, 
linked fate, perceived discrimination, and relative deprivation. 
 Hypothesis 16: The effects of American identity on attitudes toward immigration, 
criminal justice reform, and affirmative action are (partially) mediated by decreases in 
perceived discrimination and relative deprivation. 
 These hypotheses were tested using longitudinal mediation models (Cole & 
Maxwell, 2003). However, there is no reason to expect that direct effects of identity on 
policy attitudes need to take the same amount of time as indirect effects; thus, I used the 
model from Maxwell, Cole, and Mitchell’s (2011) Figure 1 and defined direct effects 
from Wave 1 identities to Wave 2 policy attitudes and from Wave 2 identities to Wave 3 
policy attitudes. I first fit a full model that included an identity, a mediator, and a policy 
attitude at all three time points, paths from every variable in Wave 1 to every variable in 
Wave 2, and paths from every variable in Wave 2 to every variable in Time 3. With 3 
waves of data, I was able to test the stationarity assumption (Cole & Maxwell, 2003) by 
constraining all Wave 1-2 paths to be equal to their Wave 2-3 counterparts and 
comparing the fit of the constrained and full models. For illustration, Figure 4 presents 
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the constrained mediation model with POC identity as the predictor, linked fate as the 
mediator, and criminal justice attitudes as the response variable (i.e., part of Hypothesis 
15). Paths are labeled using Cole and Maxwell’s (2003) letter scheme: x, m, and y paths 
indicate autoregressive effects for the predictor, mediator, and response variable, 
respectively; a paths indicate cross-lagged effects of the predictor on the mediator; b 
paths indicate cross-lagged effects of the mediator on the response variable; and c paths 
indicate direct effects of the predictor on the response variable. Dotted lines indicate 
paths in the opposite direction of the hypothesized paths, which were included in the full 
and stationarity models but are marked with dotted lines and not labeled in the figure in 
order to more clearly present the hypotheses. I also fit a third model without the reverse 
paths (the dotted lines in Figure 4) and without stationarity and compared the fit of this 
model with the unconstrained model. My hypothesized indirect effects were defined as 
the product, ab, of the a path from Wave 1 to Wave 2 and the b path from Wave 2 to 
Wave 3 in the relevant mediation model. 
 Thus, Study 1 tested my hypotheses about direct effects and indirect effects 
among Asian Americans. Study 2 extended my analyses by testing a subset of these 
hypotheses among Black and Latino Americans.  




Figure 4. Proposed mediation model for a portion of Hypothesis 15, with linked fate as 
the mediator and support for criminal justice reform as the dependent variable. This 
model assumes stationarity of lagged and cross-lagged effects across the Wave 1-2 and 
Wave 2-3 time lags. Autoregressive effects are denoted x, m, and y. Cross-lagged effects 
are denoted a, b, and c. Direct effects are the cross-lagged c paths. The indirect effect of 
interest is the product of the cross-lagged a path from Wave 1 to Wave 2 and the cross-
lagged b path from Wave 2 to Wave 3. Dashed lines indicate cross-lagged reverse effects, 
which were not part of my hypothesis. 
 
B. Study 2 
 Study 2 consisted of a set of items on the University of Minnesota Center for the 
Study of Political Psychology’s (CSPP) 2020 Presidential Election Study. The CSPP 
study involved a representative sample of eligible voters in the United States, plus an 
oversample of Black respondents, recruited through YouGov. Study 2 used the data from 
COMMON INGROUP IDENTITY AND POLITICAL SOLIDARITY 
 
68 
the Black and Latino respondents. Identification with each of the three key target groups 
(racial group, POC, and American) was measured using a 2-item version of the Huddy et 
al. scale. Racial attitude measures consisted of feeling thermometers of Whites, Blacks, 
Hispanics/Latinos, and Asian Americans. For Black respondents, the Hispanic/Latino and 
Asian American feeling thermometer ratings were aggregated into a composite score for 
“other minority groups”; for Latino respondents, this composite variable consisted of the 
ratings of Blacks and Asian Americans. Policy attitude measures consisted of two items 
on immigration, an item on mandatory minimum sentences, and items asking about 
respondents’ attitudes toward Black Lives Matter and the protests after the police killing 
of George Floyd. I treat the last three items as measures of criminal justice reform 
attitudes for the purpose of my hypotheses and conclusions. Study 2 also included 
measures of linked fate with respondents’ racial group and with POC. 
 Again, I used cross-lagged panel models (CLPM) and random-intercepts cross-
lagged panel models (RI-CLPM) to examine the cross-lagged effects of each identity on 
each measure of racial or policy attitudes. I also tested the stationarity assumption using 
the same approach as in Study 1. I analyzed the data from Black respondents and the data 
from Latino respondents separately. 
 As in Study 1, I expected based on the CIIM that POC identity would predict 
improvements in attitudes toward other racial minority groups and that American identity 
would predict improvements in attitudes toward other racial minority groups and Whites. 
These effects should be present for both Black and Latino respondents. Thus, Study 2 
also tests the following hypotheses: 
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 Hypothesis 1: A common ingroup identity that includes the dominant group 
(American identity) predicts more positive attitudes toward other racial minority groups 
and toward Whites. 
Hypothesis 2: A common ingroup identity that does not include the dominant 
group (POC identity) predicts more positive attitudes toward other racial minority groups. 
I expected immigration to be an own-group policy area for Latino respondents 
and an other-group policy area for Black respondents. Conversely, as discussed in 
Chapter 1, I expected criminal justice reform to be an own-group policy area for Black 
respondents and an other-group policy area for Latino respondents (because of the 
association between criminal justice reform and Black Lives Matter in the recent 
discourse). Accordingly, racial identity should predict changes in immigration attitudes in 
favor of more liberal policies for Latino respondents and increases in support for criminal 
justice reform among Black respondents (i.e., increases in support for own-group 
policies). POC identity should predict changes in immigration attitudes in favor of more 
liberal policies for Black respondents and increases in support for criminal justice reform 
among Latino respondents (i.e., increases in support for other-group policies). As with 
Asian Americans in Study 1, I expected American identity to predict less liberal 
immigration attitudes and decreases in support for criminal justice reform for both groups 
of respondents in this study (i.e., Hypothesis 13). Spelled out separately for each 
respondent group, these hypotheses are 
Hypothesis 17: Hispanic/Latino identity predicts more liberal immigration 
attitudes. 
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Hypothesis 18: Black identity predicts increased support for criminal justice 
reform. 
Hypothesis 19: For African Americans, POC identity predicts more liberal 
immigration attitudes. 
Hypothesis 20: For Hispanic/Latino Americans, POC identity predicts increased 
support for criminal justice reform. 
Hypothesis 13: (same as for Asian Americans in Study 1) American identity 
predicts less liberal immigration attitudes and decreased support for criminal justice 
reform. 
Because the only potential mediator variables included in Study 2 were the linked 
fate items, mediation analyses were more limited in this study. As in Study 1, I expected 
linked fate to mediate the effects of racial identity and POC identity on policy attitudes. 
But again, linked fate seemed like a more tenuous mediator for the effects of American 
identity. Additionally, to the extent that linked fate and group consciousness represent a 
single concept for African Americans but not for Latinos (Sanchez & Vargas, 2016), the 
linked fate mediator could potentially capture effects of unmeasured group consciousness 
variables for Black respondents but not for Latino respondents. In other words, linked 
fate could be a significant mediator in models for Black respondents even if a different 
aspect of group consciousness is the actual mechanism, but the same would not be true 
for Latino respondents. As a result, it was plausible that I would find indirect effects via 
linked fate for Black respondents but not Latino respondents. Thus, my mediation 
hypotheses for Study 2 are as follows: 
COMMON INGROUP IDENTITY AND POLITICAL SOLIDARITY 
 
71 
Hypothesis 21: The effect of Black identity on support for criminal justice reform 
is (partially) mediated by linked fate. 
Hypothesis 22: For African Americans, the effect of POC identity on immigration 
attitudes is (partially) mediated by linked fate. 
Hypothesis 23: (tentative) The effect of Hispanic/Latino identity on immigration 
attitudes is (partially) mediated by linked fate. 
Hypothesis 24: (tentative) For Hispanic/Latino Americans, the effect of POC 
identity on support for criminal justice reform is (partially) mediated by linked fate. 
These hypotheses were tested using the same modeling strategy as in Study 1. 
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Chapter 3: Study 1 
Study 1 was a 3-wave online panel study of Asian Americans that measured 
Asian American, POC, and American identity, potential mediators, racial attitudes, and 
attitudes toward three different policy areas: immigration, criminal justice reform, and 
affirmative action. The main purpose of this study was to test whether, for Asian 
Americans, American and POC identities predict more positive attitudes toward other 
racial minority groups (Hypotheses 1 and 2), American identity predicts less support for 
policies associated with racial minorities (Hypothesis 3), and POC identity predicts more 
support for policies associated with racial minorities (Hypothesis 4), controlling for the 
stability of each variable and attitude-to-identity “reverse” effects. I used cross-lagged 
panel models and random intercepts cross-lagged panel models to test these hypotheses. 
An additional purpose of Study 1 was to test, using longitudinal mediation models, 
whether linked fate, group political efficacy, perceived discrimination or injustice, and/or 
attitudes toward Whites mediate effects of Asian American (i.e., own racial subgroup), 
POC, and American identities on support for groups and policies that challenge the racial 
status quo (Hypotheses 12, 15, and 18). 
A. Pilot Study 
 Before running the main study, I pilot tested identity, policy, and potential 
mediator items with a smaller online sample of Asian Americans. This pilot study served 
two purposes: 1) to check the psychometric properties of identity and policy items that 
had not been validated in prior research and 2) to explore the relationship among group 
efficacy, linked fate, and group consciousness variables for Asian Americans. Because 
there is evidence that the relationship between linked fate and other group consciousness 
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variables differs across racial groups (Sanchez & Vargas, 2016), it is important to 
understand how measures of these constructs, as well as group efficacy, hang together for 
Asian Americans specifically before they can be analyzed as mediators in a study of 
Asian Americans. 
1. Method 
 Respondents. Respondents were Asian American adults recruited through 
Prolific (prolific.co) in October 2020 using two demographic filters: ethnicity = Asian 
and nationality = United States. Out of 307 respondents who consented to take part in the 
study, 297 self-identified their race as Asian. An additional 6 respondents self-identified 
as Other, but because they specified “South Asian,” “Asian American,” or an Asian 
ethnic group, their responses were included in my analyses, giving a total sample size of 
303. 
 Most respondents self-identified only as Asian (or Other), but 3 also identified as 
White, 2 also identified as American Indian or Alaskan Native, and 2 also identified as 
Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander. The most common ethnic subgroups were Chinese 
(N = 110), Vietnamese (N = 50), Indian (N = 39), Filipino (N = 33), and Korean (N = 
31). As expected based on the screening criteria, most respondents were U.S. citizens 
(298 citizens, 3 non-citizens). Perhaps because of the nationality criterion, a large 
majority of respondents were born in the U.S. (215 respondents, or 71%). One hundred 
sixty respondents identified as male, 137 identified as female, and 3 identified as non-
binary or gender non-conforming. Respondents were relatively young on average (Mean 
= 26.9, SD = 8.7), but they ranged in age from 18 to 62. They also tended to be well-
educated (171, or 57% of respondents who responded to this item, had at least a 4-year 
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college degree) and have somewhat high incomes (median = $60,000-69,999; modes = 
$50,000-59,999, $80,000-99,999, $100,000-149,000). 
 Materials and Procedure. Respondents completed a one-time survey including 
measures of identity, attitudes related to immigration and criminal justice reform, linked 
fate, group efficacy, perceived discrimination, and perceived disadvantage or inequality 
(see Appendix A for items).1 The order in which the identity, policy, and potential 
mediator items were presented was randomized to control for order effects. 
 Identity measures. Three types of social identity measures were used. First, 
respondents were asked to rank five identities—individual, ethnic group (e.g., Chinese), 
Asian American, person of color, and American—in order of how strongly they identify 
with each. Next, respondents were asked to check which of the five identities they 
consider important to who they are. Finally, they were given a version of the 4-item 
Huddy et al. (2015) scale for each of the three identities of interest (in random order): 
Asian American, person of color, and American. Thus, for each of these three identities, 
each respondent had an importance ranking, a binary variable indicating whether or not 
they selected the identity as important, and responses to the 4 items of the Huddy et al. 
identity centrality scale. 
Policy attitude measures. Policy attitude measures were a combination of items 
that have appeared on other surveys and new items written for this study. I pilot tested 
three items related to immigration and three items related to criminal justice reform. For 
immigration, respondents were asked 1) their opinion on the number of immigrants who 
 
1 Internal consistency () is provided for the final scales after the psychometric analyses 
in the Results section, below.  
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should be allowed to enter the U.S. (1 = decreased a lot; 5 = increased a lot); 2) the extent 
to which they favor allowing undocumented immigrants to stay in the U.S. versus 
deporting them (1 = strongly favor deportation; 4 = strongly favor allowing them to stay); 
and 3) the extent to which they favor or oppose detaining undocumented migrants at the 
border (1 = strongly oppose; 5 = strongly favor). The first item appeared on the 
University of Minnesota Center for the Study of Political Psychology (CSPP) 2016 
Presidential Election Panel Study, the second item is a modified version of an item from 
the 2016 CSPP study, and the third item was written for this study based on events of the 
last few years. For criminal justice reform, respondents were asked 1) whether they think 
there are too many people in prison, too few people in prison, or about the right number 
of people in prison in the U.S.; 2) the extent to which they favor or oppose proposals to 
defund police departments and redirect funds to alternative kinds of first responder 
services (1 = strongly oppose, 5 = strongly favor); and 3) the extent to which they favor 
or oppose eliminating mandatory minimum sentences for some crimes (1 = strongly 
oppose, 5 = strongly favor). The first item was adapted from a survey of Massachusetts 
voters’ opinions on criminal justice reform (Koczela & Parr, 2017); the other two items 
were written for this study. The order of the two sets of policy items was randomized, as 
was the order of the items within each policy area. 
Potential mediators. I pilot tested a variety of items tapping linked fate, group 
consciousness, relative deprivation, and group efficacy. 
Linked fate with Asian Americans and people of color was measured with a set of 
two items each: “Do you think what happens generally to other [Asians/people of color] 
in this country affects what happens in your life?” and if the respondent answered yes, 
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“Will it affect you a lot, some, or not very much?” These items were collapsed into a 
single score for Asian American linked fate and a single score for POC linked fate (1 = 
No, 2 = Not very much, 3 = Some, 4 = A lot). 
Group efficacy was measured, separately for Asian American and POC ingroups, 
using adapted versions of two external political efficacy items: “How much do public 
officials care about what [Asian Americans/people of color] think?” and “How much can 
[Asian Americans/people of color] affect what the government does?” Both items are 
measured on a 5-point scale from “not at all” to “a great deal.” I used political efficacy 
for two reasons: 1) Because I am studying policy attitudes, political efficacy seemed 
more relevant than typical measures of group efficacy (cf. Tausch et al., 2011, Study 3). 
2) Because these policies relate to longstanding structural inequalities rather than a 
specific incident, efficacy to achieve the group’s goals generally seemed more relevant 
than efficacy to address a specific issue (cf. Ufkes et al., 2015).  
Perceived discrimination was measured using three items: “How much 
discrimination or unfair treatment do you think Asians face in the U.S.?”, “How much 
discrimination or unfair treatment do you think people of color face in the U.S.?”, and 
“How much discrimination or unfair treatment do you think you have faced in the U.S. 
because of your race or ethnicity?” (“None,” “a little,” “some,” or “a lot” for each item.) 
Finally, respondents were asked how much they agree or disagree (on a 5-point 
scale) with the following items: “Asians are socially and/or economically disadvantaged 
compared to Whites in the U.S.”; “People of color are socially and/or economically 
disadvantaged compared to Whites in the U.S.”; “I have less power than Whites do in the 
U.S.”; “I have fewer opportunities than Whites do in the U.S.”; “America is an open 
COMMON INGROUP IDENTITY AND POLITICAL SOLIDARITY 77 
society where individuals of any ethnicity can achieve higher status”; and “Advancement 
in American society is possible for individuals of all ethnic groups.” These items were 
drawn from a pool of similar items variously described as measuring inequality beliefs, 
power discontent, perceived illegitimacy, individual mobility beliefs, system blame, and 
system justification. See Appendix A for items. 
Again, the order of these groups of items was randomized, and the item order 
within each group of items was also randomized. 
Potential covariates. In addition to basic demographic questions (race, which I 
used as an additional screener, gender, education, and income), respondents were asked a 
series of questions about their ethnic and immigration background and a series of 
questions related to political sophistication and political orientation. The 
ethnic/immigration background questions included the respondent’s self-identified ethnic 
group(s) (e.g., Chinese, Vietnamese, or Indian); whether the respondent is currently a 
U.S. citizen; whether the respondent was born in the U.S. and if not, in what year they 
came to live in the U.S.; and the respondent’s preference for speaking English versus 
another language. The political questions included whether the respondent is registered to 
vote; whether the respondent voted in any past election in the U.S.; the respondent’s self-
identified ideology and party affiliation; and a 5-item political knowledge battery. 
2. Results 
 Means and standard deviations for the key variables are presented in Table 1. 
When variables were measured with more than one item, the reported mean and standard 
deviation are for the composite score (i.e., the average of the item scores or, if the items 
are on different scales, the average of the 0-1 scaled item scores). 
COMMON INGROUP IDENTITY AND POLITICAL SOLIDARITY 78 
Table 1 
 
Pilot Study Variable Means and Standard Deviations 
 
 n Mean (SD) 
ID scalea   
Asian Am. 301 .693 (.225) 
POC 301 .491 (.269) 
American 301 .596 (.214) 
ID rank   
Asian Am. 271 2.39 (1.15) 
POC 271 4.06 (1.13) 
American 271 3.35 (1.37) 
ID checklistb   
Asian Am. 302 .560 (.497) 
POC 302 .172 (.378) 
American 302 .252 (.435) 
   
Policy attitudes   
Immigrationc 302 .628 (.216) 
Criminal justice 302 .704 (.236) 
   
Potential mediators   
Efficacyd 301 2.57 (0.72) 
Group consciousnesse 301 3.22 (0.69) 
 
Note: Means and standard deviations are reported for composite scores (i.e., the average 
of the relevant item scores or, if the items are on different scales, the average of the 0-1 
scaled item scores. 
 
a Identity scale scores are on a 0-1 scale, with higher scores indicating greater 
identification with the group. 
b Means on the identity checklist items reflect the proportion of respondents who checked 
that identity as important. 
c Immigration and criminal justice composite scores are on a 0-1 scale, with higher scores 
indicating more liberal policy attitudes. 
d Efficacy composite scores are on a 5-point scale, with higher scores indicating greater 
group-based political efficacy. 
e Group consciousness composite scores consist of the linked fate, are on a 0-1 scale, with 
higher scores indicating higher group consciousness. 
 
 Identity measures. I expected the identity measures to load onto 3 correlated 
factors: Asian American identity, POC identity, and American identity. To test this, I 
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used 4 confirmatory factor analysis models and modifications of those models and 
examined the fit statistics (CFI, RMSEA, and SRMR) for each model. Factor analysis 
was done using the lavaan package (Rosseel, 2012) in R. Model 1 included only the four 
items from the modified Huddy et al. (2015) scale for each identity. Model 2 included the 
scale items, as well as the ranks for each of the three identities of interest and an indicator 
variable for whether the respondent selected each of the three identities in the checklist. 
Model 3 included a scale composite score (generated by 0-1 scaling and then averaging 
the 4 scale items) for each identity and the rank and check variables from Model 2. 
Model 4 was similar to Model 2 but had the scale items for each identity loading onto a 
first-order factor, which then loaded onto a second-order factor with the rank and check 
variables for that identity. Models 2-4 were run with all observed variables treated as 
continuous, with the check variables treated as categorical, and with the rank and check 
items treated as categorical (ordered categorical in the case of the rank variables). For 
models with all variables treated as continuous, I used full-information maximum 
likelihood estimation (FIML); for models with categorical variables, I kept R’s default 
settings, which use the WLSMV estimator with robust standard errors and list-wise 
deletion for missing observations. 
 If the initial model did not show adequate fit according to Hu and Bentler’s 
(1999) criteria (CFI ≥ .95, RMSEA ≤ .06, SRMR ≤ .08), I examined modification 
indices. If indicated by the modification indices, I then added shared method covariances 
to the model (e.g., covariance between item 1 in the Asian American identity scale and 
item 1 in the POC identity scale). 
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 Fit statistics and effective sample sizes are presented in Table 2. Model 1 initially 
did not meet the Hu and Bentler (1999) criteria for CFI (.908) or RMSEA (.116). Adding 
shared method covariances for each scale item across all 3 identities resulted in good fit 
based on CFI (.974) and SRMR (.043); RMSEA (.071) also improved but was still 
slightly above the Hu and Bentler criterion. Model 2 did not meet the fit criteria, with or 
without treating the rank and check variables as categorical and with or without shared 
method covariances. With categorical rank and check variables and shared method 
covariances for scale items, rank variables, and check variables, it came close to an 
adequate fit, at least based on non-robust fit statistics (CFI = .941, RMSEA = .074, 
SRMR = .088), but included an impossibly high correlation between the check variables 
for POC and American identities (r = 1.065). Model 3 with categorical rank and check 
variables and shared method covariances for scale composite scores, ranks, and check 
variables showed mostly adequate fit based on non-robust fit statistics (CFI = .974, 
RMSEA = .073, SRMR = .072) but also included an impossibly high correlation between 
the check variables for POC and American identities (r = 1.568). Similarly, Model 4 with 
categorical rank and check variables and shared method covariances for all items plus 
first-order factors fit according to all non-robust fit statistics and robust RMSEA (CFI = 
.992, non-robust RMSEA = .029, robust RMSEA = .057, SRMR = .066) but included an 
impossibly high correlation between the same two check variables (r = 1.560). 
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Table 2 
 
Pilot Study Identity CFA Fit Statistics 
 
 N CFI RMSEA SRMR 
Model 1 (Huddy scale only)     
no error covariances 301 .908 .116 .052 
shared method covariances 301 .974 .071 .043 
Model 2 (1st-order factors)     
continuous, no cov 302 .848 .104 .095 
categorical rank & check, no cov  270 .885/.640 .096/.103 .113 
categorical rank & check, shared method cov 270 .941/.785 .074/.085 .088 
Model 3 (Huddy scale comp + rank & check     
continuous, no cov 302 .704 .162 .102 
categorical rank & check, no cov 270 .843/.719 .141/.153 .147 
categorical rank & check, shared method cov 
(rank & check) 
270 .930/.859 .108/.126 .090 
categorical rank & check, shared method cov 
(rank, check, & composite score) 
270 .974/.939 .073/.090 .072 
Model 4 (2nd-order factors)     
continuous, no cov 302 .864 .100 .111 
categorical rank & check, no cov 270 .893/.681 .094/.098 .110 
categorical rank & check, shared method cov 
(items) 
270 .952/.822 .068/.079 .082 
categorical rank & check, shared method cov 
(items + 1st-order factors) 
270 .992/.909 .029/.057 .066 
 
 For comparison, measures of each identity had good internal consistency when 
only the Huddy et al. (2015) scale items were included (Asian American identity:  = 
.87; POC identity:  = .92; American identity:  = .86), but internal consistency 
decreased when the rank and check variables were included (Asian American identity:  
= .64; POC identity:  = .74; American identity:  = .60). This decrease might be 
explained by lower correlations between item types than within the Huddy scale for each 
identity (Asian American identity: within r = .54-.69, between r = .29-.43; POC identity: 
within r = .67-.81, between r = .35-.54; American identity: within r = .55-.68, between r 
= .31-.43). Additionally, correlations across the three identities differed dramatically 
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depending on the measure: For example, correlations among identities were positive for 
scales and checks but (not surprisingly) negative for ranks, and Asian American and POC 
identities had the highest correlation (r = .37) and POC and American identities had the 
lowest correlation (r = .09) for scale composite scores, but POC and American identities 
had the highest correlation for checks (r = .32) (see Table 3). 
Table 3 
 
Pilot Study Correlations among Asian American, POC, and American Identities 
 
 Asian American Person of color American 
Huddy scalea    
Asian American 1.000   
Person of color .372 1.000  
American .122 .088 1.000 
Ranksb    
Asian American 1.000   
Person of color -.038 1.000  
American -.213 -.408 1.000 
Checklist    
Asian American 1.000   
Person of color .210 1.000  
American .023 .322 1.000 
 
a Correlations among composite scores for each identity. (Composite scores were 
generated by 0-1 scaling items and then averaging responses for each identity.) 
b Correlations for ranks are Spearman correlations. All other correlations are Pearson 
correlations. 
 
 These results provide evidence for a 3-factor structure but suggest that the Huddy 
et al. (2015) scale, rankings, and checklist might measure identity distinctly enough to 
make it difficult to consolidate the measures into a single meaningful score for each 
identity. 
 Policy attitude measures. A 2-factor oblique CFA model was tested for the 
policy attitude items, with the 3 immigration items on one factor and the 3 criminal 
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justice items on the other factor.2 Fit was not ideal initially (CFI = .942, RMSEA = .118, 
SRMR = .044), though the 2-factor model fit better than a 1-factor model (CFI = .895, 
RMSEA = .149, SRMR = .059). Modification indices suggested adding a parameter for 
the error covariance between the number of people in prison item and the mandatory 
minimum sentence item; adding this error covariance produced a model with good fit 
(CFI = .988, RMSEA = .056, SRMR = .020). The correlation between the two factors 
was high (r = .82), and internal consistency for the two groups of policy items (after 0-1 
coding all items) was lower than ideal (immigration  = .76, criminal justice  = .72). 
Nonetheless, the CFA suggests that these items capture two distinct policy areas as 
intended. 
 Potential mediators. Exploratory factor analysis was done using the nFactors 
package (Rache & Magis, 2020) in R. Although the pool of potential mediator items 
produced 3 eigenvalues greater than 1, parallel analysis suggested a 2-factor solution, and 
the scree plot showed large drops after the first and second eigenvalues but not 
subsequent ones. One, 2-, and 3-factor oblique solutions were examined. The 2-factor 
solution, with the efficacy items loading on one factor and most of the remaining items 
loading primarily on the other, appeared to be the most readily interpretable. However, 
two items (“America is an open society where individuals of any ethnicity can achieve 
higher status” and “Advancement in American society is possible for individuals of all 
ethnic groups”) did not clearly load on either factor over the other, and these two items 
 
2 The number of people in prison item was treated as continuous for the purpose of the 
pilot study CFAs. In Study 1, I fit alternative models treating this item as ordered 
categorical. 
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formed their own factor in the 3-factor solution. EFA was repeated with the addition of 
an item measuring concern about discrimination due to COVID-19, and the results did 
not change substantially; the COVID discrimination item loaded onto the same factor as 
the linked fate, perceived discrimination, and miscellaneous disadvantage/deprivation 
items. Factor loadings for the 2-factor solution, with and without the COVID 
discrimination item, are displayed in Table 4. 
Table 4 
 
Pilot Study Mediator Item Factor Loadings for 2-factor Solution 
 
 without COVID item with COVID item 
 Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 1 Factor 2 
asianLF .700 .129 .718 .125 
pocLF .689 .163 .698 .154 
pd_asian .697 .157 .711 .150 
pd_poc .654 -.008 .635 -.033 
pd_self .690 .156 .713 .155 
misc1 .715 -.111 .713 -.127 
misc2 .653 -.140 .629 -.166 
misc3 .714 -.150 .704 -.169 
misc4 .780 -.102 .766 -.125 
misc5r .360 -.364 .341 -.379 
misc6r .294 -.398 .287 -.405 
covid   .529 .091 
effasian1 -.206 .552 -.184 .565 
effasian2 .052 .769 .064 .759 
effpoc1 -.100 .490 -.090 .493 
effpoc2 .156 .644 .158 .626 
 
Note: Factor correlation r = -.098 without COVID discrimination concern item; r = -.103 
with COVID discrimination concern item. 
 
 Based on the EFA, the two items that did not clearly load onto either factor in the 
2-factor solution were dropped for Study 1. This left 4 efficacy items ( = .73) and 10 
items related to group-based injustice or inequality ( = .89) (2 linked fate, 3 perceived 
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discrimination, 5 miscellaneous disadvantage/deprivation). I hypothesized that a 2-factor 
model would adequately fit the data on these items in Study 1.  
 Potential covariates. Potential covariates were examined for whether they 
predicted the identity, policy attitude, and potential mediator items in ordinary least-
squares multiple regression analyses, with the idea of dropping items for Study 1 if they 
did not predict any of the key variables. To simplify the analyses with the ethnicity 
variable, dummy variables were created for whether a respondent identified as East Asian 
(Chinese, Korean, Japanese, or Taiwanese) and whether a respondent identified as South 
Asian (Indian, Pakistani, or Bangladeshi). The ethnicity variables, nativity (1 = foreign-
born) or age of arrival in the U.S., language preference, gender (male = 1; 0 otherwise), 
age, income, and political ideology each predicted at least one identity; political ideology 
or party, political knowledge, past vote, gender, age, and education each predicted policy 
attitudes in at least one area; language preference, age of arrival in the U.S., and political 
ideology predicted a composite of the non-efficacy mediator factor; and ethnicity and 
political knowledge predicted efficacy. These analyses suggested that voter registration 
could be dropped, as it did not significantly predict any of the variables of interest. 
Additionally, although political knowledge predicted criminal justice attitudes and 
efficacy, political knowledge scores in this sample were extremely high (median = 4 out 
of 5 questions correct), suggesting that political knowledge effects among Asian 
American respondents recruited through Prolific might not be representative of effects 
across the entire range of political knowledge among Asian American adults. This 
observation, along with the length of the political knowledge battery, led me to drop 
political knowledge as a potential covariate in Study 1. 
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B. Study 1 Method 
Respondents 
 Respondents were 1006 Asian Americans recruited through Prolific. The target 
number of respondents for Wave 1 was determined based on power analyses for RI-
CLPM3, using Monte Carlo simulation in Mplus (Muthén & Muthén, 1998-2019; Muthén 
& Muthén, 2002), and a 25% attrition rate across successive waves. The attrition estimate 
was based on Prolific’s estimate of less than 25% over a year, https://researcher-
help.prolific.co/hc/en-gb/articles/360009223613-Minimising-dropout-attrition-rate-in-
longitudinal-studies, as well as reported retention rates in published studies using Prolific 
that ranged from 57% over 2 months (Maertens et al., 2021) to 85.8% over 2 weeks 
around the 2016 election (Zucker, Weis, & Richman, 2019; see also Kadhim, Amiot, & 
Louis, 2020; Palan & Schitter, 2018; Maher, MacCarron, & Quayle, 2020; Gordon-
Hacker & Gueron-Sela, 2020; Costin & Vignoles, 2020, Study 3). Power analyses 
indicated that between 500 and 600 respondents would be needed to detect a cross-lagged 
effect of  = 0.2 with approximately power = .80. To have that number of respondents 
complete all three waves with 25% attrition across successive waves would require N = 
667-800 in Wave 2 and N = 890-1067 in Wave 1. 
Respondents were identified using the same filters as for the pilot study (ethnicity 
= Asian, nationality = United States), with the additional criterion that respondents from 
 
3 Because the CLPM is nested under the RI-CLPM and has fewer parameters to estimate 
(Hamaker et al., 2015), it does not require as large of a sample as the RI-CLPM. I also 
did power analyses for detecting a, b, and ab effects in longitudinal mediation models, as 
described in Appendix B, and those analyses indicated a somewhat smaller target sample 
size than the RI-CLPM power analyses did. Therefore, target sample size estimates were 
based on the RI-CLPM power analyses. 
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the pilot study were not eligible for this study. Respondents who did not self-identify as 
Asian or Asian American were excluded from Waves 2 and 3 and from further analysis, 
except for one respondent who marked Other and wrote “Southeast Asian.” After 
removing 10 respondents who did not identify as Asian or Asian American, 7 
respondents who did not answer the race question, and 1 respondent who appeared to be 
under 18, the final sample size in Wave 1 was 988. 
 Most respondents self-identified only as Asian or Asian American, but 21 also 
identified as White, 6 also identified as Hispanic/Latino, 6 also identified as Native 
Hawaiian or Pacific Islander, 1 also identified as Black, and 1 also identified as “Mixed.” 
As in the pilot study, the most common ethnic subgroups were Chinese (N = 409), 
Vietnamese (N = 155), Indian (N = 113), Filipino (N = 109), and Korean (N = 106). 
Again, as in the pilot study, most respondents were U.S. citizens (965 citizens, 23 non-
citizens), and the majority (764, or 77%) were born in the U.S. Respondents were 
relatively balanced on gender (488 male, 480 female, 20 nonbinary). Although 
respondents’ ages ranged from 18-72, they tended to be relatively young (Mean = 26.8, 
SD = 8.3). They also tended to be well-educated (592, or 60%, had at least a 4-year 
college degree) and have relatively high incomes (median = $70,000-79,000; mode = 
$100,000-149,000). 
The study was administered in 3 waves: Wave 1 ran from November 9 to 
November 11, 2020, Wave 2 ran from November 30 to December 4, 2020, and Wave 3 
ran from December 28, 2020, to January 2, 2021. Attrition rates were around 20% (20% 
between Waves 1 and 2; 17% between Waves 2 and 3), leaving a sample size of N = 787 
for Wave 2 and N = 651 for Wave 3. Thus, the sample size of respondents who 
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completed all three waves should have been adequate to detect effects across model 
types. 
Materials and Procedure 
Survey items consisted of 1) the identity items from the pilot study; 2) racial 
attitude measures; 3) measures of attitudes in three different policy areas: immigration, 
criminal justice reform, and affirmative action; 4) the potential mediator items from the 
pilot study except the two items that formed a third factor; and 5) the COVID 
discrimination concern item from the pilot study. Wave 1 also included the potential 
covariates from the pilot study except the voter registration and political knowledge 
items. 
 Racial attitude measures. I used two types of explicit racial attitude measures, 
feeling thermometers (FTs) and so-called stereotype items (see, e.g., Sears et al., 1997), 
to capture attitudes toward Whites, Blacks, and Latinos. Feeling thermometer items ask 
respondents to rate their feelings toward people or groups on a 100-point sliding scale 
with 1 = coldest/most negative and 100 = warmest/most positive. Stereotype items ask 
respondents to rate a group on a 7-point scale anchored on two opposite traits (e.g., 1 = 
lazy, 7 = hardworking). Respondents in this study were asked to rate each group on the 
following pairs of traits: lazy-hardworking and unintelligent-intelligent. (These pairs of 
traits were used in the 2016 CSPP study and the American National Election Studies 
(ANES) 2016 Time Series Study.) Higher ratings on the FTs and stereotype items 
indicate more positive attitudes toward the target group. 
  Policy attitude/support for change measures. Attitudes toward immigration and 
criminal justice reform were measured using the six items from the pilot study (3 for 
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immigration, 3 for criminal justice reform). Attitudes toward affirmative action were 
measured using two items: one measuring the extent to which respondents favor 
affirmative action in employment and one measuring the extent to which respondents 
favor affirmative action in higher education (5-point scales; 1 = strongly oppose, 5 = 
strongly favor). See Appendix A for items. Before analysis, items were recoded so that 
higher scores represent positions that favor racial minorities (i.e., more liberal 
immigration policies or more support for criminal justice reform or affirmative action). 
 All items except the potential covariates were included in all 3 waves. The order 
of the different types of items (identity, racial attitudes, policy attitudes, linked fate, 
political efficacy, perceived discrimination) was counterbalanced within each wave. The 
order of the identities (i.e., race, POC, American) for the identity, linked fate, and 
efficacy items, and the order of the racial attitude (FTs vs. stereotypes) and policy items 
were randomized, as was the group order for the racial attitude items. To avoid priming 
racial identity, the demographic items were asked at the end of the Wave 1 survey. 
 Dummy variables were created for East Asian and South Asian ethnic groups, 
nativity (1 = foreign-born; 0 otherwise), gender (1 = male; 0 otherwise), and past vote (1 
= voted in a past election in the U.S.; 0 otherwise). Political party affiliation was 
collapsed into a 7-point scale (1 = strong Democrat, 2 = not strong Democrat, 3 = lean 
Democratic, 4 = Independent, 5 = lean Republican, 6 = not strong Republican, 7 = strong 
Republican). These variables, as well as age, income, education, age of arrival in the 
U.S., language preference (with higher numbers indicating preference for English 
compared to another language) and political ideology were included as covariates in 
CLPM models. 
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 To facilitate comparison of effects, I recoded all items to range from 0 to 1. 
Where warranted by longitudinal confirmatory factor analysis, I created factor scores to 
consolidate items. Because White stereotypes and affirmative action attitudes were each 
represented by only two items at each time point that were highly correlated, instead of 
creating factor scores, I averaged the two items for each construct at each time point.  
C. Results 
1. Descriptive Statistics 
 Means and standard deviations in each wave for the key variables are presented in 
Table 5.  
Table 5 
 
Study 1 Variable Means and Standard Deviations 
 
 Wave 1 Wave 2 Wave 3 
 n Mean (SD) n Mean (SD) n Mean (SD) 
ID scalea       
Asian Am. 988 .719 (.201) 786 .707 (.200) 650 .701 (.201) 
POC 988 .501 (.263) 786 .504 (.260) 650 .490 (.261) 
American 988 .606 (.207) 786 .596 (.208) 650 .589 (.208) 
ID rank       
Asian Am. 978 2.39 (1.10) 769 2.50 (1.07) 635 2.55 (1.08) 
POC 978 4.03 (1.14) 769 4.10 (1.10) 635 4.16 (1.07) 
American 978 3.49 (1.30) 769 3.52 (1.30) 635 3.59 (1.26) 
ID checklistb       
Asian Am. 986 .663 (.473) 785 .608 (.489) 650 .592 (.492) 
POC 986 .267 (.442) 785 .250 (.431) 650 .228 (.420) 
American 986 .398 (.490) 785 .360 (.480) 650 .358 (.480) 
       
Racial attitudes       
Nonwhite FT 988 65.3 (19.8) 783 65.0 (19.9) 651 64.5 (19.7) 
White FT 984 57.9 (21.0) 780 58.3 (21.7) 649 57.8 (21.7) 
Nonwhite stereotypes 988 4.93 (1.11) 785 4.88 (1.12) 650 4.83 (1.09) 
White stereotypes 988 4.53 (1.10) 785 4.53 (1.11) 650 4.50 (1.10) 
       
Policy attitudes       
Immigrationc 988 .647 (.208) 786 .650 (.207) 651 .645 (.201) 
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Criminal justice 988 .732 (.218) 787 .735 (.221) 651 .739 (.226) 
Affirmative actiond 988 2.92 (1.10) 787 3.02 (1.10) 651 3.02 (1.11) 
       
Potential mediatorse       
Efficacy 988 2.63 (0.64) 784 2.55 (0.63) 650 2.53 (0.62) 
Linked fate 929 2.75 (0.91) 734 2.75 (0.92) 608 2.72 (0.89) 
Perceived discrimination 988 3.02 (0.58) 784 3.01 (0.57) 650 2.96 (0.57) 
Relative deprivation 988 3.77 (0.81) 784 3.80 (0.79) 650 3.82 (0.77) 
 
Note: Means and standard deviations are reported for composite scores. Further analyses 
involve factor scores for the identity scales, nonwhite racial attitude measures, 
immigration and criminal justice policy attitude measures, and mediator measures.  
 
a Identity scale scores are on a 0-1 scale, with higher scores indicating greater 
identification with the group. 
b Means on the identity checklist items reflect the proportion of respondents who checked 
that identity as important. 
c Immigration and criminal justice composite scores are on a 0-1 scale, with higher scores 
indicating more liberal policy attitudes. 
d Affirmative action composite scores are on a 5-point scale, with higher scores indicating 
more support for/less opposition to affirmative action. 
e Efficacy composite scores are on a 5-point scale, with higher scores indicating greater 
group-based political efficacy. Linked fate is on a 4-point scale (1 = no linked fate; 2 = 
not very much; 3 = some; 4 = a lot). Perceived discrimination composite scores are on a 
4-point scale, with higher scores indicating more perceived discrimination. Relative 
deprivation composite scores are on a 5-point scale with higher scores indicating greater 
relative deprivation. 
 
Notably, across identity measures, respondents appeared to identify relatively 
strongly as Asian American (mean scale and checklist scores above the midpoint, mean 
rankings below the midpoint) but less strongly as POC or American. Identification 
seemed particularly weak for POC identity, which only around a quarter of respondents 
checked as important in each wave (compared to somewhat over a third of respondents 
checking American identity and nearly two-thirds of respondents checking Asian 
American identity) and which was the only identity for which mean Huddy scale 
composite scores were not consistently above the midpoint. As in the pilot study, 
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correlations among the three identities varied depending on how identity was measured 
(see Table 6). With the Huddy scale factor scores, correlations were highest between 
Asian American and POC identities (r = .40-.47), and POC and American identities were 
practically uncorrelated (r = -.03-.004). A similar pattern emerged for the checklist, but 
the difference between the highest and lowest correlations was smaller. POC and 
American identities had the strongest (negative) correlation for ranks (r = -.45 to -.57). 
Table 6 
 




POC ID American ID 
Identity scale factor scores W1    
Asian American identity 1.000   
POC identity .453 1.000  
American identity .277 -.026 1.000 
Identity scale factor scores W2    
Asian American identity 1.000   
POC identity .469 1.000  
American identity .277 -.009 1.000 
Identity scale factor scores W3    
Asian American identity 1.000   
POC identity .397 1.000  
American identity .278 .004 1.000 
    
Identity ranks W1    
Asian American identity 1.000   
POC identity -.040 1.000  
American identity -.127 -.453  
Identity ranks W2    
Asian American identity 1.000   
POC identity .024 1.000  
American identity -.188 -.491 1.000 
Identity ranks W3    
Asian American identity 1.000   
POC identity .023 1.000  
American identity -.195 -.567 1.000 
    
Identity checklist W1    
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Asian American identity 1.000   
POC identity .255 1.000  
American identity .145 .161 1.000 
Identity checklist W2    
Asian American identity 1.000   
POC identity .259 1.000  
American identity .109 .095 1.000 
Identity checklist W3    
Asian American identity 1.000   
POC identity .264 1.000  
American identity .183 .114 1.000 
 
Mean racial attitude scores were above the midpoint for both White and nonwhite 
target groups on both feeling thermometers and stereotype scales, though the means for 
nonwhite FT and stereotype ratings appear slightly higher than those for White FT and 
stereotype ratings. Respondents’ policy positions were, on average, on the side of 
benefitting the relevant minority group or groups with regard to immigration and criminal 
justice reform (means > .5, the midpoint of a 0-1 scale). However, mean responses were 
around the midpoint between favoring and opposing affirmative action. 
Stability of Measures. Because one of the major differences between CLPM and 
RI-CLPM is their assumptions about variable stability (Orth et al., 2021), I examined the 
correlations of each variable (generally factor scores or composite scores except for the 
White FT) with itself across the three waves of the study. These correlations are 
presented in Table 7. As one might expect, the identity scale factor scores (r = .82-.93) 
and racial attitude variables (r = .60-.83) show high levels of stability over the time frame 
of this study. Surprisingly, the policy attitude variables, especially the immigration and 
criminal justice factor scores (r = .97-.999), show as much or more stability. These high 
COMMON INGROUP IDENTITY AND POLITICAL SOLIDARITY 94 
levels of stability potentially underlie some of the model convergence issues discussed 
below in the results for identity and policy attitudes. 
Table 7 
Study 1 Variable Autocorrelations 
 
 W1-W2 W2-W3 W1-W3 
Identity scale factor scores    
Asian American ID .822 .876 .816 
POC ID .894 .893 .864 
American ID .919 .928 .914 
Identity ranks (Spearman correlations)    
Asian American ID .478 .577 .502 
POC ID .547 .657 .566 
American ID .646 .668 .612 
Identity checklist    
Asian American ID .435 .513 .492 
POC ID .536 .623 .536 
American ID .472 .563 .437 
    
Racial attitude variables    
Non-White FT factor score .809 .832 .755 
Non-White stereotype factor score .712 .765 .767 
White FT .752 .772 .756 
White stereotype composite .627 .671 .600 
    
Policy attitude variables    
Immigration factor score .990 .992 .999 
Criminal justice factor score (continuous indicators) .972 .975 .966 
Criminal justice factor score (categorical indicator) .992 .992 .989 
Affirmative action composite .797 .843 .816 
    
Potential mediators    
Efficacy factor score .784 .780 .862 
Linked fate factor score .803 .894 .820 
Perceived discrimination factor score .856 .819 .735 
Relative deprivation factor score .875 .894 .877 
 
2. Confirmatory Factor Analysis 
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 Confirmatory factor analysis was done for the identity, racial attitude, policy 
attitude, and mediator items both cross-sectionally within each wave and longitudinally. 
All CFAs were done using the lavaan package (Rosseel, 2012) in R. Cross-sectional 
CFAs used lavaan’s default settings: list-wise deletion for missing data, maximum 
likelihood estimation for models with continuous indicators, and WLSMV estimator with 
robust standard errors for models with categorical indicators. Longitudinal CFAs were 
initially run with full-information maximum likelihood estimation if all indicators were 
continuous or diagonally weighted least squares estimation with pairwise deletion and 
robust standard errors (from the WLSMV estimator) if any indicators were treated as 
categorical. However, this estimation method imputed factor scores for missing data, 
which seemed inappropriate for a longitudinal study with attrition, and some initial panel 
models using factor scores generated from these models failed to converge. Thus, the 
CFAs were re-run with list-wise deletion. In all longitudinal CFA models, residual 
covariances were allowed for each observed variable with itself across waves. 
Longitudinal models were used to test equality of factor loadings and then intercepts 
across waves, and factor scores for identity, attitudes toward nonwhites, immigration and 
criminal justice attitudes, and potential mediators were generated based on the most 
stringent model that did not significantly worsen model fit. 
Identity. I expected a 3-factor model with the three identities (Asian American, 
POC, and American) as factors to fit the data in each wave. Cross-sectional CFA fit 
statistics are presented in Table 8. In each wave, a 3-factor model with only the Huddy 
scale items for each identity and shared method error covariances fit well based on CFI 
(.981-.982), RMSEA (.056-.057), and SRMR (.033-.044). First-order factor models with 
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the scale items, ranks, and checks did not fit well: SRMR indicated good fit only for 
Wave 1 with shared method error covariances and check variables treated as categorical 
(SRMR = .078); CFI and RMSEA never met fit criteria. Models with Huddy scale 
composite scores and rank and check variables met the fit criteria for SRMR (.063-.069) 
and CFI based on non-robust estimates (.954-.979) when shared method error 
covariances were included, but they did not meet fit criteria for RMSEA (non-robust 
RMSEA = .079-.093). Second-order factor models with shared method error covariances 
for ranks, checks, and first-order scale factors mostly fit well based on non-robust fit 
statistics (CFI = .961-.971; RMSEA = .056-.062; SRMR = .063-.068) but not robust CFI 
(.836-.872) or robust RMSEA (.069-.074). 
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Table 8 
 
Study 1 Identity Cross-sectional CFA Fit Statistics 
 
 Wave 1 Wave 2 Wave 3 
 N CFI RMSEA SRMR N CFI RMSEA SRMR N CFI RMSEA SRMR 
Model 1 (Huddy scale only) 973    780    644 
 
   
no error covariances  .916 .105 .048  .903 .114 .059  .889 .126 .055 
shared method covariances  .981 .057 .033  .982 .056 .044  .982 .057 .034 
Model 2 (1st-order factors) 963    763    629    
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Model 4 (2nd-order factors) 963    763    629    
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Longitudinal CFA only showed adequate fit for models with the Huddy scale 
items alone and within-wave shared method error covariances (unconstrained model CFI 
= .957, RMSEA = .050, SRMR = .051). Furthermore, models with rank and check 
variables, especially if they included shared method error covariances, tended to produce 
warnings about covariance matrices that were not positive definite, negative residual 
variances, or both. Fit statistics for all longitudinal CFA models with list-wise deletion 
are presented in Table 9. As was true in the pilot study, identity scale internal consistency 
was higher with only the Huddy scale items (Asian American: W1 & W2  = .84, W3  
= .85; POC: W1 & W2  = .91, W3  = .92; American:  = .84 in all 3 waves) than with 
those items and the ranks and checks (Asian American: W1  = .77, W2  = .79, W3  = 
.80; POC:  = .88 in all 3 waves; American: W1 & W2  = .80, W3  = .81). This 
pattern, along with the longitudinal CFA results, again suggests that the different 
measures of identity might capture slightly different constructs. Accordingly, the panel 
models I report below use identity factor scores based on the longitudinal CFA with only 
the Huddy scale items and within-wave shared method error covariances. 
For this longitudinal CFA model, constraining factor loadings to be equal across 
waves did not significantly affect fit (constrained: 𝜒504
2 = 1276.345, unconstrained: 
𝜒486
2 = 1265.408, ∆𝜒18
2 = 10.937, p = .897). But subsequently constraining intercepts to 
be equal across waves resulted in significantly worse fit (constrained: 𝜒528
2 = 1328.846, 
unconstrained: 𝜒504
2 = 1276.345, ∆𝜒24
2 = 52.501, p < .001). Thus, factor scores for each 
identity (Asian American, POC, and American) were generated from the model with 
equal loadings. The standardized version of the final longitudinal CFA model used to 
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generate identity factor scores is presented in Figure 5, with residual variances, item 
residual covariances, and cross-identity cross-wave covariances omitted for readability. 
Table 9 
 
Study 1 Identity Longitudinal CFA Fit Statistics 
 
 N CFI RMSEA  SRMR 2 (df) 2 
(df) 
Model 1 (Huddy scale only) 632      
no within-wave error 
covariances 







unconstrained  .957 .050 .051 1265.408 
(486) 
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Model 4 (2nd-order factors) 603      
no w/in wave error cov, 
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Note: Models with first-order factor error correlations had impossible correlations among 
first-order factors (within-wave) and between the Wave 2 and 3 American identity 
second-order factors. In some models with rank and check covariances, some within-
wave check covariances were impossible. 
 
Note: 2 was significant for all models at the p < .001 level. To save space, significance 
indicators are omitted for the 2 column. 
 
a Model converged with a warning that the covariance matrix of the residuals of the 
observed variables was not positive definite. 
b Negative residual variance (and corresponding impossible loading) for American 
identity rank  
c Negative residual variance (and corresponding impossible loading onto the second-
order factor) for 1st-order Asian American identity scale factor in Wave 3 and/or Wave 1 
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Figure 5. Study 1 identity final 3-factor longitudinal CFA model, showing standardized 
coefficients. This model includes only the Huddy scale items for each identity, with item 
residual autocorrelations across waves, within-wave shared method covariances for each 
scale item across identities, and equal (unstandardized) factor loadings across waves. 
Item residual covariances and cross-identity, cross-wave factor covariances are omitted 
from the figure for readability. Italics indicate non-significant within-wave factor 
correlations (between POC and American identities). 
 
 Racial attitudes. Cross-sectional CFA models with all items about nonwhites 
loading onto a single factor and no error covariances did not fit well in any wave (CFI = 
.759-.762; RMSEA = .355-.362; SRMR = .088-.094). Adding shared method covariances 
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(i.e., between the FTs and between the same stereotype item for the different target 
groups) resulted in adequate fit based on SRMR (.029-.041) and based on CFI in Wave 1 
(.963), but RMSEA remained high across waves (.171-.215). For comparison, a 1-factor 
model for nonwhite stereotypes (with no error covariances) showed good fit based on 
CFI (.955-.969) and SRMR (.029-.036) but again, not based on RMSEA (.205-.244). Fit 
statistics are presented in Table 10. (Cross-sectional CFA models could not be tested for 
the White FT and stereotype items because they would have been just-identified.) Black 
and Hispanic/Latino FT ratings were highly correlated in each wave (W1 r = .866, W2 r 
= .867, W3 r = .863), and internal consistency for a scale combining the Black and 
Hispanic stereotype items was high ( = .89 in every wave), though dropping the 
Hispanic lazy-hardworking item tended to increase alpha.
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Table 10 
 
Study 1 Racial Attitude Cross-sectional CFA Fit Statistics 
 
 Wave 1 Wave 2 Wave 3 
 N CFI RMSEA SRMR N CFI RMSEA SRMR N CFI RMSEA SRMR 
Attitudes toward non-Whites, 1 
factor 
984    781    646    
no error covariances  .761 .355 .094  .759 .362 .092  .762 .355 .088 
FT cov  .949 .174 .033  .938 .195 .037  .938 .192 .037 
shared method cov  .963 .171 .029  .944 .215 .038  .942 .215 .041 
Non-White stereotypes 984 .962 .228 .033 783 .969 .205 .029 646 .955 .244 .036 
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 Longitudinal CFA with full-information maximum likelihood estimation similarly 
showed that a 1-factor model of attitudes toward nonwhites did not fit (CFI = .806, 
RMSEA = .162, SRMR = .133). A 2-factor model with the feeling thermometers on one 
factor and the stereotype items on the other factor fit well based on CFI (.962) and SRMR 
(.033), but RMSEA (.076) was somewhat higher than ideal. Constraining loadings and 
intercepts to be equal across waves did not significantly affect model fit. However, with 
list-wise deletion and regular maximum likelihood estimation, the 2-factor model had an 
impossible residual covariance for one of the feeling thermometer items between Wave 1 
and Wave 3. Thus, I also modeled nonwhite FTs and nonwhite stereotypes separately. 
The nonwhite stereotypes model fit well based on CFI (.972) and SRMR (.043) but not 
RMSEA (.089). Constraining loadings to be equal across waves did not significantly 
affect model fit (𝜒45
2 = 241.409, 𝜒39
2 = 236.354, ∆𝜒5
2 = 5.066, 𝑝 =  .535), and neither 
did constraining intercepts to be equal across waves (𝜒53
2 = 248.986, ∆𝜒8
2 = 7.577, 𝑝 =
 .476). The nonwhite FT unconstrained model was just identified; however, despite 
warnings that the smallest eigenvalues were close to 0, the equal loadings and equal 
intercepts models fit well (equal loadings: CFI = 1.000, RMSEA = .005, SRMR = .004, 
𝜒2
2 = 2.029; equal intercepts: CFI = .999, RMSEA = .030, SRMR = .009, 𝜒6
2 = 9.530), 
and neither constraint significantly affected fit (equal loadings: ∆𝜒2
2 = 0.321, 𝑝 =  .852; 
∆𝜒4
2 = 7.501, 𝑝 =  .112). Fit statistics for longitudinal models of attitudes toward 
nonwhites are presented in Table 11. Because of the problems with the 2-factor model, 
factor scores for nonwhite stereotypes and FTs were generated from the separate FT and 
stereotype models with equal intercepts. Standardized versions of the final models used 
to generate factor scores are presented in Figure 6. 
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Table 11 
 
Study 1 Racial Attitude Longitudinal CFA Fit Statistics 
 















unconstrained 988 .962 .076 .033 677.977 
(102) 
 













unconstraineda 642 .963 .084 .039 565.695 
(102) 
 












unconstrained 988 .971 .096 .088 150.214 
(15) 
 











unconstrainedb 650 1.000 .000 .002 1.708 (0)  
=loadingsc  1.000 .005 .004 2.029 (2)  





unconstrained 650 .972 .089 .043 236.354 
(39) 
 









Note: 2 was significant for all models at the p < .001 level. To save space, significance 
indicators are omitted for the 2 column. 
 
a Model converged with a warning that the covariance matrix of the residuals of the 
observed variables was not positive definite. 
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b Non-White FT unconstrained model is underidentified/just identified (df = 0). 
c Model converged with a warning that the variance-covariance matrix of the estimated 









Figure 6. Study 1 final longitudinal CFA models for nonwhite feeling thermometers (a) 
and nonwhite stereotypes (b), showing standardized coefficients. Both models have equal 
(unstandardized) factor loadings and intercepts across waves. Item residual 
autocorrelations are omitted for readability. 
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 Policy attitudes. To make sure the policy items loaded onto 3 separate factors—
immigration, criminal justice, and affirmative action—a 3-factor cross-sectional model 
was examined for each wave. Because the item about the number of people in prison only 
had 3 response options, I tested both a model treating that variable as continuous and a 
model treating it as ordered categorical. The continuous indicators model fit well based 
on CFI (.966-.974) and SRMR (.038-.040) but not RMSEA (.069-.076) in every wave; 
the model with the categorical indicator fit well based on all non-robust fit statistics (CFI 
= .993-.999; RMSEA = .016-.036; SRMR = .036-.040) but not robust CFI (.904-.933) or 
RMSEA (.072-.084). Fit statistics for both the cross-sectional and longitudinal CFA 
models are presented in Table 12. 
Table 12 
 
Study 1 Policy Attitude CFA Fit Statistics 
 
  N CFI RMSEA SRMR 2 (df) 2 (df) 
3-factor, continuous 
indicators 
      
Wave 1  985 .968 .072 .040 103.123 
(17) 
 
Wave 2  783 .966 .076 .039 93.738 
(17) 
 





unconstra 988 .986 .032 .041 381.795 
(192) 
 








3-factor, categorical crim 
indicator 
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Immigration       
FIML unconstr 988 .999 .017 .011 19.485 
(15) 
 








no FIML unconstr 649 .999 .023 .011 20.105 
(15) 
 












unconstr 988 1.000 .010 .009 16.609 
(15) 
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unconstr 646 1.000 .010 .010 15.920 
(15) 
 








































unconstrc,d 988 .998 .000 .004 6.191 (0)  
=loadingsd  .998 .062 .012 9.481 (2) 3.290 
(2) 





a Model converged with a warning that the covariance matrix of latent variables was not 
positive definite. 
b Model converged with a warning that the variance-covariance matrix of the estimated 
parameters might not be positive definite and that the smallest eigenvalue was close to 0. 
c Affirmative action unconstrained model is underidentified/just identified (df = 0). 
d Negative residual variances (and corresponding impossible loadings) for affirmative 
action in employment item. 
 
 Longitudinal 3-factor CFA models with full-information maximum likelihood 
estimation or pairwise deletion appeared to fit well (continuous indicators: CFI = .986, 
RMSEA = .034, SRMR = .041; categorical number of people in prison item: non-robust 
CFI = .999, robust CFI = .932, non-robust RMSEA = .015, robust RMSEA = .046, 
SRMR = .038) but resulted in warnings that the covariance matrix of latent variables was 
not positive definite. Because my hypotheses treat the three policy areas as separate, I 
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then fit 1-factor longitudinal CFA models for each policy area separately for factor score 
generation. Fit statistics for longitudinal models with both FIML/pairwise deletion and 
list-wise deletion are presented in Table 11. The unconstrained models for immigration 
attitudes and criminal justice attitudes fit well, regardless of whether the number of 
people in prison variable was treated as continuous or categorical and regardless of 
whether FIML/pairwise deletion or list-wise deletion was used. However, a 1-factor 
unconstrained model for affirmative action attitudes was just identified, and one of the 
items had an impossibly high factor loading and a negative residual covariance. Because 
the two affirmative action items were highly correlated with each other in each wave (W1 
r = .738, W2 r = .742, W3 r = .790), composite scores seemed more appropriate for 
further analyses than factor scores generated from potentially problematic longitudinal 
CFA models. Internal consistency for immigration attitudes and criminal justice attitudes 
was lower than expected— = .73-.74 for immigration and  = .67-.74 for criminal 
justice—so factor scores seemed more appropriate for those policy areas. 
 In models with list-wise deletion, constraining loadings to be equal across waves 
did not significantly affect fit for immigration attitudes (𝜒19
2 = 24.876, 𝜒15
2 =
20.105, Δ𝜒4
2 = 4.771, 𝑝 = .312), criminal justice attitudes with continuous indicators 
(𝜒19
2 = 18.035, 𝜒15
2 = 15.920, Δ𝜒4
2 = 2.115, 𝑝 = .715), or criminal justice attitudes with 
the number of people in prison item treated as ordered categorical (𝜒19
2 = 4.125, 𝜒15
2 =
2.126, Δ𝜒4
2 = 1.999, 𝑝 = .736). Constraining intercepts to be equal across waves also did 
not affect model fit for immigration attitudes (𝜒25
2 = 27.350, Δ𝜒6
2 = 2.474, 𝑝 = .871) but 
marginally significantly worsened fit for criminal justice attitudes with continuous 
indicators (𝜒25
2 = 29.844, Δ𝜒6
2 = 11.809, 𝑝 = .066). For criminal justice attitudes with 
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the categorical indicator, the equal intercepts model produced a warning that the smallest 
eigenvalue was close to 0, though model fit was not significantly worse than in the 
unconstrained model (𝜒25
2 = 7.431, Δ𝜒6
2 = 3.306, 𝑝 = .770). Based on these results, 
factor scores for immigration attitudes were generated based on the equal intercepts 
model, and factor scores for criminal justice attitudes were generated based on the equal 
loadings models, with separate factor scores from the model with continuous indicators 
and the model with the number of people in prison variable treated as ordered categorical. 
(Equal loadings models were used for both versions of the criminal justice attitude factor 
scores to keep them as comparable as possible.) The standardized version of the final 
immigration attitude model is presented in Figure 7; the standardized versions of the final 
criminal justice attitude models are presented in Figure 8. 
 
 
Figure 7. Study 1 final longitudinal CFA model for immigration attitudes, showing 
standardized coefficients. The model has equal (unstandardized) factor loadings and 
intercepts across waves. Item residual autocorrelations are omitted for readability. 
 
 







Figure 8. Study 1 final longitudinal CFA models for criminal justice attitudes, with the 
number of people in prison item treated as continuous (a) and categorical (b), showing 
standardized coefficients. Both models have equal (unstandardized) loadings across 
waves. Item residual autocorrelations are omitted for readability. 
 
 Potential mediators. One-factor cross-sectional CFA models were examined 
separately for efficacy and for all of the other items (which the pilot study EFA indicated 
were part of a single factor, and which I refer to in this analysis as “relative deprivation”). 
Neither model fit well in any wave (efficacy: CFI = .710-.779, RMSEA = .337-.430, 
SRMR = .085-.100; relative deprivation: CFI = .729-.776, RMSEA = .186-.200, SRMR = 
.090-.113). Adding shared method error covariances to the efficacy model (i.e., 
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covariances between similarly worded items across the two identities) led to a warning 
that the information matrix could not be inverted. Because one of the largest modification 
indices in the relative deprivation model suggested a covariance between the two linked 
fate scores, I tested a 2-factor model with the linked fate items on one factor and the 
remaining items on the other (which fits identically to a 1-factor model with error 
covariance between the two linked fate items). This model also did not fit well (CFI = 
.830-.850, RMSEA = .153-.161, SRMR = .075-.091), but adding error covariances 
among the perceived discrimination items resulted in at least meeting the criterion for 
SRMR (.061-.072).  
I also examined models with all of the potential mediator items. A 2-factor model 
with efficacy and relative deprivation as the factors fit poorly (CFI = .698-.754, RMSEA 
= .143-.160, SRMR = .089-.111). A 3-factor model separating linked fate from relative 
deprivation also did not meet fit criteria (CFI = .778-.814, RMSEA = .126-.139, SRMR = 
.081-.096). Adding error covariances among the perceived discrimination items met the 
SRMR criterion in Wave 1 (SRMR = .075). Adding shared method error covariances for 
the efficacy items resulted in negative residual variances. Fit statistics for the cross-
sectional CFA models are presented in Table 13.
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Table 13 
 
Study 1 Potential Mediators Cross-sectional CFA Fit Statistics 
 
 Wave 1 Wave 2 Wave 3 
 N CFI RMSEA SRMR N CFI RMSEA SRMR N CFI RMSEA SRMR 
Efficacy 987    784    649    
no error covariances  .748 .359 .086  .779 .337 .085  .710 .430 .100 
shared method cova  .834 0 .108  .854 0 .074  .844 0 .139 
Relative deprivation 1-factor 807 .776 .186 .090 629 .772 .186 .093 530 .729 .200 .113 
Relative deprivation 2-factor 807    629    530    
no error cov  .843 .158 .075  .850 .153 .076  .830 .161 .091 
PD cov  .912 .126 .061  .912 .125 .063  .923 .115 .072 
2-factor model (RD + Eff) 806 .754 .143 .089 629 .748 .144 .100 529 .698 .160 .111 
3-factor model (LF + RD + Eff) 806    629    529    
no error cov  .809 .128 .081  .814 .126 .090  .778 .139 .096 
PD cov  .863 .111 .075  .862 .111 .084  .847 .119 .088 
eff shared method cov  .836 .120b .070  .839 .119b .067  .820 .127b .084 
PD cov & eff shared method cov  .889 .101b .063  .887 .103+ .061  .888 .103b .075 
 
a Information matrix could not be inverted. Standard errors not available. 
b Negative residual variances for some observed variables. 
c Model converged with a warning that the covariance matrix of observed variables was not positive definite
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 Longitudinal CFA models were initially tested using FIML. A 1-factor model for 
efficacy met the fit criterion for SRMR (.069) but not for CFI (.847) or RMSEA (.127). A 
1-factor model for relative deprivation did not meet the criteria for any of the fit statistics 
(CFI = .854, RMSEA = .082, SRMR = .092). A 2-factor relative deprivation model with 
within-wave error covariances among the perceived discrimination items fit well based 
on RMSEA (.060) and SRMR (.079) but not CFI (.926). I also fit a 3-factor relative 
deprivation model that separated the perceived discrimination items from the remaining 
“relative deprivation” items; this model nearly met fit criteria (CFI = .945, RMSEA = 
.053, SRMR = .055) without any within-wave error covariances. Combining the 3-factor 
relative deprivation model with a factor for the efficacy items produced a 4-factor model 
that fit based on RMSEA (.051) and SRMR (.072) but not CFI (.912). Adding within-
wave shared method covariances for the efficacy items appeared to improve fit, although 
CFI was still less than ideal (CFI = .922, RMSEA = .048, SRMR = .069). 
 I re-fit the relative deprivation 3-factor model and the mediator 4-factor model 
using list-wise deletion for missing data. The relative deprivation model fit based on 
SRMR (.060) and was close to but did not quite meet the criteria for CFI or RMSEA (CFI 
= .945, RMSEA = .062). However, the 4-factor mediator model did not fit well (CFI = 
.898, RMSEA = .064, SRMR = .085). Adding within-wave shared method covariances 
for the efficacy items brought RMSEA down to .060 (good fit) and SRMR down to .082 
(almost a good fit), but CFI (.911) was still low. I also tested models (using both FIML 
and list-wise deletion) with both within-wave and between-wave efficacy item shared 
method covariances, but these models had impossible loadings and negative residual 
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Study 1 Potential Mediators Longitudinal CFA Fit Statistics 
 
 N CFI RMSEA SRMR 2 (df) 2 (df) 
Efficacy (FIML) 988      
no w/in wave error cov  .847 .127 .069 656.352 
(39) 
 
w/in wave shared method 
cov 
 .889 .117 .067 482.835 
(33) 
 
RD 1-factor (FIML) 988 .854 .082 .092 2233.303 
(294) 
 
RD 2-factor (FIML) 988      
no w/in wave error cov  .896 .070 .076 1662.331 
(282) 
 
w/in wave PD 
cov 
unconst  .926 .060 .079 1258.879 
(273) 
 




RD 3-factor       
FIML unconst 988 .945 .053 .055 983.846 
(261) 
 




no FIML unconst 421 .945 .062 .060 677.910 
(261) 
 




Mediator 2F (eff + RD) 
(FIML) 
988 .840 .066 .091 3450.468 
(648) 
 
Mediator 3F (eff, LF, RD) 
(FIML) 
988 .874 .060 .081 2832.968 
(627) 
 
Mediator 4F (eff, LF, PD, 
RD) 
      
unconst 988 .912 .051 .072 2138.736 
(597) 
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no w/in wave 
error cov, 
FIML 




w/in wave eff 
cov, FIML 
unconst 988 .922 .048 .069 1962.581 
(591) 
 




w/in & between-wave eff 
cov, FIMLa 
988 .929 .047 .060 1824.094 
(579) 
 
no w/in wave 
error cov, no 
FIML 
unconst 420 .898 .064 .085 1623.945 
(597) 
 




w/in wave eff 
cov, no 
FIML 
unconst 420 .911 .060 .082 1485.956 
(591) 
 




w/in & between-wave eff 
cov, no FIMLa 




a Negative residual variances (and corresponding impossible loadings) for Asian 
American efficacy item 1. 
 
For the 4-factor model with within-wave error covariances for the efficacy items, 
constraining loadings to be equal across waves resulted in significantly worse fit (𝜒609
2 =
1993.737, 𝜒591
2 = 1962.581, Δ𝜒18
2 = 31.156, 𝑝 = .028). Because it appeared to provide 
the best fit for the full set of mediator items and because equality constraints significantly 
reduced fit, I used the unconstrained 4-factor model with efficacy shared method error 
covariances to generate factor scores for efficacy, linked fate, perceived discrimination, 
and relative deprivation. The standardized version of the final longitudinal CFA model 
for the mediator items is presented in Figure 9. 
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Figure 9. Study 1 final 4-factor longitudinal CFA model for mediator items, showing 
standardized coefficients and significant within-wave factor correlations. The four factors 
were efficacy, linked fate, perceived discrimination, and relative deprivation, and the 
model included within-wave shared method covariances for the Asian American and 
POC versions of each efficacy item. Item residual covariances, cross-wave factor 
covariances, and non-significant within-wave factor covariances are omitted for 
readability. 
 
3. Identity and Racial Attitudes 
 I hypothesized based on the common ingroup identity model that 1) identification 
as POC would predict more positive attitudes toward Black and Latino Americans 
(Hypothesis 2); 2) identification as American would predict more positive attitudes 
toward Black and Latino Americans (Hypothesis 1); and 3) identification as American 
would predict more positive attitudes toward Whites (Hypothesis 1). 
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Cross-lagged panel models and random-intercepts cross-lagged panel models 
were used to test these hypotheses. CLPM was used to test whether between-person 
differences in identity importance at Time 1 predict changes in racial attitudes (relative to 
other people) from Time 1 to Time 2 (cf. Orth et al., 2020). However, the CLPM lagged 
and cross-lagged coefficients conflate between-person and within-person effects 
(Hamaker et al., 2015). By separating stable between-person variance from within-person 
variance over time, RI-CLPM could provide two pieces of information: 1) whether, at the 
between-person level, stable individual differences in identity and racial attitudes are 
correlated with each other and 2) whether within-person variation in identity predicts 
within-person changes in racial attitudes. 
CLPM and RI-CLPM were analyzed through structural equation modeling using 
the lavaan package in R. For each identity-attitude pair, I tested CLPM with and without 
demographic and political covariates4 and with and without stationarity across lags, and I 
tested RI-CLPM with and without stationarity. 
 a. Cross-lagged panel models (CLPM). Fit statistics for the identity-racial 
attitude panel models are provided in Tables 15-18. CLPM models with nonwhite FTs 
appeared to fit well based on CFI and SRMR (CFI ≥ .95, SRMR ≤ .08), but RMSEA was 
high across identities and models (.146-.218 for Asian American identity, .137-.206 for 
POC identity, .176-.252 for American identity). Models with nonwhite stereotypes met 
the criteria for SRMR but not always for CFI (.910-.944 for Asian American identity, 
 
4 Because two of the demographic covariates, foreign-born and age of arrival in the U.S., 
are in a sense perfectly collinear (only foreign-born respondents have a value for age of 
arrival), I fit separate models with all of the other covariates plus foreign-born and all of 
the other covariates plus age of arrival. 
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.928-.956 for POC identity, .917-.945 for American identity) and not for RMSEA (.225-
.322 for Asian American identity, .210-.313 for POC identity, .245-.360 for American 
identity). White FTs and stereotypes showed similar patterns (FT: CFI = .929-.963, 
RMSEA = .190-.302; stereotypes: CFI = .936-.975, RMSEA = .153-.266). Less than 
ideal model fit as measured by CFI and RMSEA is not unexpected for CLPM with real 
data, however (see Orth et al., 2021). 
 Stationarity constraints significantly worsened model fit for some identity-attitude 
pairs but not others, but no clear pattern emerged for when this was the case (see right 
column of Tables 15-18). Parameter estimates reported in this section are from the 
models without covariates, unless otherwise specified, and I indicate whether they come 
from models with or without stationarity.
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Table 15 
 
Study 1 Panel Model Fit Statistics: Nonwhite FTs 
 
 N CFI RMSEA SRMR 2 (df) 2 (df) 
IV: Asian American ID       
CLPM Model 1 631 .962 .218 .028 123.907 (4)***  
CLPM Model 1 w/ stationarity 631 .961 .156 .033 130.726 (8)*** 6.819 (4) 
CLPM Model 2 613 .973 .218 .010 120.394 (4)***  
CLPM Model 2 w/ stationarity 613 .972 .156 .012 127.989 (8)*** 7.595 (4) 
CLPM Model 3 126 .979 .204 .010 24.928 (4)***  
CLPM Model 3 w/ stationarity 126 .978 .146 .014 29.519 (8)*** 4.591 (4) 
RI-CLPM 631 1.000 .000 .000 0.001 (1) 123.906 (3)*** 
RI-CLPM w/ stationarity 631 .998 .046 .026 11.546 (5)* 11.545 (4)* 
IV: POC ID       
CLPM Model 1 631 .971 .203 .023 108.279 (4)***  
CLPM Model 1 w/ stationarity 631 .971 .145 .027 113.591 (8)*** 5.312 (4) 
CLPM Model 2 613 .978 .206 .008 108.152 (4)***  
CLPM Model 2 w/ stationarity 613 .978 .145 .009 110.501 (8)*** 2.349 (4) 
CLPM Model 3 129 .986 .168 .007 18.200 (4)**  
CLPM Model 3 w/ stationarity 126 .982 .137 .014 26.942 (8)** 8.742 (4)† 
RI-CLPM 631 1.000 .000 .002 0.144 (1) 108.135 (3)*** 
RI-CLPM w/ stationarity 631 1.000 .017 .014 5.951 (5) 5.807 (4) 
IV: American ID       
CLPM Model 1 631 .960 .252 .023 164.457 (4)***  
CLPM Model 1 w/ stationarity 631 .958 .182 .027 175.385 (8)*** 10.928 (4)* 
CLPM Model 2 613 .971 .245 .008 151.677 (4)***  
CLPM Model 2 w/ stationarity 613 .970 .176 .009 159.628 (8)*** 7.951 (4)† 
CLPM Model 3 126 .977 .237 .007 32.197 (4)***  
CLPM Model 3 w/ stationarity 126 .973 .179 .012 40.237 (8)*** 8.040 (4)† 
COMMON INGROUP IDENTITY AND POLITICAL SOLIDARITY 123 
RI-CLPM 631 1.000 .000 .004 0.354 (1) 164.103 (3)*** 
RI-CLPM w/ stationarity 631 1.000 .000 .012 4.203 (5) 3.849 (4) 
 






Study 1 Panel Model Fit Statistics: Nonwhite Stereotypes 
 
 N CFI RMSEA SRMR 2 (df) 2 (df) 
IV: Asian American ID       
CLPM Model 1 625 .912 .318 .053 256.202 (4)***  
CLPM Model 1 w/ stationarity 625 .910 .227 .057 266.088 (8)*** 9.886 (4)* 
CLPM Model 2 607 .936 .322 .019 255.510 (4)***  
CLPM Model 2 w/ stationarity 607 .935 .231 .021 267.067 (8)*** 11.557 (4)* 
CLPM Model 3 125 .944 .320 .018 55.175 (4)***  
CLPM Model 3 w/ stationarity 125 .944 .225 .020 58.772 (8)*** 3.597 (4) 
RI-CLPM 625 1.000 .000 .004 0.390 (1) 255.812 (3)*** 
RI-CLPM w/ stationarity 625 .995 .065 .036 18.267 (5)** 17.877 (4)** 
IV: POC ID       
CLPM Model 1 625 .929 .306 .050 238.315 (4)***  
CLPM Model 1 w/ stationarity 625 .928 .219 .052 247.206 (8)*** 8.891 (4)† 
CLPM Model 2 607 .946 .313 .018 242.435 (4)***  
CLPM Model 2 w/ stationarity 607 .945 .224 .019 250.852 (8)*** 8.417 (4)† 
CLPM Model 3 125 .956 .293 .016 46.981 (4)***  
CLPM Model 3 w/ stationarity 125 .955 .210 .019 51.997 (8)*** 5.016 (4) 
RI-CLPM 625 1.000 .000 .005 0.719 (1) 237.596 (3)*** 
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RI-CLPM w/ stationarity 625 .999 .033 .020 8.393 (5) 7.674 (4) 
IV: American ID       
CLPM Model 1 625 .921 .341 .050 295.514 (4)***  
CLPM Model 1 w/ stationarity 625 .917 .248 .056 314.579 (8)*** 19.065 (4)*** 
CLPM Model 2 607 .941 .341 .018 286.584 (4)***  
CLPM Model 2 w/ stationarity 607 .939 .245 .020 300.154 (8)*** 13.570 (4)** 
CLPM Model 3 125 .943 .360 .016 68.769 (4)***  
CLPM Model 3 w/ stationarity 125 .945 .250 .018 70.706 (8)*** 1.937 (4) 
RI-CLPM 625 1.000 .000 .001 0.017 (1) 295.497 (3)*** 
RI-CLPM w/ stationarity 625 .997 .063 .032 17.445 (5)** 17.428 (4)** 
 






Study 1 Panel Model Fit Statistics: White FT 
 
 N CFI RMSEA SRMR 2 (df) 2 (df) 
IV: Asian American ID       
CLPM Model 1 627 .937 .272 .041 189.526 (4)***  
CLPM Model 1 w/ stationarity 627 .929 .204 .050 216.167 (8)*** 26.641 (4)*** 
CLPM Model 2 609 .956 .269 .015 180.542 (4)***  
CLPM Model 2 w/ stationarity 609 .952 .199 .017 201.413 (8)*** 20.871 (4)*** 
CLPM Model 3 124 .954 .284 .015 44.132 (4)***  
CLPM Model 3 w/ stationarity 124 .949 .213 .020 52.805 (8)*** 8.673 (4)† 
RI-CLPM 627 1.000 .000 .001 0.033 (1) 189.493 (3)*** 
RI-CLPM w/ stationarity 627 .993 .079 .036 24.351 (5)*** 24.318 (4)*** 
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IV: POC ID       
CLPM Model 1 627 .945 .269 .039 185.327 (4)***  
CLPM Model 1 w/ stationarity 627 .945 .190 .040 188.901 (8)*** 3.574 (4) 
CLPM Model 2 609 .960 .271 .014 182.388 (4)***  
CLPM Model 2 w/ stationarity 609 .960 .191 .015 186.150 (8)*** 3.762 (4) 
CLPM Model 3 124 .963 .262 .013 38.033 (4)***  
CLPM Model 3 w/ stationarity 124 .956 .203 .017 48.995 (8)*** 10.962 (4)* 
RI-CLPM 627 .999 .066 .013 3.728 (1)† 181.599 (3)*** 
RI-CLPM w/ stationarity 627 1.000 .023 .016 6.651 (5) 2.923 (4) 
IV: American ID       
CLPM Model 1 627 .944 .293 .038 218.639 (4)***  
CLPM Model 1 w/ stationarity 627 .944 .208 .040 225.689 (8)*** 7.050 (4) 
CLPM Model 2 609 .960 .285 .013 201.496 (4)***  
CLPM Model 2 w/ stationarity 609 .959 .203 .015 208.112 (8)*** 6.616 (4) 
CLPM Model 3 124 .960 .302 .013 49.169 (4)***  
CLPM Model 3 w/ stationarity 124 .959 .216 .017 54.238 (8)*** 5.069 (4) 
RI-CLPM 627 1.000 .000 .002 0.110 (1) 218.529 (3)*** 
RI-CLPM w/ stationarity 627 1.000 .007 .016 5.156 (5) 5.046 (4) 
 






Study 1 Panel Model Fit Statistics: White Stereotypes 
 
 N CFI RMSEA SRMR 2 (df) 2 (df) 
IV: Asian American ID       
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CLPM Model 1 632 .939 .242 .048 152.156 (4)***  
CLPM Model 1 w/ stationarity 632 .936 .175 .051 162.833 (8)*** 10.677 (4)* 
CLPM Model 2 614 .959 .240 .017 145.023 (4)***  
CLPM Model 2 w/ stationarity 614 .958 .172 .018 154.047 (8)*** 9.024 (4)† 
CLPM Model 3 126 .967 .232 .014 31.128 (4)***  
CLPM Model 3 w/ stationarity 126 .967 .163 .018 34.773 (8)*** 3.645 (4) 
RI-CLPM 632 1.000 .000 .004 0.257 (1) 151.899 (3)*** 
RI-CLPM w/ stationarity 632 .996 .054 .033 14.349 (5)* 14.092 (4)** 
IV: POC ID       
CLPM Model 1 632 .950 .235 .045 143.992 (4)***  
CLPM Model 1 w/ stationarity 632 .950 .166 .046 147.894 (8)*** 3.902 (4) 
CLPM Model 2 614 .965 .235 .016 139.859 (4)***  
CLPM Model 2 w/ stationarity 614 .965 .165 .017 142.252 (8)*** 2.393 (4) 
CLPM Model 3 126 .975 .208 .013 25.899 (4)***  
CLPM Model 3 w/ stationarity 126 .973 .153 .017 31.580 (8)*** 5.681 (4) 
RI-CLPM 632 .999 .054 .014 2.874 (1)† 141.118 (3)*** 
RI-CLPM w/ stationarity 632 .997 .049 .028 12.616 (5)* 9.742 (4)* 
IV: American ID       
CLPM Model 1 632 .946 .266 .043 182.566 (4)***  
CLPM Model 1 w/ stationarity 632 .945 .189 .045 188.964 (8)*** 6.398 (4) 
CLPM Model 2 614 .962 .258 .016 166.947 (4)***  
CLPM Model 2 w/ stationarity 614 .963 .181 .016 169.690 (8)*** 2.743 (4) 
CLPM Model 3 126 .974 .234 .010 31.697 (4)***  
CLPM Model 3 w/ stationarity 126 .971 .174 .017 38.522 (8)*** 6.825 (4) 
RI-CLPM 632 1.000 .026 .011 1.427 (1) 181.139 (3)*** 
RI-CLPM w/ stationarity 632 1.000 .012 .020 5.476 (5) 5.049 (4) 
 
Note: 2 for RI-CLPM without stationarity is vs. CLPM Model 1 without stationarity. Otherwise, 2 is for stationarity vs. no 
stationarity.
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 Consistent with Hypothesis 2, higher POC identification (as measured by the 
Huddy et al. scale items) predicted higher ratings on nonwhite stereotypes (model 
without covariates: Wave 1-2: b = .092, SE = .023, p < .001,  = .116; Wave 2-3: b = 
.043, SE = .022, p = .048,  = .054), as shown in Figure 10a. (Lagged and cross-lagged 
coefficients for all models are presented in Appendix C.) Higher POC identification also 
predicted higher nonwhite FT ratings (with stationarity: b = .031, SE = .014, p = .023,  = 
.038 & .039), at least between Waves 1 and 2 (b = .057, SE = .020, p = .005,  = .069) 
(see Figure 10b for model with stationarity). Thus, respondents who identified more as 
POC tended to show improvements in nonwhite stereotype ratings and possibly nonwhite 
FT ratings, at least from Wave 1 to Wave 2, compared to respondents who identified less 
as POC.  






Figure 10. Study 1 CLPM for POC identity and nonwhite stereotypes, without covariates 
and with no stationarity constraints (a), and POC identity and nonwhite feeling 
thermometers (FT), without covariates and with stationarity constraints on lagged and 
cross-lagged effects (b). Unstandardized coefficients with standard errors (in parentheses) 
and standardized coefficients are shown. Statistical significance is indicated as follows: 
*** p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05, † p < .10 (marginally significant). 
 
However, the identity-FT cross-lagged coefficients are not significant for the 
Wave 2-3 time lag unless stationarity across time lags is assumed, and the same is true 
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for the identity-stereotypes cross-lagged coefficients in models with covariates. The 
stationarity assumption appears appropriate for POC identity and nonwhite FTs. 
However, because fit is marginally significantly worse with stationarity for the POC 
identity-nonwhite stereotypes models with larger sample sizes (i.e., the models without 
covariates and the models with foreign-born as a covariate) (see right column of Table 
16) the Wave 2 to Wave 3 cross-lagged effects are less well-supported than the Wave 1 to 
Wave 2 cross-lagged effects.  
 Cross-lagged coefficients for American identity and attitudes toward nonwhites 
are not consistent in either significance or sign across time lags. The cross-lagged effect 
of American identity on nonwhite stereotypes is negative and marginally significant from 
Wave 1 to Wave 2 (b = -.047, SE = .028, p = .087,  = -.048) and positive and significant 
from Wave 2 to Wave 3 (b = .057, SE = .026, p = .029,  = .056); the reverse effect, from 
stereotypes to identity, switches signs in the opposite direction, though only the positive 
Wave 1-2 effect is significant (b = .035, SE = .016, p = .035,  = .034). A similar pattern 
emerges for nonwhite FTs, but only the reverse effects approach significance (W1-W2 b 
= .034, SE = .016, p = .029,  = .034; W2-W3 b = -.024, SE = .015, p = .097,  = -.025). 
The results of the CLPM models for American identity and nonwhite stereotypes (a) and 
FTs (b), without stationarity, are presented in Figure 11. Unsurprisingly in light of the 
different signs across time lags, the stationarity assumption generally does not hold (see 
bottom section, right column of Tables 17 & 18). Overall, the CLPM do not provide 
evidence that Asian Americans who identify more strongly as American feel more 
positively toward other racial minorities over time. 






Figure 11. Study 1 CLPM for American identity and nonwhite stereotypes (a) and 
American identity and nonwhite FTs (b), without covariates and with no stationarity 
constraints. Unstandardized coefficients with standard errors (in parentheses) and 
standardized coefficients are shown. Statistical significance is indicated as follows: *** p 
< .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05, † p < .10 (marginally significant). 
 
 However, American identity does show significant, positive cross-lagged effects 
on both the White FT (with stationarity: b = .110, SE = .021, p < .001,  = .101 & .100) 
(Figure 12a) and White stereotypes (with stationarity: b = .102, SE = .021, p < .001,  = 
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.108 & .111) (Figure 12b) across most models (see Appendix C for coefficients from 
additional models).5 The reverse effect from White FT ratings to American identity is 
also marginally significant to significant, at least between Wave 2 and Wave 3 (with 
stationarity: b = .020, SE = .011, p = .070,  = .021; without stationarity: W2-W3 b = 
.031, SE = .015, p = .035,  = .034). Thus, Asian Americans who identify more as 
American tend to show improvements in their attitudes toward Whites compared to Asian 
Americans who identify less as American, but there is also some evidence that Asian 
Americans with more positive attitudes toward Whites might increase their identification 
as American compared to those with less positive attitudes toward Whites.  
 
5 Additionally, in contrast to the nonwhite attitude models, the stationarity assumption 
holds for all of the American identity – attitudes toward Whites CLPM models (see 
bottom section, right column of Tables 17 & 18). 






Figure 12. Study 1 CLPM for American identity and the White FT (a) and American 
identity and White stereotypes (b), without covariates and with stationarity constraints on 
lagged and cross-lagged coefficients. Unstandardized coefficients with standard errors (in 
parentheses) and standardized coefficients are shown. Statistical significance is indicated 
as follows: *** p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05, † p < .10 (marginally significant). 
 
 Unexpectedly, Asian American identity also had a significant, positive cross-
lagged effect on non-White stereotypes from Wave 2 to Wave 3 (b = .058, SE = .027, p = 
.035,  = .055) (Figure 13), and POC identity and the White FT showed negative cross-
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lagged effects on each other (ID to FT: b = -.039, SE = .016, p = .016,  = -.044; FT to 
ID: b = -.033, SE = .015, p = .027,  = -.028)6 (Figure 14). Thus, individual differences in 
Asian Americans’ social identities potentially predict attitudes toward groups that are not 
included in those identities. 
 
  
Figure 13. Study 1 CLPM for Asian American identity and nonwhite stereotypes, without 
covariates and with no stationarity constraints. Unstandardized coefficients with standard 
errors (in parentheses) and standardized coefficients are shown. Statistical significance is 




6 With stationarity, which did not significantly change model fit. Without stationarity, 
only the Wave 2 to Wave 3 cross-lagged coefficients approached significance. 
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Figure 14. Study 1 CLPM for POC identity and the White FT, without covariates and 
with stationarity constraints on lagged and cross-lagged coefficients. Unstandardized 
coefficients with standard errors (in parentheses) and standardized coefficients are 
shown. Statistical significance is indicated as follows: *** p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05, 
† p < .10 (marginally significant). 
 
 b. Random-intercepts cross-lagged panel models (RI-CLPM). As one might 
expect for constructs with trait-like stability (Hamaker et al., 2015; Orth et al., 2021), RI-
CLPM produced better model fit than CLPM across identities and racial attitude 
measures. All identity-racial attitude models met the Hu and Bentler (1999) criteria 
except Asian American identity and nonwhite stereotypes with stationarity (RMSEA = 
.065), Asian American identity and White FT with stationarity (RMSEA = .08), and POC 
identity and White FT without stationarity (RMSEA = .07). However, stationarity 
constraints significantly worsened model fit for Asian American identity and all racial 
attitude measures (nonwhite FTs: 𝜒5
2 = 11.546, 𝜒1
2 = 0.001, Δ𝜒4
2 = 11.545, 𝑝 =  .021; 
nonwhite stereotypes: 𝜒5
2 = 18.267, 𝜒1
2 = 0.390, Δ𝜒4
2 = 17.877, 𝑝 =  .001; White FT: 
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𝜒5
2 = 24.351, 𝜒1
2 = 0.033, Δ𝜒4
2 = 24.318, 𝑝 <  .001; White stereotypes: 𝜒5
2 =
14.349, 𝜒1
2 = 0.257, Δ𝜒4
2 = 14.092, 𝑝 =  .007), American identity and nonwhite 
stereotypes (𝜒5
2 = 17.445, 𝜒1
2 = 0.017, Δ𝜒4
2 = 17.428, 𝑝 =  .002), and POC identity and 
White stereotypes (𝜒5
2 = 12.616, 𝜒1
2 = 2.874, Δ𝜒4
2 = 9.742, 𝑝 =  .045). Fit statistics are 
presented in Tables 15-18. 
 Trait-level covariances were significant and in the expected direction for almost 
every identity-racial attitude pair. POC identity was significantly positively related to 
nonwhite FT (c = .013, SE = .002, p < .001, r = .344) and stereotype ratings (c = .012, SE 
= .002, p < .001, r = .309)7. American identity was significantly positively related to 
White FT (c = .016, SE = .002, p < .001, r = .457) and stereotype ratings (c = .010, SE = 
.001, p < .001, r = .404) and to nonwhite stereotype ratings in the model without 
stationarity (c = .003, SE = .001, p = .046, r = .087). However, trait-level covariance 
between American identity and nonwhite FTs was not significant (c = .002, SE = .001, p 
= .126, r = .073). At the between-person level, then, identification as POC is associated 
with more positive attitudes toward other minority groups included in the POC common 
ingroup. Identification as American is associated with more positive attitudes toward 
Whites, who are part of this common ingroup, but is less clearly associated with attitudes 
toward other minority groups, who at least in theory are also part of this common 
ingroup. 
 
7 Because stationarity did not significantly change model fit for most of the RI-CLPM 
relevant to my hypotheses about racial attitudes, I report the trait-level covariances from 
the models with stationarity unless otherwise specified. 
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 As with cross-lagged effects in the CLPM, Asian American identity showed an 
unexpected positive relationship with nonwhite stereotype ratings (c = .004, SE = .001, p 
= .001, r = .157)8. Additionally, the trait covariance with nonwhite FT ratings was 
positive and significant (c = .004, SE = .001, p = .006, r = .151). Again, in keeping with 
the cross-lagged effects in the CLPM, POC identity had a significant, negative trait-level 
covariance with White FT ratings (c = -.009, SE = .002, p < .001, r = -.215). POC identity 
also had a marginally significant (and significant with stationarity constraints, though 
stationarity is not met) negative trait-level covariance with White stereotype ratings (c = -
.003, SE = .002, p = .056, r = -.099), and Asian American identity had a marginally 
significant (also significant with stationarity constraints, but stationarity is not met) 
positive trait-level covariance with White stereotype ratings (c = .002, SE = .001, p = 
.068, r = .098). 
 At the within-person level, the RI-CLPM results are more difficult to interpret. 
Consistent with the cross-lagged effects in the CLPM, within-person increases in POC 
identification appeared to predict increased positivity in stereotype ratings of other 
minority groups (b = .280, SE = .087, p = .001,  = .293 & .265). But the reverse effect is 
also significant (b = .134, SE = .058, p = .022,  = .141 & .116), and both cross-lagged 
effects are only significant when stationarity is assumed. (The model with stationarity is 
shown in Figure 15.) As with the CLPM, POC identification did not have significant 
cross-lagged effects on nonwhite FT ratings in the RI-CLPM. 
 
8 Trait-level covariances reported for Asian American identity and racial attitudes are 
from the models without stationarity because stationarity significantly worsened model 
fit. 
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Figure 15. Study 1 RI-CLPM for POC identity and nonwhite stereotypes, with 
stationarity constraints on lagged and cross-lagged coefficients. Unstandardized 
coefficients with standard errors (in parentheses) and standardized coefficients are 
shown. Statistical significance is indicated as follows: *** p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05, 
† p < .10 (marginally significant). 
 
In contrast to the lack of between-person effects (i.e., trait-level covariance) and 
the lack of cross-lagged effects in the CLPM, American identity and nonwhite FT ratings 
had significant, positive cross-lagged effects at the within-person level in the RI-CLPM 
(ID-FT: b = .273, SE = .137, p = .047,  = .135 & .098; FT-ID: b = .149, SE = .050, p = 
.003,  = .388 & .280), though the forward effect is only significant with the stationarity 
assumption. (The American identity-nonwhite FT RI-CLPM with stationarity is shown in 
Figure 16a). Thus, although the CLPM and trait-level covariance would suggest that 
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American identity has no effect on attitudes toward other racial minorities, the RI-CLPM 
suggests that higher American identity might actually improve at least affective attitudes 
at the within-person level. However, as can be seen in Figure 16b, American identity did 
not show the same positive within-person cross-lagged effects on nonwhite stereotype 
ratings, or at least not consistently across time lags (W1-W2: b = -.532, SE = .269, p = 
.048,  = -.337; W2-W3: b = .384, SE = .200, p = .056,  = .190). The reverse effect also 
switched signs (in the opposite direction) across time lags (W1-W2: b = .224, SE = .090, 
p = .017,  = .384; W2-W3: b = -.197, SE = .097, p = .041,  = -.287).  






Figure 16. Study 1 RI-CLPM for American identity and nonwhite FTs, with stationarity 
constraints on lagged and cross-lagged coefficients (a) and American identity and 
nonwhite stereotypes, with no stationarity constraints (b). Unstandardized coefficients 
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with standard errors (in parentheses) and standardized coefficients are shown. Statistical 
significance is indicated as follows: *** p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05, † p < .10 
(marginally significant). 
 
Again, in contrast to the CLPM results and the RI-CLPM between-person results, 
American identity did not have significant within-person cross-lagged effects on White 
FT ratings in the RI-CLPM. Furthermore, controlling for positive, trait-level covariance, 
American identity and White stereotype ratings showed negative cross-lagged effects on 
each other (ID-stereotype: b = -.400, SE = .136, p = .003,  = -.188 & -.162; stereotype-
ID: b = -.082, SE = .031, p = .008,  = -.202 & -.177) in the model with stationarity, as 
shown in Figure 17. Thus, American identity appears to relate to Asian Americans’ racial 
attitudes differently at the between- and within-person levels. 
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Figure 17. Study 1 RI-CLPM for American identity and White stereotypes, with 
stationarity constraints on lagged and cross-lagged coefficients. Unstandardized 
coefficients with standard errors (in parentheses) and standardized coefficients are 
shown. Statistical significance is indicated as follows: *** p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05, 
† p < .10 (marginally significant). 
 
Unexpectedly, some significant cross-lagged effects appeared between Asian 
American identity and attitudes toward Whites in the RI-CLPM. For White FT ratings 
(Figure 18), both the forward and reverse effects switched signs, in opposite directions, 
across waves (forward W1-W2: b = .354, SE = .179, p = .048,  = .239; forward W2-W3: 
b = -.254, SE = .123, p = .039,  = -.172; reverse W1-W2: b = -.256, SE = .095, p = .007, 
 = -.332; reverse W2-W3: b = .135, SE = .059, p = .023,  = .186). For White stereotype 
ratings, the RI-CLPM with stationarity indicated significant, negative cross-lagged 
effects in both directions (ID-stereotype: b = -.242, SE = .088, p = .006,  = -.171 & -
.142; stereotype-ID: b = -.136, SE = .039, p = .001,  = -.231 & -.230); however, 
stationarity significantly worsened model fit, and only the W1-W2 reverse effect was 
significant in the RI-CLPM without stationarity (b = -.152, SE = .076, p = .047,  = -
.217). 
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Figure 18. Study 1 RI-CLPM for Asian American identity and the White FT, with no 
stationarity constraints. Unstandardized coefficients with standard errors (in parentheses) 
and standardized coefficients are shown. Statistical significance is indicated as follows: 
*** p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05, † p < .10 (marginally significant). 
 
Additionally, controlling for the negative trait-level covariance, White FT ratings 
had a significant, positive cross-lagged effect on POC identity (b = .138, SE = .067, p = 
.040,  = .187 & .165) in the RI-CLPM (Figure 19). This finding further suggests that 
identity and racial attitudes might relate to each other differently at the between- and 
within-person levels. 
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Figure 19. Study 1 RI-CLPM for POC identity and the White FT, with stationarity 
constraints on lagged and cross-lagged coefficients. Unstandardized coefficients with 
standard errors (in parentheses) and standardized coefficients are shown. Statistical 
significance is indicated as follows: *** p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05, † p < .10 
(marginally significant). 
 
4. Identity and Policy Attitudes 
 a. Immigration. In my hypotheses, I treated immigration as an own-group issue 
area for Asian Americans. Thus, I expected Asian American identity to predict more 
liberal immigration policy stances—allowing more immigrants and opposing deportation 
and detention of undocumented immigrants—which would be captured by higher 
immigration attitude factor scores (Hypothesis 11). Based on the paradoxical effects 
literature, I expected American identity to predict less liberal immigration attitudes (i.e., 
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lower immigration attitude factor scores) (Hypothesis 13). I did not expect POC identity 
to predict immigration attitudes. 
Several of the panel models did not initially converge, but setting starting values 
in those models resulted in all CLPM converging. Starting values were based on OLS 
regressions of each Wave 2 variable on all Wave 1 variables and each Wave 3 variable on 
all Wave 2 variables for models without stationarity and based on coefficients from the 
model that did not converge for models with stationarity. The final CLPM models did not 
show adequate fit based on CFI (ranging from .81 for Asian American identity without 
covariates to .85 for American identity with covariates) or RMSEA (ranging from .55 for 
POC identity without covariates and with stationarity to .83 for American identity with 
covariates and age of arrival in U.S. and no stationarity), but they did meet fit criteria for 
SRMR (all SRMR < .03). Fit statistics are presented in Table 19. Stationarity had a 
marginally significant effect on model fit for Asian American identity without covariates 
(𝜒8
2 = 1573.103, 𝜒4
2 = 1565.120, ∆𝜒4
2 = 7.983, 𝑝 =  .092) but did not significantly 
affect fit for any other CLPM model.9
 
9 Thus, coefficients reported in the text are from the CLPM with stationarity unless 
otherwise specified. 
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Table 19 
 
Study 1 Panel Model Fit Statistics: Immigration Attitudes 
 
 N CFI RMSEA SRMR 2 (df) 2 (df) 
IV: Asian American ID       
CLPM Model 1 630 .812 .787 .021 1565.120 (4)***  
CLPM Model 1 w/ stationarity 630 .811 .557 .026 1573.103 (8)*** 7.983 (4)† 
CLPM Model 2 612 .839 .790 .008 1533.409 (4)***  
CLPM Model 2 w/ stationarity 612 .839 .560 .010 1541.115 (8)*** 7.706 (4) 
CLPM Model 3 124 .841 .808 .007 327.692 (4)***  
CLPM Model 3 w/ stationarity 124 .839 .574 .013 335.100 (8)*** 7.408 (4) 
RI-CLPM 630 1.000 .000 .002 0.103 (1) 1565.017 (3)*** 
RI-CLPM w/ stationaritya 630 .999 .048 .026 12.244 (5)* 12.141 (4)* 
IV: POC ID       
CLPM Model 1 630 .824 .783 .014 1547.994 (4)***  
CLPM Model 1 w/ stationarity 630 .824 .553 .017 1550.767 (8)*** 2.773 (4) 
CLPM Model 2 612 .848 .787 .005 1520.744 (4)***  
CLPM Model 2 w/ stationarity 612 .848 .556 .006 1523.004 (8)*** 2.260 (4) 
CLPM Model 3 124 .847 .800 .005 321.548 (4)***  
CLPM Model 3 w/ stationarity 124 .847 .565 .007 324.771 (8)*** 3.223 (4) 
RI-CLPM 630 1.000 .000 .006 0.910 (1) 1547.084 (3)*** 
RI-CLPM w/ stationarity 630 1.000 .022 .012 6.471 (5) 5.561 (4) 
IV: American ID       
CLPM Model 1 630 .825 .797 .014 1603.925 (4)***  
CLPM Model 1 w/ stationarity 630 .825 .563 .016 1607.563 (8)*** 3.638 (4) 
CLPM Model 2 612 .850 .797 .005 1558.587 (4)***  
CLPM Model 2 w/ stationarity 612 .850 .564 .005 1563.083 (8)*** 4.496 (4) 
CLPM Model 3 124 .850 .827 .004 343.426 (4)***  
CLPM Model 3 w/ stationarity 124 .850 .584 .006 346.786 (8)*** 3.360 (4) 
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RI-CLPM 630 1.000 .019 .005 1.227 (1) 1602.698 (3)*** 
RI-CLPM w/ stationarityb 630 1.000 .000 .006 2.276 (5) 1.049 (4) 
 
Note: 2 for RI-CLPM without stationarity is vs. CLPM Model 1 without stationarity. Otherwise, 2 is for stationarity vs. no 
stationarity. 
 
Note: All Asian American identity CLPM and POC identity CLPM Model 2 (with and without stationarity) only converged with 
starting values for structural coefficients. In models without stationarity, starting values came from ordinary least-squares regression 
of each W2 variable on all W1 variables and covariates and/or each W3 variable on all W2 variables and covariates; in models with 
stationarity, starting values came from the CLPM models that did not converge (which produced estimates of coefficients but not 
standard errors). 
 
Note: RI-CLPM with stationarity for all 3 identities included a non-significant negative residual variance for the Wave 3 immigration 
attitude variable. RI-CLPM without stationarity for Asian American identity also included a non-significant negative residual variance 
for this variable. Constraining this residual variance to 0 resulted in the Asian American model without stationarity and the POC 
identity model with stationarity not converging, and it produced a warning that the covariance matrix of latent variables was not 
positive definite and an infinite standardized correlation between the Wave 3 identity and immigration variables for the Asian 
American and American identity models with stationarity. 
 
a Asian American identity RI-CLPM with stationarity and Wave 3 immigration attitude residual variance = 0: CFI = .999, RMSEA = 
.041, SRMR = .026, 𝜒6
2 = 12.505, Δ𝜒5
2 = 12.402, p = .030. 
b American identity RI-CLPM with stationarity and Wave 3 immigration attitude residual variance = 0: CFI = 1.000, RMSEA = .000, 
SRMR = .006, 𝜒6
2 = 2.281, Δ𝜒5
2 = 1.054, p = .958. 
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RI-CLPM models converged, but almost all had a non-significant negative 
residual variance for the Wave 3 immigration latent variable. Only POC identity and 
American identity without stationarity did not produce this negative variance. 
Nonetheless, model fit was good for all RI-CLPM models (CFI ≥ .999, RMSEA ≤ .048, 
SRMR ≤ .026), and RI-CLPM produced significantly better fit than CLPM in every case 
(see Table 18). Stationarity significantly worsened model fit for Asian American identity 
(𝜒5
2 = 12.244, 𝜒1
2 = 0.103, Δ𝜒4
2 = 12.141, 𝑝 =  .016) but not for POC or American 
identity. Constraining the Wave 3 immigration residual variance to equal 0 (to eliminate 
the non-significant negative variance) resulted in the Asian American identity model 
without stationarity and the POC identity model with stationarity not converging. The 
Asian American identity and American identity models with stationarity and this variance 
constraint converged, but with a warning that the covariance matrix of latent variables 
was not positive definite and an infinite standardized correlation between the Wave 3 
identity and immigration variables. This version of the Asian American identity model 
with stationarity also fit less well than the model without stationarity (with the negative 
residual variance) (𝜒6
2 = 12.505, 𝜒1
2 = 0.103, Δ𝜒5
2 = 12.402, 𝑝 =  .030). Because of the 
worse model fit for Asian American identity and the problems with the Wave 3 
immigration variance for POC and American identities when stationarity was assumed, 
RI-CLPM coefficients reported below are from the models without stationarity unless 
otherwise specified. 
All three identities had significant trait-level covariance with immigration 
attitudes. Consistent with my hypotheses, this covariance was positive for Asian 
American identity (c = .005, SE = .001, p = .001, r = .142) and negative for American 
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identity (c = -.007, SE = .002, p < .001, r = -.200). However, POC identity also had a 
significant, positive trait-level covariance with immigration attitudes that was, if 
anything, larger than the covariance between Asian American identity and immigration 
attitudes (c = .018, SE = .002, p < .001, r = .391). 
Cross-lagged effects from Asian American and American identities to 
immigration attitudes were not significant in either the CLPM or RI-CLPM, though a 
significant reverse effect from immigration attitudes to American identity appeared in the 
CLPM (b = -.023, SE = .011, p = .030,  = -.024). Again, though I did not predict them, 
there were significant cross-lagged effects in the CLPM (with stationarity) for POC 
identity and immigration attitudes (ID to attitude: b = .007, SE = .003, p = .040,  = .008; 
attitude to ID: b = .033, SE = .017, p = .047,  = .027 & .026) (Figure 20).10 Cross-lagged 
coefficients were not significant for any identity in the RI-CLPM. 
  
 
10 Although stationarity did not significantly affect model fit, the only significant cross-
lagged coefficient in the model without stationarity was from Wave 2 identity to Wave 3 
immigration attitude (b = .009, SE = .004, p = .032,  = .011). 
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Figure 20. Study 1 CLPM for POC identity and immigration attitudes, without covariates 
and with stationarity constraints on lagged and cross-lagged coefficients. Unstandardized 
coefficients with standard errors (in parentheses) and standardized coefficients are 
shown. Statistical significance is indicated as follows: *** p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05, 
† p < .10 (marginally significant). 
 
These results suggest that identities and attitudes are related at the between-person 
level, and the signs of these relationships are consistent with the literature on collective 
action/group consciousness and paradoxical effects of prejudice reduction. However, I 
did not find evidence that Asian American or American identity precedes immigration 
attitudes either between or within individuals. On the other hand, the results suggest that 
Asian American individuals who identify more strongly as POC might shift toward more 
liberal immigration attitudes compared to those who identify less strongly as POC. 
 b. Criminal justice reform. I treated criminal justice reform as an other-group 
issue for Asian Americans. Thus, I hypothesized that POC identity would predict more 
support for criminal justice reform—belief that there are too many people in prison and 
support for defunding police and eliminating mandatory minimum sentences—which 
would be captured by higher criminal justice factor scores (Hypothesis 12) and that 
American identity would predict less support for criminal justice reform (i.e., lower 
criminal justice factor scores) (Hypothesis 13). I did not expect Asian American identity 
to predict attitudes toward criminal justice reform. 
 I fit panel models for two different versions of criminal justice factor scores: one 
that treated all three items as continuous variables and one that treated the number of 
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people in prison item as an ordered categorical variable (too few < about the right number 
< too many). Fit statistics are presented in Tables 20 (continuous variable models) and 21 
(categorical variable models). However, with the ordered categorical variable, starting 
values (from OLS regression) were needed for the CLPM models with POC and 
American identities and age of arrival in the U.S. to converge, the RI-CLPM models with 
stationarity had (non-significant) negative residual variances for the Wave 2 criminal 
justice attitude latent variable, and the RI-CLPM models without stationarity did not 
converge. Fixing the residual variance for the Wave 2 criminal justice attitude latent 
variable to 0 allowed the models for Asian American and POC identities to converge but 
(in models with and without stationarity) produced warnings that the covariance matrix of 
latent variables was not positive definite, as well as infinite standardized correlation 
coefficients for the Wave 2 identity and criminal justice attitude variables; the same 
warning and infinite standardized correlation coefficient occurred when I fixed this 
residual variance in the American identity model with stationarity.11 The RI-CLPM 
without stationarity for American identity did not converge with this variance set to 0. 
With either set of factor scores, CLPM models fit well based on CFI (all ≥ .966) and 
SRMR (all ≤ .026) but not RMSEA (.118 for the categorical variable with POC identity, 
age of arrival in the U.S., and stationarity, to .307 for the continuous variable with 
American identity, age of arrival in the U.S., and no stationarity). Stationarity did not 
significantly affect fit for any of the CLPM models, but it significantly worsened the fit 
of the RI-CLPM for Asian American identity (continuous variable factor scores: 𝜒5
2 =
 
11 RI-CLPM fit statistics in Table 21 are reported for the models with the Wave 2 
criminal justice residual variance set to 0.  
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13.622, 𝜒1
2 = 0.204, Δ𝜒4
2 = 13.418, 𝑝 =  .009; categorical variable factor scores: 𝜒6
2 =
16.088, 𝜒2
2 = 1.328, Δ𝜒4
2 = 14.760, 𝑝 =  .005). Thus, CLPM coefficients reported 
below are from the models with stationarity, RI-CLPM coefficients for POC and 
American identities are from models with stationarity (and with the Wave 2 criminal 
justice residual variance fixed to 0 when categorical variable factor scores were used), 
and RI-CLPM coefficients for Asian American identity are from models without 
stationarity (and with the fixed residual variance when categorical variable factor scores 
were used). When RI-CLPM models converged without negative variances (i.e., with 
continuous variable factor scores), they fit significantly better than their corresponding 
CLPM models.12 
 
12 The fit of the CLPM was not compared to the fit of the RI-CLPM with the Wave 2 
criminal justice residual variance set to 0 because the CLPM is not nested within this 
version of the RI-CLPM.  
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Table 20 
 
Study 1 Panel Model Fit Statistics: Criminal Justice Attitudes (continuous indicators) 
 
 N CFI RMSEA SRMR 2 (df) 2 (df) 
IV: Asian American ID       
CLPM Model 1 628 .969 .263 .021 178.205 (4)***  
CLPM Model 1 w/ stationarity 628 .968 .188 .026 185.011 (8)*** 6.806 (4) 
CLPM Model 2 610 .976 .255 .008 162.157 (4)***  
CLPM Model 2 w/ stationarity 610 .976 .182 .010 168.900 (8)*** 6.743 (4) 
CLPM Model 3 125 .975 .275 .007 41.825 (4)***  
CLPM Model 3 w/ stationarity 125 .976 .192 .011 45.026 (8)*** 3.201 (4) 
RI-CLPM 628 1.000 .000 .003 0.204 (1) 178.001 (3)*** 
RI-CLPM w/ stationarity 628 .998 .052 .026 13.622 (5)* 13.418 (4)** 
IV: POC ID       
CLPM Model 1 628 .973 .253 .015 165.301 (4)***  
CLPM Model 1 w/ stationarity 628 .973 .179 .017 169.382 (8)*** 4.081 (4) 
CLPM Model 2 610 .979 .245 .005 150.895 (4)***  
CLPM Model 2 w/ stationarity 610 .980 .173 .006 153.835 (8)*** 2.940 (4) 
CLPM Model 3 125 .980 .248 .005 34.797 (4)***  
CLPM Model 3 w/ stationarity 125 .982 .168 .007 36.298 (8)*** 1.501 (4) 
RI-CLPM 628 1.000 .021 .006 1.265 (1) 164.036 (3)*** 
RI-CLPM w/ stationarity 628 1.000 .000 .011 4.548 (5) 3.283 (4) 
IV: American ID       
CLPM Model 1 628 .966 .293 .014 219.779 (4)***  
CLPM Model 1 w/ stationarity 628 .966 .208 .018 226.135 (8)*** 6.356 (4) 
CLPM Model 2 610 .975 .278 .005 192.818 (4)***  
CLPM Model 2 w/ stationarity 610 .975 .196 .005 195.345 (8)*** 2.527 (4) 
CLPM Model 3 125 .973 .307 .004 51.214 (4)***  
CLPM Model 3 w/ stationarity 125 .974 .215 .006 54.333 (8)*** 3.119 (4) 
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RI-CLPM 628 1.000 .000 .001 0.037 (1) 219.742 (3)*** 
RI-CLPM w/ stationarity 628 1.000 .000 .005 1.980 (5) 1.943 (4) 
 






Study 1 Panel Model Fit Statistics: Criminal Justice Attitudes (categorical indicator) 
 
 N CFI RMSEA SRMR 2 (df) 2 (df) 
IV: Asian American ID       
CLPM Model 1 628 .981 .231 .021 138.253 (4)***  
CLPM Model 1 w/ stationarity 628 .980 .165 .026 145.220 (8)*** 6.967 (4) 
CLPM Model 2 610 .985 .225 .008 127.337 (4)***  
CLPM Model 2 w/ stationarity 610 .985 .160 .009 133.234 (8)*** 5.897 (4) 
CLPM Model 3 125 .986 .224 .007 28.987 (4)***  
CLPM Model 3 w/ stationarity 125 .987 .154 .011 31.812 (8)*** 2.825 (4) 
RI-CLPM 628 1.000 .000 .006 1.328 (2)  
RI-CLPM w/ stationarity 628 .999 .052 .026 16.088 (6)* 14.760 (4)** 
IV: POC ID       
CLPM Model 1 628 .984 .220 .014 125.364 (4)***  
CLPM Model 1 w/ stationarity 628 .984 .155 .016 128.816 (8)*** 3.452 (4) 
CLPM Model 2 610 .987 .214 .005 115.953 (4)***  
CLPM Model 2 w/ stationarity 610 .987 .150 .006 117.841 (8)*** 1.888 (4) 
CLPM Model 3 125 .991 .182 .005 20.473 (4)***  
CLPM Model 3 w/ stationarity 125 .992 .118 .007 21.981 (8)*** 1.508 (4) 
RI-CLPM 628 1.000 .012 .006 2.196 (2)  
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RI-CLPM w/ stationarity 628 1.000 .013 .009 6.615 (6) 4.419 (4) 
IV: American ID       
CLPM Model 1 628 .978 .264 .014 179.084 (4)***  
CLPM Model 1 w/ stationarity 628 .978 .187 .017 184.074 (8)*** 4.990 (4) 
CLPM Model 2 610 .983 .250 .005 157.105 (4)***  
CLPM Model 2 w/ stationarity 610 .983 .176 .005 159.020 (8)*** 1.915 (4) 
CLPM Model 3 125 .983 .260 .004 37.830 (4)***  
CLPM Model 3 w/ stationarity 125 .984 .179 .005 40.092 (8)*** 2.262 (4) 
RI-CLPM 628      
RI-CLPM w/ stationarity 628 1.000 .000 .006 5.043 (6)  
 
Note: POC identity CLPM Model 2 without stationarity and American identity Model 3 without stationarity only converged with 
starting values for structural coefficients. Starting values came from ordinary least-squares regression of each W2 variable on all W1 
variables and covariates and each W3 variable on all W2 variables and covariates. 
 
Note: RI-CLPM without stationarity did not initially converge. RI-CLPM with stationarity converged, but included a non-significant 
negative residual variance for the Wave 2 criminal justice attitude variable. Setting the Wave 2 criminal justice residual variance to 0 
allowed the RI-CLPM without stationarity for Asian American and POC identities to converge with a warning that the covariance 
matrix of latent variables was not positive definite, as well as infinite standardized correlation coefficients for the Wave 2 identity and 
criminal justice attitude variables. Setting these residual variances to 0 produced similar warnings and infinite correlations for the RI-
CLPM with stationarity for all 3 identities. For ease of comparison between models with and without stationarity, fit statistics reported 
in the table are from the RI-CLPM with the Wave 2 criminal justice residual variance set to 0. 
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 Criminal justice attitudes had significant, positive trait-level covariance with POC 
identity (continuous variable factor scores: c = .010, SE = .002, p < .001, r = .216; 
categorical variable factor scores: c = .012, SE = .002, p < .001, r = .245 and significant, 
negative trait-level covariance with American identity (continuous variable factor scores: 
c = -.003, SE = .002, p = .034, r = -.087; categorical variable factor scores: c = -.005, SE 
= .002, p = .003, r = -.120) in the RI-CLPM. The signs of these covariances are consistent 
with my hypotheses. Also consistent with my hypotheses, Asian American identity did 
not have a significant trait-level covariance with criminal justice attitudes (continuous 
variable factor scores: c = .000, SE = .002, p = .792, r = .011; categorical variable factor 
scores: c = .000, SE = .002, p = .830, r = .009). 
 Cross-lagged coefficients were not significant across most models. However, the 
RI-CLPM with POC identity and categorical variable criminal justice factor scores 
(Figure 21) had significant, negative cross-lagged effects in both directions (ID to 
attitude: b = -.068, SE = .032, p = .033, W1-W2  = -.761, W2-W3  = -.227; attitude to 
ID: b = -1.166, SE = .529, p = .028, W1-W2  = -.277, W2-W3  = -.091). These 
negative cross-lagged coefficients contrast with the positive trait-level covariance and 
potentially contradict my hypothesis that higher POC identification predicts increased 
support for criminal justice reform. But the model fitting problems for the RI-CLPM with 
the criminal justice factor scores treating the number of people in prison item as 
categorical cautions against over-interpreting this result. 
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Figure 21. Study 1 RI-CLPM for POC identity and criminal justice attitudes (factor 
scores from the CFA model treating the number of people in prison item as categorical), 
with stationarity constraints on lagged and cross-lagged coefficients. Unstandardized 
coefficients with standard errors (in parentheses) and standardized coefficients are 
shown. (Identity-attitude correlation coefficient for Wave 2 is not shown because it was 
estimated as -.) Statistical significance is indicated as follows: *** p < .001, ** p < .01, 
* p < .05, † p < .10 (marginally significant). 
 
 c. Affirmative action. Because of its status as a wedge issue between some Asian 
Americans and other racial minority groups, I treated affirmative action as an other-group 
issue area even though Asian Americans might benefit from it. Thus, as with criminal 
justice reform, I hypothesized that POC identity would predict more support (Hypothesis 
12) and American identity would predict less support (Hypothesis 13) for affirmative 
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action, and I did not expect Asian American identity to predict affirmative action 
attitudes. 
 In contrast to immigration and criminal justice reform, all CLPM and RI-CLPM 
models for affirmative action attitudes converged without issue. CLPM models without 
covariates were slightly below the CFI criterion for good fit (.934-.936 for Asian 
American identity, .946-.949 for POC identity, and .939-.940 for American identity), but 
the models with covariates met this criterion. All CLPM models met the SRMR criterion 
(all ≤ .041), but none met the RMSEA criterion (.177 for POC identity with age of arrival 
in U.S. and stationarity to .311 for American identity without covariates or stationarity). 
All RI-CLPM models fit well (CFI ≤ .997, RMSEA ≤ .055, SRMR ≤ .031), and showed 
significantly improved fit over CLPM. Stationarity significantly worsened CLPM fit for 
POC identity (𝜒8
2 = 212.368, 𝜒4
2 = 198.373, Δ𝜒4
2 = 13.995, 𝑝 =  .007) and American 
identity (𝜒8
2 = 259.858, 𝜒4
2 = 248.532, Δ𝜒4
2 = 11.326, 𝑝 =  .023) and marginally 
significantly worsened CLPM fit for Asian American identity (𝜒8
2 = 222.405, 𝜒4
2 =
214.542, Δ𝜒4
2 = 7.863, 𝑝 =  .097).13 With RI-CLPM, stationarity significantly affected 
fit only for Asian American identity (𝜒5
2 = 14.321, 𝜒1
2 = 0.766, Δ𝜒4
2 = 13.555, 𝑝 =
 .009). Fit statistics are presented in Table 22. 
 
13 Stationarity also resulted in significantly worse fit for POC identity and marginally 
significantly worse fit for Asian American identity with the foreign-born covariate (see 
Table 22). 
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Table 22 
 
Study 1 Panel Model Fit Statistics: Affirmative Action Attitudes 
 
 N CFI RMSEA SRMR 2 (df) 2 (df) 
IV: Asian American ID       
CLPM Model 1 632 .936 .289 .037 214.542 (4)***  
CLPM Model 1 w/ stationarity 632 .934 .206 .041 222.405 (8)*** 7.863 (4)† 
CLPM Model 2 614 .960 .270 .012 183.477 (4)***  
CLPM Model 2 w/ stationarity 614 .959 .193 .014 191.728 (8)*** 8.251 (4)† 
CLPM Model 3 126 .959 .273 .014 41.597 (4)***  
CLPM Model 3 w/ stationarity 126 .959 .194 .017 45.918 (8)*** 4.321 (4) 
RI-CLPM 632 1.000 .000 .005 0.766 (1) 213.776 (3)*** 
RI-CLPM w/ stationarity 632 .997 .054 .031 14.321 (5)* 13.555 (4)** 
IV: POC ID       
CLPM Model 1 632 .949 .277 .033 198.373 (4)***  
CLPM Model 1 w/ stationarity 632 .946 .201 .037 212.368 (8)*** 13.995 (4)** 
CLPM Model 2 614 .966 .261 .011 170.880 (4)***  
CLPM Model 2 w/ stationarity 614 .964 .189 .012 184.177 (8)*** 13.297 (4)** 
CLPM Model 3 126 .967 .253 .014 36.218 (4)***  
CLPM Model 3 w/ stationarity 126 .968 .177 .016 39.517 (8)*** 3.299 (4) 
RI-CLPM 632 .999 .055 .010 2.916 (1)† 195.457 (3)*** 
RI-CLPM w/ stationarity 632 .999 .028 .016 7.470 (5) 4.554 (4) 
IV: American ID       
CLPM Model 1 632 .940 .311 .033 248.532 (4)***  
CLPM Model 1 w/ stationarity 632 .939 .223 .037 259.858 (8)*** 11.326 (4)* 
CLPM Model 2 614 .962 .287 .011 205.785 (4)***  
CLPM Model 2 w/ stationarity 614 .962 .203 .011 210.575 (8)*** 4.790 (4) 
CLPM Model 3 126 .965 .284 .012 44.688 (4)***  
CLPM Model 3 w/ stationarity 126 .965 .200 .014 48.148 (8)*** 3.460 (4) 
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RI-CLPM 632 1.000 .033 .008 1.700 (1) 246.832 (3)*** 
RI-CLPM w/ stationarity 632 .999 .026 .016 7.171 (5) 5.471 (4) 
 
Note: 2 for RI-CLPM without stationarity is vs. CLPM Model 1 without stationarity. Otherwise, 2 is for stationarity vs. no 
stationarity. 
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Again, consistent with my hypotheses, POC identity had a significant, positive 
trait-level covariance (c = .025, SE = .003, p < .001, r = .431), and American identity had 
a significant, negative trait-level covariance (c = -.006, SE = .002, p = .004, r = -.123) 
with support for affirmative action (estimates from models with stationarity). But Asian 
American identity also had a significant, positive trait-level covariance with support for 
affirmative action (without stationarity: c = .005, SE = .002, p = .012, r = .116). 
 CLPM showed significant, positive cross-lagged effects in both directions for 
POC identity, at least from Wave 1 to Wave 2 (ID-attitude: b = .114, SE = .029, p < .001, 
 = .100; attitude-ID: b = .062, SE = .017, p < .001,  = .071) in the model without 
stationarity (Figure 22). Thus, respondents who identified more as POC in Wave 1 
showed increased support for affirmative action from Wave 1 to Wave 2 compared to 
respondents who identified less as POC, and respondents who reported more support for 
affirmative action in Wave 1 showed increased identification as POC from Wave 1 to 
Wave 2 compared to respondents who reported less support for affirmative action. 
Although the Wave 2 to Wave 3 coefficients remain positive, however, they are not 
significant, and the stationarity assumption does not hold, which suggests that these 
effects are not the same across both time lags. 
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Figure 22. Study 1 CLPM without covariates and with no stationarity constraints for 
POC identity and affirmative action attitudes. Unstandardized coefficients with standard 
errors (in parentheses) and standardized coefficients are shown. Statistical significance is 
indicated as follows: *** p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05, † p < .10 (marginally 
significant). 
 
Unexpectedly, Asian American identity showed a similar pattern of results to 
POC identity, at least in the model with stationarity (Figure 23), though the cross-lagged 
effects are only marginally significant (ID-attitude: b = .042, SE = .024, p = .076,  = 
.027; attitude-ID: b = .018, SE = .010, p = .069,  = .026). 
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Figure 23. Study 1 CLPM without covariates and with stationarity constraints on lagged 
and cross-lagged coefficients for Asian American identity and affirmative action 
attitudes. Unstandardized coefficients with standard errors (in parentheses) and 
standardized coefficients are shown. Statistical significance is indicated as follows: *** p 
< .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05, † p < .10 (marginally significant). 
 
 By contrast, cross-lagged effects from American identity to affirmative action 
attitudes were not significant in the CLPM. However, the reverse effect from affirmative 
action attitude to American identity was significant from Wave 2 to Wave 3 (b = -.024, 
SE = .011, p = .022,  = -.034) in the model without stationarity. 
 At the within-person level, RI-CLPM (with stationarity) (Figure 24) revealed 
significant, positive cross-lagged effects in both directions for POC identity and 
affirmative action attitudes (ID-attitude: b = .364, SE = .116, p = .002,  = .280 & .256; 
attitude-ID: b = .107, SE = .049, p = .030,  = .169 & .127), consistent with the effects in 
the CLPM. However, controlling for the negative trait-level covariance, American 
identity also had a significant, positive cross-lagged effect on affirmative action attitudes 
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(b = .439, SE = .177, p = .013,  = .224 & .244), and affirmative action attitudes had a 
marginally significant, positive cross-lagged effect on American identity (b = .070, SE = 
.036, p = .052,  = .166 & .141) in the RI-CLPM with stationarity (Figure 25). Asian 
American identity in Wave 2 had a marginally significant, positive cross-lagged effect on 
affirmative action attitudes in Wave 3 (b = .291, SE = .173, p = .094,  = .189) in the RI-
CLPM without stationarity (Figure 26). Thus, while POC identity and, to some extent, 
Asian American identity appear to be related to affirmative action attitudes similarly at 
the between- and within-person levels, American identity appears to be negatively related 
to affirmative action attitudes at the between-person level but (contrary to Hypothesis 13) 




Figure 24. Study 1 RI-CLPM with stationarity constraints on lagged and cross-lagged 
coefficients for POC identity and affirmative action attitudes. Unstandardized coefficients 
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with standard errors (in parentheses) and standardized coefficients are shown. Statistical 






Figure 25. Study 1 RI-CLPM for American identity and affirmative action attitudes, with 
stationarity constraints on lagged and cross-lagged coefficients. Unstandardized 
coefficients with standard errors (in parentheses) and standardized coefficients are 
shown. Statistical significance is indicated as follows: *** p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05, 
† p < .10 (marginally significant). 
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Figure 26. Study 1 RI-CLPM with no stationarity constraints for Asian American identity 
and affirmative action attitudes. Unstandardized coefficients with standard errors (in 
parentheses) and standardized coefficients are shown. Statistical significance is indicated 
as follows: *** p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05, † p < .10 (marginally significant). 
 
5. Identity-Policy Attitude Indirect Effects 
 Although the cross-lagged effects of Asian American, POC, and American 
identities on policy attitudes were generally not significant, I examined whether they 
nevertheless had indirect effects through each of the four mediator factors scores 
generated from the longitudinal CFA models: efficacy, linked fate, perceived 
discrimination, and relative deprivation. For each combination of identity, mediator, and 
policy attitude, I first fit a full model with lagged or cross-lagged paths from each 
variable to every variable in the next wave and covariances or residual covariances 
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among all three variables within each wave. I then fit a model with stationarity across 
time lags (i.e., constraining lagged and cross-lagged paths from Wave 2 to Wave 3 to be 
equal to their counterparts from Wave 1 to Wave 2) and a directional model with only 
forward structural paths (in other words, all reverse paths—mediator to identity, attitude 
to mediator, attitude to identity—were set to 0). For immigration attitudes, model fit was 
generally poor based on CFI (≤ .855) and RMSEA (≥ .520 for full models) but acceptable 
based on SRMR (≤ .041 for full models, ≤ .055 for all models). For criminal justice 
reform attitudes,14 SRMR indicated good fit (≤ .049), and CFI indicated good fit (> .95) 
except where efficacy was the mediator (CFI = .924-.939), but RMSEA still failed to 
meet the criteria for acceptable fit (≥ .151 for full models). Similarly, for affirmative 
action, SRMR indicated good fit (≤ .056), CFI was mixed but lowest for models with 
efficacy (CFI = .875-.904 efficacy; CFI = .930-.969 other mediators), and RMSEA again 
indicated poor fit (≥ .172 for full models). In almost every case, the stationarity and 
directional models fit significantly less well than the full model, and thus, unless 
otherwise specified, I report results from the full model. Fit statistics for longitudinal 
mediation models are presented in Tables 23-25.  
 
14 To avoid convergence issues, mediation models for criminal justice reform attitudes 
use the factor scores generated by treating all of the attitude variables as continuous. 
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Table 23 
 
Study 1 Mediation Model Fit Statistics: Immigration Attitudes 
 
  CFI RMSEA SRMR 2 (df) 2 (df) 
IV: Asian 
American ID 
      
Mediator: Efficacy full .805 .582 .041 1254.601 
(9)*** 
 










fulla .836 .543 .022 1090.719 
(9)*** 
 










fullb .840 .530 .017 1040.741 
(9)*** 
 










full .835 .555 .022 1140.041 
(9)*** 
 








       
IV: POC ID       
Mediator: Efficacy fulla .820 .574 .037 1218.423 
(9)*** 
 










full .851 .533 .015 1052.703 
(9)*** 
 








COMMON INGROUP IDENTITY AND POLITICAL SOLIDARITY 168 
Mediator: Perceived 
discrimination 
full .855 .520 .009 1000.538 
(9)*** 
 










full .848 .547 .017 1108.361 
(9)*** 
 








       
IV: American ID       
Mediator: Efficacy fulla .816 .589 .039  1281.846 
(9)*** 
 










full .844 .548 .018 1113.337 
(9)*** 
 










fullb .849 .534 .012 1057.324 
(9)*** 
 










fulla .844 .559 .018 1157.593 
(9)*** 
 









Note: N = 408 for all ID-immigration attitude mediation models. 
 
Note: 2 is vs. the full model, which has paths from all W1 variables to all W2 variables 
and from all W2 variables to all W3 variables and no stationarity assumption. 
 
a Needed starting values for W1-W2 coefficients to converge. 
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b Needed starting values for W2-W3 coefficients to converge. 
c Needed starting values for W2-W3 coefficients and W1 ID-RD covariance to converge. 
d Needed starting values for W2-W3 coefficients and W1 ID-immigration attitude 
covariance to converge. 
e Needed starting values for lagged and cross-lagged coefficients for both time lags and 
W1 ID-PD covariance to converge. 
f Needed starting values for lagged and cross-lagged coefficients for both time lags to 
converge. 
g Needed starting values for W2-W3 coefficients and W1 ID-LF covariance to converge. 





Study 1 Mediation Model Fit Statistics: Criminal Justice Attitudes (continuous 
indicators) 
 
  CFI RMSEA SRMR 2 (df) 2 (df) 
IV: Asian American 
ID 
      
Mediator: Efficacy full .927 .301 .041 340.142 
(9)*** 
 










full .964 .216 .022 179.178 
(9)*** 
 










full .973 .184 .017 133.164 
(9)*** 
 










full .958 .238 .022 216.812 
(9)*** 
 




directional .958 .186 .033 225.330 
(15)*** 
8.518 (6) 
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IV: POC ID       
Mediator: Efficacy full .939 .285 .037 305.756 
(9)*** 
 









full .975 .189 .016 139.986 
(9)*** 
 










full .983 .151 .010 92.617 
(9)*** 
 










full .967 .219 .017 184.994 
(9)*** 
 




directional .967 .170 .023 191.742 
(15)*** 
6.748 (6) 
       
IV: American ID       
Mediator: Efficacy full .929 .313 .039 368.038 
(9)*** 
 









full .964 .229 .018 199.973 
(9)*** 
 










full .972 .196 .012 149.146 
(9)*** 
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Mediator: Relative 
deprivation 
full .959 .248 .018 234.020 
(9)*** 
 









Note: N = 406 for all ID-criminal justice attitude mediation models. 
 
Note: 2 is vs. the full model, which has paths from all W1 variables to all W2 variables 





Study 1 Mediation Model Fit Statistics: Affirmative Action Attitudes 
 
  CFI RMSEA SRMR 2 (df) 2 (df) 
IV: Asian American 
ID 
      
Mediator: Efficacy full .883 .313 .045 368.663 
(9)*** 
 










full .942 .229 .030 202.118 
(9)*** 
 










full .953 .200 .027 155.385 
(9)*** 
 










full .933 .253 .030 243.118 
(9)*** 
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IV: POC ID       
Mediator: Efficacy full .904 .299 .043 337.427 
(9)*** 
 










full .958 .207 .026 166.992 
(9)*** 
 










full .969 .172 .023 117.432 
(9)*** 
 










full .948 .236 .027 213.585 
(9)*** 
 








       
IV: American ID       
Mediator: Efficacy full .894 .322 .044 389.382 
(9)*** 
 










full .944 .239 .027 219.551 
(9)*** 
 










full .956 .208 .023 167.190 
(9)*** 
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Mediator: Relative 
deprivation 
full .939 .259 .027 255.148 
(9)*** 
 









Note: N = 408 for all ID-affirmative action attitude mediation models. 
 
Note: 2 is vs. the full model, which has paths from all W1 variables to all W2 variables 
and from all W2 variables to all W3 variables and no stationarity assumption. 
 
 Indirect effects were defined as the product (ab) of the W1 identity to W2 
mediator path (a) and the W2 mediator to W3 attitude path (b). Total effects were defined 
as 𝑎𝑏 + (𝑥 ∗ 𝑐1) + (𝑐1 ∗ 𝑦), where x is the W1-W2 identity lagged path, y is the W2-W3 
attitude lagged path, c1 is the direct effect of W1 identity on W2 attitude, and c2 is the 
direct effect of W2 identity on W3 attitude. The coefficients for these effects were 
estimated using the sem() function defaults in lavaan, and then standard errors and 
confidence intervals for the effects of interest were re-estimated by adding the se = 
“bootstrap” option.  
None of the identities had significant indirect effects on immigration attitudes 
through any of the four hypothesized mediators. Thus, Hypotheses 14 and 16 were not 
supported with regard to this policy area. However, POC identity had a significant 
positive total effect in every model (efficacy model: t = .013, p = .001; 95% CI: [.006, 
.021]; linked fate model: t = .015, p = .009; 95% CI: [.004, .026]; perceived 
discrimination model: t = .014, p = .003; 95% CI: [.005, .023]; relative deprivation 
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model15: t = .019, p < .001; 95% CI: [.011, .028]), and American identity had a 
marginally significant to significant negative total effect in every model except the 
efficacy model (linked fate model: t = -.009, p = .059; 95% CI: [-.018, -.001]; perceived 
discrimination model: t = -.009, p = .052; 95% CI: [-.018, .000]; relative deprivation 
model: t = -.010, p = .038; 95% CI: [-.019, -.001]). 
Similarly, none of the identities had significant indirect effects on criminal justice 
attitudes through any of the four hypothesized mediators, and thus, Hypotheses 15 and 16 
were not supported with regard to this issue. Surprisingly, with the mediator variables in 
the model, neither POC identity nor American identity had significant total effects on 
criminal justice attitudes. But Asian American identity had a significant, positive total 
effect in every model (efficacy model16: t = .038, p = .015; 95% CI: [.008, .069]; linked 
fate model: t = .036, p = .013; 95% CI: [.008, .065]; perceived discrimination model: t = 
.035, p = .018; 95% CI: [.008, .067]; relative deprivation model17: t = .031, p = .038; 95% 
CI: [.002, .062]). 
 For affirmative action, again, none of the identities had significant indirect effects 
through any of the four hypothesized mediators, failing to support Hypotheses 15 and 16. 
Although, consistent with my predictions, the coefficients for the indirect effects of POC 
identity through linked fate, perceived discrimination, and relative deprivation were 
positive, and the coefficients for the indirect effects of American identity through 
 
15 Estimates are from the model with stationarity, which did not fit significantly worse 
than the full model. 
16 Estimates are from the directional model, which had only marginally significantly 
worse fit than the full model (𝜒15
2 = 350.852, 𝜒9
2 = 340.142, Δ𝜒6
2 = 10.710, 𝑝 =  .098) 
17 Estimates are from the directional model, which did not fit significantly worse than the 
full model. 
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perceived discrimination and relative deprivation were negative, these effects were not 
significant. As with immigration attitudes, POC identity did have a significant, positive 
total effect on affirmative action attitudes in every model (efficacy model: t = .131, p = 
.002; 95% CI: [.046, .214]; linked fate model: t = .100, p = .023; 95% CI: [.015, .186]; 
perceived discrimination model: t = .106, p = .020; 95% CI: [.020, .196]; relative 
deprivation model: t = .125, p = .011; 95% CI: [.020, .215]). Asian American and 
American identities did not have significant total effects. 
D. Discussion 
 Overall, the results of this study tended to be consistent with my hypotheses at the 
level of (between-person) trait covariances in the RI-CLPM. Asian Americans who 
identify more strongly as POC also tend to report more positive attitudes toward other 
racial minority groups (Hypothesis 2), and Asian Americans who identify more strongly 
as American tend to report more positive attitudes toward Whites (Hypothesis 1) across 
two different racial attitude measures (feeling thermometers and stereotype scales). 
Notably, however, identification as American did not share significant trait-level 
covariance with attitudes toward other racial minorities, contrary to Hypothesis 1, and 
unexpected trait covariances appeared for Asian American identity and attitudes toward 
nonwhites, as well as both Asian American and POC identities and attitudes toward 
Whites. 
 Consistent with my hypotheses based on the paradoxical effects literature, higher 
identification as American was associated, at the trait level, with less liberal immigration 
attitudes, less support for criminal justice reform, and less support for affirmative action 
(Hypothesis 13). Racial identity and POC identity tended to be positively associated with 
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policy attitudes that favor racial minority groups, consistent with the collective action 
literature, in which identification with a disadvantaged group is associated with more 
action on behalf of the ingroup. But racial identity and POC identity did not follow the 
pattern of own-group and other-group policy areas that I expected: Racial identity was 
associated with more liberal immigration attitudes, as I expected for an own-group issue 
(Hypothesis 11), and it was not associated with support for criminal justice reform, as I 
expected for an other-group issue. But it was associated with more support for affirmative 
action, which I expected to be an other-group issue. POC identity was positively 
associated not only with the other-group issues of criminal justice reform and affirmative 
action (Hypothesis 12), but also immigration. Nonetheless, the pattern of positive trait 
covariances with racial and POC identity and negative trait covariances with American 
identity is generally consistent with the collective action and paradoxical effects 
literatures, respectively. 
 However, Study 1 provides only inconsistent evidence that identification with 
their racial group or either common ingroup precedes changes in Asian Americans’ racial 
attitudes or attitudes toward polices associated with racial minority groups. In the CLPM, 
which reflect a combination of between-person and within-person dynamics, Asian 
Americans who identify more strongly as POC appear to show improvements in their 
stereotype ratings of Black and Hispanic Americans, though not in their feeling 
thermometer ratings of the same groups, compared to Asian Americans who identify less 
strongly as POC. Asian Americans who identify more strongly as American tend to show 
improvements in their attitudes toward White Americans (on both measures) compared to 
those who identify less strongly as American. The RI-CLPM with stationarity suggests 
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that increases in POC identification might specifically predict improvements in Black and 
Hispanic stereotype ratings at the within-person level. But the cross-lagged effects of 
American identity on attitudes toward Whites that appeared in the CLPM are not present 
at the within-person level; in fact, the RI-CLPM with stationarity suggests that increased 
identification as American at the within-person level predicts worsening ratings of 
Whites on the stereotype scale, and vice versa. By contrast, increased identification as 
American seems to predict improvements in feeling thermometer ratings of other 
minorities at the within-person level, consistent with Hypothesis 1, though that portion of 
the hypothesis is not supported at the between-person level or with regard to the 
stereotype scales. 
 Despite the trait-level covariances, cross-lagged effects were generally not 
significant for attitudes toward immigration and criminal justice reform. This could be 
due to the particularly high stability of those attitudes among respondents in this study, 
which could have limited the variance left for other variables to explain. The only 
significant cross-lagged effect for either of these policy areas in the CLPM was a small, 
positive effect of POC identity on immigration attitudes (which I did not expect for an 
own-group issue), and the only significant (within-person) cross-lagged effect in the RI-
CLPM was a negative effect of POC identity on one version of the criminal justice 
attitude variable (the opposite of what I expected). Thus, Hypotheses 11-13 were not 
supported for these issues. 
With regard to affirmative action, POC identity had significant cross-lagged 
effects in both the CLPM and RI-CLPM, supporting Hypothesis 12 at both the between-
person and within-person levels. However, contrary to Hypothesis 13 and the negative 
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trait covariance between the two variables, increases in American identity at the within-
person level appear to predict increases in support for affirmative action and vice versa. 
This effect, together with its within-person cross-lagged effects on White stereotype and 
nonwhite FT ratings, suggests that identification as American, in particular, could have 
different effects at the between-person and within-person levels and that one should be 
careful when extrapolating from CLPM results (as well as cross-sectional correlational 
results) to theories about what effects within-person changes in group identification can 
have. 
 The distinction between between-person and within-person effects is practically, 
as well as theoretically, important in the context of prejudice reduction because 
significant within-person cross-lagged effects in models like the RI-CLPM provide 
insight into whether an intervention to shift individuals’ group identification could 
potentially change those individuals’ attitudes. In this study, increases in POC identity 
were associated with improvements in one measure of attitudes toward other racial 
minorities and with increased support for affirmative action at both the between-person 
and within-person levels. Together with the low levels of POC identification among the 
respondents in this study and the pilot study, which suggest the potential for particularly 
large increases in identification with that common ingroup, the within-person effects 
suggest that increasing Asian Americans’ identification as POC could be a pathway for 
interventions to increase their solidarity with other racial minority groups. (However, 
negative cross-lagged effects in the RI-CLPM for one version of the criminal justice 
attitudes variable cautions against moving toward interventions without further research.) 
The inconsistent and sometimes unexpected effects of American identity, on the other 
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hand, make it a less attractive target for potential interventions, at least with Asian 
Americans. 
 A major limitation of this study was the stability of most of the key variables 
across the study’s time span. I expected some stability in the identity and racial attitude 
variables, as those have been treated as stable, endogenous, individual difference 
variables in much of the political psychology literature, and the potential for trait-like 
stability was why the use of RI-CLPM in this study is an important contribution to the 
literature on identity and racial attitudes. However, the stability of the policy attitudes in 
this study, especially the extremely high stability of the immigration and criminal justice 
attitudes, was unexpected given the extensive literature on political non-attitudes among 
the general public (e.g., Converse, 1964; Zaller, 1992). Although there is evidence that 
policy attitudes associated with race (especially affirmative action-related attitudes) are 
more stable than economic policy attitudes (e.g., Zaller, 1992, ch. 4), they are not the 
kind of culture war issues (e.g., abortion or same-sex marriage) that, for example, have 
been shown to shift political affiliation (Goren & Chapp, 2017). The three-item scales in 
this study could have had some aggregation effects on measured stability (Ansolabhere et 
al., 2008), but the stable policy attitude scales Ansolabhere et al. (2008) examined tended 
to combine many more items across broader policy areas. On the other hand, using factor 
scores to aggregate items could account for some of the unexpectedly high stability, not 
only in policy attitudes but also in group identification and racial attitudes.18  
 
18 For comparison, correlations across waves were calculated for composite scores (i.e., 
the average across scale items in each wave) of the Huddy scale for each identity, the 
nonwhite FTs and stereotypes, and the immigration and criminal justice policy attitudes. 
Although the composite scores also appeared to be highly stable, they were less stable 
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Furthermore, participant and contextual factors could explain why policy attitudes 
were so stable in this study. Respondents in both Study 1 and the pilot study tended to 
have high incomes and high educational attainment, and results from the political 
knowledge battery in the pilot study suggest that Asian Americans on Prolific might be 
especially politically sophisticated. Thus, this study might reflect the attitudes of an Asian 
American political elite rather than Asian Americans in the general public. Additionally, 
the data were collected at the end of 2020, after four years of inflammatory rhetoric on 
immigration and in the wake of the police killing of George Floyd and the protests that 
followed; thus, immigration and criminal justice reform might have been more salient 
than they ordinarily would be, which could have resulted in stronger and more accessible 
attitudes that would have produced more stable responses to those policy items. 
Alternatively, policy attitudes, as well as identity and racial attitudes, might simply be 
stable among adults across a 1- to 2-month time span. Future research could follow 
respondents over years instead of months or focus on younger adults, perhaps college 
students in particular, for whom aspects of identity such as centrality and commitment 
can still change (e.g., Ramos et al., 2012; Fuller-Rowell et al., 2013) and racial and 
political attitudes might also still have room to change. On the other hand, to better 
inform the development of interventions, future studies could manipulate different 
aspects of identity (such as identity salience) to examine whether similar identity-attitude 
 
than their factor score counterparts, as one might expect because factor scores (at least in 
theory) capture latent constructs without measurement error, and measurement error is 
still present in composite scores. 
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dynamics apply when a change in identity comes from an intervention as exist over the 
long term.  
Overall, while POC identity generally related to racial and policy attitudes in this 
study as expected (predicting more positive attitudes toward other racial minorities and 
toward policies associated with other racial minority groups), American identity 
produced an inconsistent pattern of results. Thus, Study 1 suggests that 1) POC identity 
fits into the common ingroup identity model as a superordinate identity that is associated 
with less prejudice against other superordinate group members, but 2) POC identity is 
associated with, if anything, more support for policies that benefit minority groups, in 
contrast to broader superordinate identities in the paradoxical effects literature but 
consistent with the collective action and group consciousness literatures. (Racial identity 
also appears to be associated with more support for policies that benefit minority groups, 
consistent with the collective action and group consciousness literatures, though this 
applied not only to the own-group issue of immigration but also to the other-group issue 
of affirmative action.) Study 1 provides some evidence of American identity being 
associated with both less prejudice and less support for policies that benefit minority 
groups, but it also provides some contrary evidence. However, much of the evidence 
from this study that is consistent with the existing literature is at the trait level (and 
therefore not directional), and thus, further research is necessary to test the causal 
implications of these theories for Asian Americans’ racial, POC, and American identities.  
Additionally, further research should explore the extent to which the dynamics of 
racial, POC, and American identities and racial and political attitudes are similar or 
different across racial minority groups. Study 2 begins to address this last question. 
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Chapter 4: Study 2 
 Study 2 examines the effects of POC and American identities for two other racial 
minority groups: African Americans and Latinos. This study uses data from the 
University of Minnesota Center for the Study of Political Psychology’s (CSPP) 2020 
Presidential Election Panel Study, a 3-wave longitudinal study with data collection in 
October before the 2020 elections (Waves 1 and 2) and in November after the elections 
(Wave 3). The CSPP study was a multi-investigator study, and Study 2 was one of 
several modules included in the study. The data from this study allowed me to examine 
whether racial, POC, and American identities have similar or different patterns of results 
on the racial and political attitudes of members of different racial minority groups. 
A. Method 
Respondents 
Respondents were adult United States citizens recruited through YouGov. They 
consist of a nationally representative sample, plus an oversample of African Americans. 
The sample included 658 respondents who self-identified as Black (38% male) and 272 
respondents who self-identified as Hispanic or Latino (57% male). Both the Black and 
Latino respondents in this study tended to be older than the Asian American respondents 
in Study 1 (Black respondents: range = 18-85, Mean = 48.8, SD = 16.2; Latino 
respondents: range = 18-83, Mean = 42.3, SD = 16.7). The median income for Black 
respondents was $30,000-39,999, and the median income for Latino respondents was 
$40,000-49,999. For both groups, the modal response for education level was “high 
school graduate”; 19% of Black respondents and 16% of Latino respondents had a 4-year 
college degree or higher (compared to 60% of the Asian American respondents in Study 
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1). Like the Asian American respondents in Study 1, despite being thought of as a largely 
immigrant group, most of the Latino respondents in this study were born in the U.S. (18% 
immigrant citizens, 35% first-generation citizens, 24% second-generation citizens, 24% 
third-generation and above). The vast majority of Black respondents were born in the 
U.S. (9% immigrant citizens, 8% first-generation citizens, 4% second-generation citizens, 
80% third-generation and above). 
Both groups showed a trimodal distribution on political ideology, though more 
identified as at least slightly liberal (42% of Black respondents; 39% of Latino 
respondents) than identified as at least slightly conservative (17% of Black respondents; 
26% of Latino respondents). A large majority of Black respondents (72%) and a slight 
majority of Latino respondents (51%) identified as Democrats or Democratic leaning. 
Most reported being registered to vote in the 2016 elections (88% of Black respondents; 
86% of Latino respondents). 
The study was administered in 3 waves: Wave 1 ran from October 6 to October 
14, 2020, Wave 2 ran from October 25 to November 3, 2020,1 and Wave 3 ran from 
November 9 to November 16, 2020. Of the 658 Black respondents who completed Wave 
1, 531 completed Wave 2 (19% attrition), and 441 completed Wave 3 (17% attrition from 
Wave 2; 33% attrition overall). Of the 272 Latino respondents who completed Wave 1, 
146 completed Wave 2 (46% attrition), and 120 completed Wave 3 (18% attrition from 
Wave 2; 56% attrition overall). Respondents who completed more waves tended to be 
 
1 Election Day was November 3. Despite a small number of Wave 2 responses collected 
on that day, we treat Wave 2 as pre-election, largely because the results of the 
Presidential election were not officially announced until November 7.  
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older, and respondents in the lowest income category and respondents who did not vote 
in 2016 appeared to be more likely to drop out between waves. Among Latino 
respondents, men and those with less education dropped out in higher numbers after the 
first wave than women and those with more education. There were trends for Black 
conservatives to drop out at slightly higher rates than Black moderates and liberals and 
for Latino extreme liberals and Democrats to complete all three waves of the study at 
higher rates than Latino respondents in other ideological or party identity categories. 
Among Black respondents, those who were not registered to vote appeared to be more 
likely to drop out after the first wave. 
Materials and Procedure 
An abbreviated version of the Study 1 materials was included in the CSPP 2020 
study. Racial, POC, and American identities were measured using 2-item versions of the 
Huddy et al. (2015) identity scale, specifically the items “how important is being __ to 
you?” and “to what extent do you think of yourself as being __?” Responses were on a 5-
point scale, with “moderately important” added between “slightly important” and “very 
important” for the first item and “quite a bit” added between “somewhat” and “a great 
deal” for the second item. These two items generally formed a reliable measure, for both 
Black and Latino respondents, of racial identity (Black respondents: Wave 1  = .87, 
Wave 2  = .83, Wave 3  = .87; Latino respondents: Wave 1  = .87, Wave 2  = .91, 
Wave 3  = .89), POC identity (Black respondents:  = .87, .85, .85; Latino respondents: 
 = .85, .78, .84), and American identity (Black respondents:  = .87, .88, .88; Latino 
respondents:  = .89, .87, .90). Accordingly, responses to the two scale items were 
averaged to form a composite score for each identity in each wave. 
COMMON INGROUP IDENTITY AND POLITICAL SOLIDARITY 185 
Racial attitude items consisted of feeling thermometers (FT) for Whites, Blacks, 
Latinos, and Asians. FT ratings of Latinos and Asians were averaged in each wave for 
Black respondents (Wave 1  = .91; Wave 2  = .89; Wave 3  =.89), and FT ratings of 
Blacks and Asians were averaged in each wave for Latino respondents ( = .85 all 3 
waves) to form composite scores of attitudes toward other racial minority groups. 
Support for change consisted of 2 items measuring attitudes toward immigration 
policy—one asking respondents’ opinion on the number of immigrants who should be 
allowed to enter the U.S. (1 = increased a lot; 7 = decreased a lot) and one asking how 
much they support or oppose ending criminal penalties for people crossing the border 
illegally (1 = strongly oppose; 7 = strongly support)—as well as items measuring 
attitudes toward Black Lives Matter (1 = very positive; 5 = very negative), mandatory 
minimum sentencing (1 = “Mandatory minimum sentences should be given in all cases 
where they apply, with no exceptions.” 2 = “Even where a mandatory minimum sentence 
applies, a judge should have the freedom to give a shorter sentence if the judge finds 
compelling circumstances.”), and support for the protests after George Floyd’s death (1 = 
strongly support; 7 = strongly oppose). Because responses to the immigration items did 
not show adequate internal consistency (Black respondents:  = .12, .22, .08; Latino 
respondents:  = .28, .52, .46), these items were treated as separate measures of 
immigration policy attitudes in further analyses. The Black Lives Matter and George 
Floyd protests items did show some amount of internal consistency (Black respondents: 
 = .75, .79, .82; Latino respondents:  = .91, .89, .96), and thus, responses to those two 
items were averaged (after 0-1 coding) to form a composite score for each respondent in 
each wave. However, the mandatory minimum sentence item was only weakly correlated 
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with the other two items and was treated as a separate measure of criminal justice reform 
attitudes in further analyses. 
Of the potential mediators, this study only included the linked fate items. 
However, if Sanchez and Vargas’s (2016) findings still hold, linked fate should 
adequately represent the single-factor group consciousness construct for Black 
respondents, at least with regard to their racial identity. For Latino respondents, linked 
fate might still be a partial mediator even if it does not capture the full scope of group 
consciousness. 
Respondents were asked their race and gender, as well as their political ideology, 
political party affiliation (which was recoded onto a 7-point scale as in Study 1), and 
whether they were registered to vote as part of the study. Additionally, YouGov provided 
respondents’ birth year, education, family income, and immigration background. Based 
on these variables, I created dummy variables for gender (1 = male; 0 otherwise) and 
immigrant status (1 = immigrant; 0 otherwise), and I subtracted respondents’ birth years 
from 2020 to create a variable for age. 
Toward the beginning of Wave 1, respondents were asked to select one or more 
racial or ethnic categories that describe them. The racial category or categories they 
selected were then piped into the racial identity and linked fate questions, so that, for 
example, a respondent who chose Black would be asked, “how important is being a Black 
person to you?” Respondents who selected more than one racial category were asked the 
racial identity and linked fate questions for each racial category they selected. All 
respondents were asked the racial identity, American identity, and racial linked fate 
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questions, but only respondents who selected at least one racial category other than White 
were asked the POC identity and linked fate questions. 
In Wave 1, respondents were first asked their gender, employment status, and 
race, followed by questions about their political orientation and interest in politics. Next, 
they were presented with feeling thermometers for a variety of people and groups, 
including the racial groups relevant to this study. Following these were a set of policy 
attitude items, including the immigration and criminal justice reform items relevant to 
this study. Then, after a number of items unrelated to this study, respondents were asked 
the racial and POC linked fate questions and after another set of items unrelated to this 
study, they were given the 2-item identity scale for a number of identities including 
American, POC, and racial identities. Waves 2 and 3 followed a similar order but did not 
ask the demographic and political orientation questions from Wave 1 except that Wave 3 
included a question about respondents’ political party affiliation. 
All items were recoded to range from 0 to 1. Items that were averaged to form 
composite scores were 0-1 coded before averaging. Composite scores were used for 
racial, POC, and American identities (average of 2 items per time point for each identity); 
nonwhite FTs (average of Latino and Asian FTs at each time point for Black respondents; 
average of Black and Asian FTs at each time point for Latino respondents); and criminal 
justice reform attitudes (average of BLM and protest items at each time point; mandatory 
minimum sentence item was analyzed separately). I included age, the gender dummy 
variable, education, family income, the immigrant status dummy variable, political 
ideology, and party affiliation as covariates in panel models. 
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As in Study 1, cross-lagged panel models and random-intercepts cross-lagged 
panel models were analyzed through structural equation modeling using the lavaan 
package in R. Data from Black and Latino respondents were analyzed separately. As in 
Study 1, for each identity-attitude pair, I tested CLPM with and without demographic and 
political covariates and with and without stationarity across lags, and I tested RI-CLPM 
with and without stationarity. Because Study 2 did not involve factor scores or extensive 
model convergence problems, panel models were fit using full-information maximum 
likelihood estimation or WLSMV estimation with pairwise deletion. 
B. Results 
1. Descriptive Statistics 
 Means and standard deviations for the identity, racial attitude, policy attitude, and 




Study 2 Variable Means and Standard Deviations 
 
 Wave 1 Wave 2 Wave 3 
 n Mean (SD) n Mean (SD) n Mean (SD) 
Racial IDa       
Black 658 4.29 (1.09) 531 4.26 (1.05) 441 4.32 (1.05) 
Latino 272 3.77 (1.20) 146 3.91 (1.14) 120 3.91 (1.20) 
POC ID       
Black 658 4.26 (1.10) 531 4.22 (1.09) 441 4.28 (1.09) 
Latino 272 2.88 (1.38) 146 3.09 (1.25) 120 3.08 (1.38) 
American ID       
Black 658 3.79 (1.21) 531 3.89 (1.13) 441 3.85 (1.15) 
Latino 272 3.82 (1.15) 146 3.87 (1.06) 120 3.89 (1.13) 
       
Nonwhite FT comp       
Black 658 67.5 (25.4) 531 69.1 (24.5) 441 67.3 (25.6) 
Latino 272 69.4 (24.7) 146 70.8 (24.9) 120 70.3 (23.8) 
White FT       
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Black 658 60.4 (27.4) 531 61.7 (27.9) 441 61.6 (27.7) 
Latino 272 62.7 (27.0) 146 66.5 (25.6) 120 64.4 (25.4) 
       
Immigration: # 
immigrantsb 
      
Black 658 4.39 (1.52) 531 4.30 (1.53) 441 4.33 (1.50) 
Latino 272 4.45 (1.61) 146 4.26 (1.65) 120 4.45 (1.62) 
Immigration: Ending 
criminal penalties 
      
Black 658 3.93 (1.77) 531 3.87 (1.85) 441 3.93 (1.83) 
Latino 272 4.26 (1.90) 146 4.26 (1.98) 120 4.07 (2.12) 
Criminal justice: 
BLM/protestsc 
      
Black 658 .773 (.249) 531 .772 (.258) 441 .775 (.259) 




      
Black 658 .728 (.445) 531 .753 (.431) 441 .776 (.418) 
Latino 272 .658 (.475) 146 .712 (.454) 120 .733 (.444) 
       
Linked fate: racee       
Black 556 2.74 (1.16) 422 2.80 (1.18) 386 2.80 (1.21) 
Latino 212 2.18 (1.14) 118 2.32 (1.14) 101 2.35 (1.16) 
Linked fate: POC       
Black 540 2.55 (1.20) 410 2.57 (1.19) 372 2.70 (1.17) 
Latino 221 2.12 (1.14) 118 2.20 (1.17) 102 2.21 (1.15) 
 
a Identity composite variables are on a 5-point scale, with higher scores indicating greater 
identification with the group. 
b Both immigration items are on a 7-point scale. The number of immigrants item was 
recoded so higher scores on both items indicate more liberal immigration attitudes. 
c BLM/protest composite scores are reported on a 0-1 scale, with higher scores indicating 
more support. 
d Means on the mandatory minimum sentence item reflect the proportion of respondents 
who chose the answer favoring judges’ ability to give sentences shorter than the 
mandatory minimum. 
e Linked fate is on a 4-point scale (1 = no linked fate; 2 = not very much; 3 = some; 4 = a 
lot). 
 
Racial identification and American identification tended to be high among both 
Black and Latino respondents across waves, but Latino respondents’ identification as 
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POC was close to the scale midpoint and, in Wave 1, was slightly below the midpoint. 
For Black respondents, racial identity and POC identity were highly correlated at each 
time point (r = .83-.88); this correlation was somewhat lower for Latino respondents (r = 
.52-.66), though for both groups it was higher than the correlation between either of these 




Study 2 Identity Intercorrelations 
 
 Racial identity POC identity American identity 
Black respondents W1    
Racial identity 1.000   
POC identity .875 1.000  
American identity .308 .362 1.000 
Black respondents W2    
Racial identity 1.000   
POC identity .865 1.000  
American identity .319 .344 1.000 
Black respondents W3    
Racial identity 1.000   
POC identity .829 1.000  
American identity .290 .327 1.000 
    
Latino respondents W1    
Racial identity 1.000   
POC identity .520 1.000  
American identity .259 .032 1.000 
Latino respondents W2    
Racial identity 1.000   
POC identity .627 1.000  
American identity .281 .105 1.000 
Latino respondents W3    
Racial identity 1.000   
POC identity .664 1.000  
American identity .236 .004 1.000 
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 Both Black and Latino respondents tended to rate other racial minority groups 
above the midpoint on the feeling thermometers (Black respondents: Wave 1 Mean = 
67.5, SD = 25.4; Wave 2 Mean = 69.1, SD = 24.5; Wave 3 Mean = 67.3, SD = 25.6; 
Latino respondents: Wave 1 Mean = 69.4, SD = 24.7, Wave 2 Mean = 70.8, SD = 24.9, 
Wave 3 Mean = 70.3, SD = 23.8). Both groups also tended to rate Whites above the 
midpoint, though the average White FT ratings were somewhat lower than the average 
nonwhite FT ratings (Black respondents: Wave 1 Mean = 60.4, SD = 27.4; Wave 2 Mean 
= 61.7, SD = 27.9; Wave 3 Mean = 61.6, SD = 27.7; Latino respondents: Wave 1 Mean = 
62.7, SD = 27.0; Wave 2 Mean = 66.5, SD = 25.6; Wave 3 Mean = 64.4, SD = 25.4). 
 Although the mean responses for both groups on the number of immigrants item 
were above the midpoint (Black respondents: Mean = 4.30-4.39 on a 7-point scale; 
Latino respondents: Mean = 4.26-4.45), Black respondents were on average just below 
the midpoint in support for ending criminal penalties for immigration (Mean = 3.87-3.93 
on a 7-point scale), and Latino respondents were slightly to somewhat above the midpoint 
(Mean = 4.07-4.26). Both groups appeared to support criminal justice reform, but Black 
respondents tended to show more support than Latino respondents (BLM/protests, Black 
respondents: Mean = .772-.775 on a 0-1 scale, Latino respondents: Mean = .563-.572; 
mandatory minimum sentence, Black respondents: Mean = .728-.776, Latino 
respondents: Mean = .658-.733). 
 Stability of measures. Correlations of each variable with itself across waves are 
presented in Table 28. As in Study 1, the identity variables (r = .73-.88) and nonwhite FT 
composite scores (r = .73-.83) show high levels of stability. And the criminal justice 
attitude composite formed from the BLM and protest items was even more stable, 
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especially among Latino respondents (Black respondents: r = .86-.90; Latino 
respondents: r = .93-.97). The number of immigrants item was also fairly stable (r = .67-
.84), though less so than immigration attitudes appeared to be in Study 1. However, in 
contrast to Study 1, one of the immigration items in Study 2 did not appear to be highly 
stable across waves (r = .27-.40), and one of the criminal justice items (the mandatory 
minimum sentence item) showed an intermediate but highly variable level of stability (r 
= .38-.57).
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Table 28 
 
Study 2 Variable Autocorrelations 
 
 Black respondents Latino respondents 
 W1-W2 W2-W3 W1-W3 W1-W2 W2-W3 W1-W3 
Identity composite scores       
Racial ID .768 .785 .773 .826 .832 .759 
POC ID .766 .796 .742 .736 .731 .793 
American ID .792 .826 .818 .828 .885 .870 
       
Racial attitude variables       
Non-White FT composite score .790 .792 .758 .731 .822 .827 
White FT .686 .735 .707 .684 .755 .644 
       
Policy attitude variables       
Immigration: number of immigrants .670 .689 .694 .670 .837 .815 
Immigration: ending criminal penalties .270 .299 .313 .360 .399 .343 
Criminal justice: BLM/protests composite .862 .897 .861 .927 .967 .970 
Criminal justice: mandatory minimum 
sentence 
.378 .511 .448 .465 .566 .408 
       
Linked fate       
Race .722 .730 .701 .589 .637 .590 
POC .612 .674 .626 .545 .653 .526 
Composite score .706 .733 .677 .598 .651 .580 
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2. Identity and Racial Attitudes 
 Again, I hypothesized that identification as POC would predict more positive 
attitudes toward other racial minority groups (Hypothesis 2), and identification as 
American would predict more positive attitudes toward both other racial minority groups 
and Whites (Hypothesis 1). 
 a. Cross-lagged panel models. Fit statistics for the identity-nonwhite FT panel 
models are provided in Tables 29 (Black respondents) and 30 (Latino respondents). 
SRMR for all CLPM models met the Hu and Bentler (1999) criteria. CFI was close to the 
criterion in all of the models for Black respondents (CFI > .92) and met the criterion in 
the models for Black respondents’ POC identity and nonwhite FTs with covariates. But it 
was in this range for Latino respondents only for the model with racial identity and was 
lower in the models with POC (CFI = .849-.898) and American (CFI = .875-.924) 




Study 2 Panel Model Fit Statistics: Non-White FTs, Black Respondents 
 
 CFI RMSEA SRMR 2 (df) 2 (df) 
Racial ID      
CLPM no covariates .930 .231 .040 144.394 
(4)*** 
 
CLPM no cov w/ 
stationarity 
.928 .165 .047 151.719 
(8)*** 
7.325 (4) 
CLPM w/ covariates .943 .227 .020 140.085 
(4)*** 
 
CLPM w/ cov w/ 
stationarity 
.942 .162 .023 146.547 
(8)*** 
6.462 (4) 
RI-CLPM 1.000 .030 .010 1.576 (1) 142.818 
(3)*** 
RI-CLPM w/ stationarity 1.000 .000 .015 4.234 (5) 2.658 (4) 
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POC ID      
CLPM no covariates .947 .201 .035 110.739 
(4)*** 
 
CLPM no cov w/ 
stationarity 
.943 .147 .042 122.035 
(8)*** 
11.296 (4)* 
CLPM w/ covariates .955 .201 .018 110.861 
(4)*** 
 
CLPM w/ cov w/ 
stationarity 
.953 .146 .021 120.373 
(8)*** 
9.512 (4)* 
RI-CLPM .999 .046 .011 2.399 (1) 108.340 
(3)*** 
RI-CLPM w/ stationarity .997 .042 .023 10.708 (5)† 8.309 (4)† 
American ID      
CLPM no covariates .930 .241 .039 156.572 
(4)*** 
 
CLPM no cov w/ 
stationarity 
.926 .175 .050 169.483 
(8)*** 
12.911 (4)* 
CLPM w/ covariates .946 .229 .018 142.475 
(4)*** 
 
CLPM w/ cov w/ 
stationarity 
.945 .164 .022 149.719 
(8)*** 
7.244 (4) 
RI-CLPM .997 .101 .021 7.740 (1)** 148.832 
(3)*** 
RI-CLPM w/ stationarity .998 .035 .022 9.115 (5) 1.375 (4) 
 
Note: N = 658 for all models. 
 
Note: 2 for RI-CLPM without stationarity is vs. CLPM Model 1 without stationarity. 





Study 2 Panel Model Fit Statistics: Non-White FTs, Latino Respondents 
 
 CFI RMSEA SRMR 2 (df) 2 (df) 
Racial ID      
CLPM no covariates .926 .203 .044 48.932 
(4)*** 
 
CLPM no cov w/ 
stationarity 
.927 .143 .050 52.460 
(8)*** 
3.528 (4) 
CLPM w/ covariates .945 .200 .023 47.623 
(4)*** 
 
CLPM w/ cov w/ 
stationarity 
.944 .143 .026 52.448 
(8)*** 
4.825 (4) 
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RI-CLPM 1.000 .030 .015 1.252 (1) 47.680 
(3)*** 
RI-CLPM w/ stationarity .995 .047 .034 7.957 (5) 6.705 (4) 
POC ID      
CLPM no covariates .854 .272 .063 84.382 
(4)*** 
 
CLPM no cov w/ 
stationarity 
.849 .195 .076 90.641 
(8)*** 
6.259 (4) 
CLPM w/ covariates .898 .267 .032 81.765 
(4)*** 
 
CLPM w/ cov w/ 
stationarity 
.893 .194 .039 89.620 
(8)*** 
7.855 (4)† 
RI-CLPM 1.000 .000 .009 0.412 (1) 83.970 
(3)*** 
RI-CLPM w/ stationarity .993 .052 .042 8.617 (5) 8.205 (4)† 
American ID      
CLPM no covariates .896 .254 .050 74.348 
(4)*** 
 
CLPM no cov w/ 
stationarity 
.875 .197 .076 92.128 
(8)*** 
17.780 (4)** 
CLPM w/ covariates .924 .255 .027 74.964 
(4)*** 
 
CLPM w/ cov w/ 
stationarity 




RI-CLPM 1.000 .000 .004 0.110 (1) 74.238 
(3)*** 
RI-CLPM w/ stationarity .993 .061 .045 10.015 (5)† 9.905 (4)* 
 
Note: N = 272 for all models. 
 
Note: 2 for RI-CLPM without stationarity is vs. CLPM Model 1 without stationarity. 
Otherwise, 2 is for stationarity vs. no stationarity. 
 
 Fit statistics for the identity-White FT panel models are provided in Tables 31 
(Black respondents) and 32 (Latino respondents). Again, SRMR indicated good fit 
(SRMR ≤ .071). CFI met the fit criterion for the model of Latino respondents’ racial 
identity and White FT ratings (CFI = .973-.982) and was close to the criterion in all of the 
other models (CFI = .910-.956) except the one for Latino respondents’ POC identity (CFI 
= .881-.927). RMSEA again indicated poor fit for all CLPM models, though the models 
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for Latino respondents’ racial identity with stationarity were close to the fit criterion 




Study 2 Panel Model Fit Statistics: White FT, Black Respondents 
 
 CFI RMSEA SRMR 2 (df) 2 (df) 
Racial ID      
CLPM no covariates .910 .243 .049 160.023 
(4)*** 
 
CLPM no cov w/ 
stationarity 
.910 .171 .051 162.826 
(8)*** 
2.803 (4) 
CLPM w/ covariates .928 .240 .025 155.486 
(4)*** 
 
CLPM w/ cov w/ 
stationarity 
.929 .169 .026 159.025 
(8)*** 
3.539 (4) 
RI-CLPM .999 .055 .013 2.958 (1)† 157.065 
(3)*** 
RI-CLPM w/ stationarity 1.000 .000 .018 4.828 (5) 1.870 (4) 
POC ID      
CLPM no covariates .928 .217 .045 128.456 
(4)*** 
 
CLPM no cov w/ 
stationarity 
.929 .152 .046 130.135 
(8)*** 
1.679 (4) 
CLPM w/ covariates .941 .217 .023 127.746 
(4)*** 
 
CLPM w/ cov w/ 
stationarity 
.942 .152 .024 130.038 
(8)*** 
2.292 (4) 
RI-CLPM .998 .079 .016 5.110 (1)* 123.346 
(3)*** 
RI-CLPM w/ stationarity .998 .034 .022 8.861 (5) 3.751 (4) 
American ID      
CLPM no covariates .918 .247 .047 164.981 
(4)*** 
 
CLPM no cov w/ 
stationarity 
.916 .177 .051 172.008 
(8)*** 
7.027 (4) 
CLPM w/ covariates .936 .239 .023 154.244 
(4)*** 
 
CLPM w/ cov w/ 
stationarity 
.936 .168 .024 157.196 
(8)*** 
2.952 (4) 
RI-CLPM .999 .052 .013 2.750 (1)† 162.231 
(3)*** 
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RI-CLPM w/ stationarity .999 .029 .021 7.677 (5) 4.927 (4) 
 
Note: N = 658 for all models. 
 
Note: 2 for RI-CLPM without stationarity is vs. CLPM Model 1 without stationarity. 





Study 2 Panel Model Fit Statistics: White FT, Latino Respondents 
 
 CFI RMSEA SRMR 2 (df) 2 (df) 
Racial ID      
CLPM no covariates .973 .114 .032 18.263 (4)**  
CLPM no cov w/ 
stationarity 
.973 .081 .044 22.194 (8)** 3.931 (4) 
CLPM w/ covariates .982 .108 .015 16.657 (4)**  
CLPM w/ cov w/ 
stationarity 
.982 .077 .020 20.826 (8)** 4.169 (4) 
RI-CLPM 1.000 .000 .004 0.060 (1) 18.203 
(3)*** 
RI-CLPM w/ stationarity 1.000 .000 .025 3.858 (5) 3.798 (4) 
POC ID      
CLPM no covariates .883 .218 .056 55.533 
(4)*** 
 
CLPM no cov w/ 
stationarity 
.881 .156 .070 60.618 
(8)*** 
5.085 (4) 
CLPM w/ covariates .927 .212 .028 52.839 
(4)*** 
 
CLPM w/ cov w/ 
stationarity 
.926 .151 .035 57.704 
(8)*** 
4.865 (4) 
RI-CLPM 1.000 .000 .003 0.045 (1) 55.488 
(3)*** 
RI-CLPM w/ stationarity 1.000 .000 .024 2.221 (5) 2.176 (4) 
American ID      
CLPM no covariates .938 .187 .041 42.039 
(4)*** 
 
CLPM no cov w/ 
stationarity 




CLPM w/ covariates .956 .187 .020 42.159 
(4)*** 
 
CLPM w/ cov w/ 
stationarity 
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RI-CLPM 1.000 .000 .008 0.309 (1) 41.730 
(3)*** 
RI-CLPM w/ stationarity .994 .052 .040 8.657 (5) 8.348 (4)† 
 
Note: N = 272 for all models. 
 
Note: 2 for RI-CLPM without stationarity is vs. CLPM Model 1 without stationarity. 
Otherwise, 2 is for stationarity vs. no stationarity. 
 
 Stationarity constraints significantly reduced model fit for Black respondents’ 
POC identity and nonwhite FTs (without covariates: 𝜒4
2 = 110.739, 𝜒8
2 =
122.035, Δ𝜒4
2 = 11.296, 𝑝 =  .023; with covariates: 𝜒4
2 = 110.861, 𝜒8
2 =
120.373, Δ𝜒4
2 = 9.512, 𝑝 =  .050) and American identity and nonwhite FTs without 
covariates (𝜒4
2 = 156.572, 𝜒8
2 = 169.483, Δ𝜒4
2 = 12.911, 𝑝 =  .012) and for Latino 
respondents’ American identity and nonwhite FTs (without covariates: 𝜒4
2 =
74.348, 𝜒8
2 = 92.128, Δ𝜒4
2 = 17.780, 𝑝 =  .001; with covariates: 𝜒4
2 = 74.964, 𝜒8
2 =
95.622, Δ𝜒4
2 = 20.658, 𝑝 <  .001). Additionally, stationarity constraints marginally 
reduced fit for Latino respondents’ POC identity and nonwhite FTs with covariates (𝜒4
2 =
81.765, 𝜒8
2 = 89.620, Δ𝜒4
2 = 7.855, 𝑝 =  .097). Stationarity constraints also significantly 
reduced model fit for Latino respondents’ American identity and White FTs (without 
covariates: 𝜒4
2 = 42.039, 𝜒8
2 = 61.403, Δ𝜒4
2 = 19.364, 𝑝 <  .001; with covariates: 𝜒4
2 =
42.159, 𝜒8
2 = 64.726, Δ𝜒4
2 = 22.567, 𝑝 < .001). Thus, results for Black respondents’ 
POC and American identities and nonwhite FTs and Latino respondents’ American 
identity and all FTs are reported below based on the models without stationarity. 
 For Black respondents, both POC identity and American identity in Wave 2 had 
significant, positive cross-lagged effects on nonwhite FT ratings in Wave 3 (POC 
identity: b = .080, SE = .028, p = .005; American identity: b = .096, SE = .026, p < .001). 
COMMON INGROUP IDENTITY AND POLITICAL SOLIDARITY 200 
However, FT ratings in Wave 1 also had a significant positive effect on POC identity in 
Wave 2 (b = .089, SE = .030, p = .004). Additionally, racial identity had a significant 
positive cross-lagged effect on nonwhite FT ratings even though it was not predicted to 
be related to racial attitudes (ID-attitude: b = .051, SE = .019, p = .008). (Figure 27 
presents CLPM results for all 3 identities—without stationarity for POC and American 
identities and with stationarity for racial identity.) Thus, there is evidence for Hypotheses 
1 and 2 among Black respondents, but it is inconsistent across time lags, there is evidence 
of a reverse effect from nonwhite FT ratings to POC identity, and racial identity 
unexpectedly shows a similar effect. 
 
  








Figure 27. Study 2 CLPM for Black respondents’ POC identity and nonwhite FTs, with 
no stationarity constraints (a); American identity and nonwhite FTs, with no stationarity 
constraints (b); and racial identity and nonwhite FTs, with stationarity constraints on 
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lagged and cross-lagged coefficients (c). These models do not include covariates. 
Unstandardized coefficients with standard errors (in parentheses) and standardized 
coefficients are shown. Statistical significance is indicated as follows: *** p < .001, ** p 
< .01, * p < .05, † p < .10 (marginally significant). 
 
 For Latino respondents, American identity in Wave 1 had a significant positive 
effect on nonwhite FT ratings in Wave 2 (b = .158, SE = .051, p = .002) (Figure 28). 
There is some evidence of a similar effect of POC identity, but only in the model with 
covariates (b = .096, SE = .049, p = .050). These results support Hypothesis 1 and 
possibly Hypothesis 2, but again, they are inconsistent across time lags. 
 
  
Figure 28. Study 2 CLPM for Latino respondents’ American identity and nonwhite FTs, 
without covariates and with no stationarity constraints. Unstandardized coefficients with 
standard errors (in parentheses) and standardized coefficients are shown. Statistical 
significance is indicated as follows: *** p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05, † p < .10 
(marginally significant). 
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 Consistent with Hypothesis 1, American identity had positive cross-lagged effects 
on White FT ratings for Black respondents (b = .103, SE = .022, p < .001) in the model 
with stationarity and for Latino respondents from Wave 1 to Wave 2 (b = .226, SE = .053, 
p < .001) in the model without stationarity. (Figure 29 presents the CLPM results from 
the model with stationarity for Black respondents and the model without stationarity for 
Latino respondents.) These effects appear to be larger than the reverse effects from White 
FT ratings to American identity: In follow-up analyses, constraining the forward and 
reverse effects to be equal (in both waves in the model with stationarity for Black 
respondents and from Wave 1 to Wave 2 in the model without stationarity for Latino 
respondents) significantly worsened model fit (Black respondents: 𝜒8
2 = 172.008, 𝜒9
2 =
176.778, Δ𝜒1
2 = 4.770, 𝑝 = .029; Latino respondents: 𝜒4
2 = 42.039, 𝜒5
2 =
48.055, Δ𝜒1
2 = 6.016, 𝑝 = .014). Unexpectedly, however, racial identity (b = .056, SE = 
.024, p = .021) and POC identity (b = .058, SE = .023, p = .014) also had positive cross-
lagged effects on White FT ratings (in the models with stationarity) among Black 
respondents. Neither of these identities showed significant cross-lagged relationships 
with White FT ratings among Latino respondents.  






Figure 29. Study 2 CLPM for American identity and the White FT among Black 
respondents, with stationarity constraints on lagged and cross-lagged coefficients (a), and 
among Latino respondents, with no stationarity constraints (b). Unstandardized 
coefficients with standard errors (in parentheses) and standardized coefficients are 
shown. Statistical significance is indicated as follows: *** p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05, 
† p < .10 (marginally significant). 
 
 b. Random-intercepts cross-lagged panel models. As was the case in Study 1, 
RI-CLPM showed better fit than CLPM for all identities and both nonwhite and White 
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FTs. All models met the Hu and Bentler (1999) criteria except Black respondents’ 
American identity and nonwhite FTs without stationarity (RMSEA = .101), Latino 
respondents’ American identity and nonwhite FTs with stationarity (RMSEA = .061), and 
Black respondents’ POC identity and White FT without stationarity (RMSEA = .079). 
Stationarity significantly worsened model fit for Latino respondents’ American identity 
and nonwhite FTs (𝜒1
2 = 0.110, 𝜒5
2 = 10.015, Δ𝜒4
2 = 9.905, 𝑝 = .042) and marginally 
significantly worsened model fit for Latino respondents’ American identity and White 
FTs (𝜒1
2 = 0.309, 𝜒5
2 = 8.657, Δ𝜒4
2 = 8.348, 𝑝 = .080), as well as POC identity and 
nonwhite FTs among both Black (𝜒1
2 = 2.399, 𝜒5
2 = 10.708, Δ𝜒4
2 = 8.309, 𝑝 = .081) 
and Latino (𝜒1
2 = 0.412, 𝜒5
2 = 8.617, Δ𝜒4
2 = 8.205, 𝑝 = .084) respondents. Fit statistics 
are presented in Tables 29-32. Parameter estimates reported below are from the models 
without stationarity for Black respondents’ POC identity and nonwhite FTs, Latino 
respondents’ POC and American identities and nonwhite FTs, and Latino respondents’ 
American identity and White FT; any other parameter estimates reported below are from 
the models with stationarity. 
 Trait-level covariances were significant and positive for POC identity and 
nonwhite FTs among both Black (c = .013, SE = .003, p < .001) and Latino (c = .020, SE 
= .005, p < .001) respondents, consistent with Hypothesis 2. However, American identity 
was significantly positively related to nonwhite FT ratings at the trait level only for Black 
respondents (c = .017, SE = .003, p < .001). Unexpectedly, racial identity was 
significantly positively related to nonwhite FT ratings for both groups (Black 
respondents: c = .012, SE = .003, p < .001; Latino respondents: c = .014, SE = .005, p = 
.010).  
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Consistent with Hypothesis 1, American identity was significantly positively 
related to White FT ratings at the trait level for both groups (Black respondents: c = .024, 
SE = .003, p < .001; Latino respondents: c = .017, SE = .005, p = .001); neither racial 
identity (Black respondents: c = .001, SE = .003, p = .729; Latino respondents: c = .005, 
SE = .007, p = .465) nor POC identity (Black respondents: c = .004, SE = .003, p = .227; 
Latino respondents: c = -.001, SE = .005, p = .849) was significantly related to White FT 
ratings. Thus, as expected, identification with a common ingroup that includes Whites is 
associated (at least at the between-person level) with more positive attitudes toward 
Whites, and identification with groups that do not include Whites are not significantly 
associated with attitudes toward Whites. 
At the within-person level, neither racial identity nor POC identity significantly 
predicted nonwhite FT ratings over time. On the other hand, for Black respondents, 
American identity and nonwhite FT ratings had marginally significant to significant 
negative cross-lagged effects on each other (ID-FT: b = -.124, SE = .071, p = .078; FT-
ID: b = -.223, SE = .090, p = .013) in the RI-CLPM with stationarity (Figure 30). For 
Latino respondents, American identity in Wave 1 had a positive cross-lagged effect on 
nonwhite FT ratings in Wave 2 (b = .599, SE = .281, p = .033) in the RI-CLPM without 
stationarity (Figure 31), but this effect is not present from Wave 2 to Wave 3, and the 
relatively small sample size and large standard errors suggest that the effect might not be 
reliable. Thus, if anything, it is American identity that appears to relate to attitudes 
toward other racial minorities over time at the within-person level, and for African 
Americans, that relationship could well be negative, despite the positive between-person 
relationship. 
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Figure 30. Study 2 RI-CLPM for Black respondents’ American identity and nonwhite 
FTs, with stationarity constraints on lagged and cross-lagged coefficients. 
Unstandardized coefficients with standard errors (in parentheses) and standardized 
coefficients are shown. Statistical significance is indicated as follows: *** p < .001, ** p 
< .01, * p < .05, † p < .10 (marginally significant). 
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Figure 31. Study 2 RI-CLPM for Latino respondents’ American identity and nonwhite 
FTs), with no stationarity constraints. Unstandardized coefficients with standard errors 
(in parentheses) and standardized coefficients are shown. Statistical significance is 
indicated as follows: *** p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05, † p < .10 (marginally 
significant). 
 
Despite the positive trait-level association between American identity and White 
FT ratings, Black respondents showed no significant cross-lagged effects between these 
variables in the RI-CLPM, and Latino respondents showed a positive effect of Wave 1 
identity on Wave 2 FT ratings (b = .581, SE = .236, p = .014) but a marginally significant 
(though larger in absolute magnitude) negative effect of Wave 2 identity on Wave 3 FT 
ratings (b = -.884, SE = .485, p = .068) in the RI-CLPM without stationarity (Figure 32). 
Additionally, Black respondents showed an unexpected positive cross-lagged effect of 
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racial identity on White FT ratings in the RI-CLPM with stationarity (b = .225, SE = 





Figure 32. Study 2 RI-CLPM for Latino respondents’ American identity and White FT, 
with no stationarity constraints. Unstandardized coefficients with standard errors (in 
parentheses) and standardized coefficients are shown. Statistical significance is indicated 
as follows: *** p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05, † p < .10 (marginally significant). 
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Figure 33. Study 2 RI-CLPM for Black respondents’ racial identity and the White FT, 
with stationarity constraints on lagged and cross-lagged effects. Unstandardized 
coefficients with standard errors (in parentheses) and standardized coefficients are 
shown. Statistical significance is indicated as follows: *** p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05, 
† p < .10 (marginally significant). 
 
3. Identity and Policy Attitudes 
 a. Immigration. I expected immigration to be an own-group issue area for Latino 
Americans, both because many of them are immigrants or have immediate family who 
are immigrants and because elite discourse on immigration tends to associate immigrants 
with Latinos. Thus, among Latino respondents, I expected racial identity to predict more 
liberal immigration attitudes (allowing more immigrants and favoring ending criminal 
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penalties for illegal border-crossing) (Hypothesis 17) and American identity to predict 
less liberal immigration attitudes (Hypothesis 13). By contrast, I expected immigration to 
be an other-group issue area for a majority of African Americans (though with the 
potential exception of refugees from predominantly Muslim countries). Thus, among 
Black respondents, I expected POC identity, rather than racial identity, to predict more 
liberal immigration attitudes (Hypothesis 19) and American identity to predict less liberal 
immigration attitudes (Hypothesis 13). 
 Latino respondents. CLPM models showed adequate fit based on SRMR (≤ .08). 
For the models with the number of immigrants item, although CFI approached the fit 
criteria for the racial attitude models with covariates (CFI = .936), the CFI and RMSEA 
fit criteria were not met (CFI = .843-.936, RMSEA = .160-.284). With the 
decriminalizing immigration item, the racial identity models met the CFI fit criterion 
(CFI ≥ .952), and the American identity models approached this criterion (CFI = .913-
.946). But RMSEA did not indicate adequate fit for any of these models (RMSEA = .086-
.238), and CFI indicated poor fit for the POC identity models (CFI = .806-.880). 
Stationarity significantly worsened fit in almost all CLPM models with the number of 
immigrants item but did not significantly affect fit for any of the models with the 
decriminalizing immigration item, though the American identity model without 
covariates fit marginally significantly worse with stationarity (𝜒4
2 = 36.365, 𝜒8
2 =
45.532, Δ𝜒4
2 = 9.167, 𝑝 = .057). Thus, CLPM parameter estimates reported below are 
from models without stationarity except for racial and POC identities and decriminalizing 
immigration. 
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RI-CLPM fit significantly better than CLPM for all 3 identities and both 
immigration items, and the RI-CLPM models without stationarity met all 3 fit criteria. 
However, the sample size of Latino respondents in this study is relatively small (total N = 
272; 120 completed all 3 waves), so I did not have the statistical power to reliably detect 
cross-lagged effects in the RI-CLPM, at least without assuming stationarity. Stationarity 
significantly worsened fit for racial and American identities and number of immigrants 
(racial identity: 𝜒1
2 = 0.049, 𝜒5
2 = 10.488, Δ𝜒4
2 = 10.439, 𝑝 = .034; American identity: 
𝜒1
2 = 0.867, 𝜒5
2 = 11.122, Δ𝜒4
2 = 10.255, 𝑝 = .036) and produced a warning in the 
racial identity model that the variance-covariance matrix of latent variables was not 
positive definite. Fit statistics are presented in Tables 33 and 34. 
Table 33 
 
Study 2 Panel Model Fit Statistics: Immigration Attitudes (Number of Immigrants), 
Latino Respondents 
 
 CFI RMSEA SRMR 2 (df) 2 (df) 
Racial ID      
CLPM no covariates .908 .226 .049 59.708 (4)***  
CLPM no cov w/ 
stationarity 
.901 .165 .061 67.460 (8)*** 7.752 (4) 
CLPM w/ covariates .931 .233 .025 63.172 (4)***  
CLPM w/ cov w/ 
stationarity 
.922 .175 .033 74.619 (8)*** 11.447 (4)* 
RI-CLPM 1.000 .000 .003 0.049 (1) 59.659 
(3)*** 
RI-CLPM w/ stationarity .991 .064 .046 10.488 (5)† 10.439 (4)* 
POC ID      
CLPM no covariates .850 .275 .065 86.495 (4)***  
CLPM no cov w/ 
stationarity 
.843 .200 .077 94.760 (8)*** 8.265 (4)† 
CLPM w/ covariates .893 .284 .033 91.805 (4)***  
CLPM w/ cov w/ 
stationarity 
.882 .211 .042 104.929 
(8)*** 
13.124 (4)* 
RI-CLPM 1.000 .009 .014 1.020 (1)  
RI-CLPM w/ stationarity .994 .050 .041 8.447 (5) 7.427 (4) 
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American ID      
CLPM no covariates .895 .257 .053 75.836 (4)***  
CLPM no cov w/ 
stationarity 
.884 .192 .087 87.978 (8)*** 12.142 (4)* 
CLPM w/ covariates .917 .275 .028 86.406 (4)***  
CLPM w/ cov w/ 
stationarity 




RI-CLPM 1.000 .000 .012 0.867 (1) 74.969 
(3)*** 
RI-CLPM w/ stationarity .991 .067 .043 11.122 (5)* 10.255 (4)* 
 
Note: N = 272 for all models. 
 
Note: 2 for RI-CLPM without stationarity is vs. CLPM Model 1 without stationarity. 





Study 2 Panel Model Fit Statistics: Immigration Attitudes (Ending Criminal Penalties for 
Illegal Immigration), Latino Respondents 
 
 CFI RMSEA SRMR 2 (df) 2 (df) 
Racial ID      
CLPM no covariates .952 .127 .042 21.439 
(4)*** 
 
CLPM no cov w/ 
stationarity 
.956 .086 .050 23.974 (8)** 2.535 (4) 
CLPM w/ covariates .966 .129 .022 22.137 
(4)*** 
 
CLPM w/ cov w/ 
stationarity 
.968 .089 .026 25.067 (8)** 2.930 (4) 
RI-CLPM 1.000 .000 .019 0.644 (1) 20.795 
(3)*** 
RI-CLPM w/ stationarity 1.000 .000 .025 2.035 (5) 1.391 (4) 
POC ID      
CLPM no covariates .810 .231 .063 62.031 
(4)*** 
 
CLPM no cov w/ 
stationarity 
.806 .165 .075 67.000 
(8)*** 
4.969 (4) 
CLPM w/ covariates .880 .238 .033 65.403 
(4)*** 
 
CLPM w/ cov w/ 
stationarity 
.874 .172 .040 72.210 
(8)*** 
6.807 (4) 
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RI-CLPM 1.000 .000 .014 0.354 (1) 61.677 
(3)*** 
RI-CLPM w/ stationarity 1.000 .000 .034 4.814 (5) 4.460 (4) 
American ID      
CLPM no covariates .925 .172 .045 36.365 
(4)*** 
 
CLPM no cov w/ 
stationarity 
.913 .131 .064 45.532 
(8)*** 
9.167 (4)† 
CLPM w/ covariates .946 .181 .025 39.561 
(4)*** 
 
CLPM w/ cov w/ 
stationarity 
.941 .134 .029 47.096 
(8)*** 
7.535 (4) 
RI-CLPM 1.000 .000 .010 0.206 (1) 36.159 
(3)*** 
RI-CLPM w/ stationarity 1.000 .001 .039 5.003 (5) 4.797 (4) 
 
Note: N = 272 for all models. 
 
Note: 2 for RI-CLPM without stationarity is vs. CLPM Model 1 without stationarity. 
Otherwise, 2 is for stationarity vs. no stationarity. 
 
Contrary to Hypothesis 17, racial identity did not have significant cross-lagged 
effects on Latino respondents’ attitudes about the number of immigrants who should be 
allowed into the U.S., at least in the CLPM. In the RI-CLPM without stationarity, neither 
the within-person cross-lagged effects nor the trait-level covariance were significant. The 
RI-CLPM with stationarity did show a marginally significant positive trait-level 
covariance between racial identity and attitudes about the number of immigrants (b = 
.009, SE = .005, p = .060), as well as significant positive cross-lagged effects in both 
directions (ID-attitude: b = .330, SE = .168, p = .050; attitude-ID: b = .263, SE = .115, p = 
.022); however, this model not only fit significantly worse than the model without 
stationarity but also produced a warning that the covariance matrix of latent variables was 
not positive definite, and these observations, along with the small sample size, caution 
against relying on these results. Racial identity had no significant cross-lagged effects or 
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trait-level covariance with attitudes toward ending criminal penalties for illegal border 
crossing. Thus, overall, these results do not support Hypothesis 17 that racial identity 
would predict more liberal immigration attitudes among Latino Americans. 
On the other hand, POC identity showed a significant positive trait-level 
covariance with preference for allowing more immigrants in the RI-CLPM with 
stationarity (c = .027, SE = .005, p < .001) and, more importantly, a significant cross-
lagged effect on support for ending criminal penalties for immigration that appeared in 
both the CLPM without covariates (and with stationarity) (b = .117, SE = .059, p = .047) 
and the RI-CLPM (with stationarity) (b = .430, SE = .198, p = .030) (The CLPM and RI-
CLPM results are illustrated in Figure 34). In the CLPM without stationarity, POC 
identity in Wave 1 had a significant positive cross-lagged effect on preference for 
allowing more immigrants into the U.S. in Wave 2 (b = .105, SE = .051, p = .042), 
though the reverse effect was also positive and significant (b = .187, SE = .067, p = .005) 
(Figure 35); no significant cross-lagged effects appeared in the RI-CLPM. Taken 
together, these effects suggest that for Latino Americans, as for Asian Americans, it 
might be POC identity rather than racial identity that connects to immigration attitudes. 
 
 






Figure 34. Study 2 CLPM (without covariates) (a) and RI-CLPM (b) for Latino 
respondents’ POC identity and support for ending criminal penalties for illegal 
immigration. Both models include stationarity constraints on lagged and cross-lagged 
effects. Unstandardized coefficients with standard errors (in parentheses) and 
standardized coefficients are shown. Statistical significance is indicated as follows: *** p 
< .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05, † p < .10 (marginally significant). 
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Figure 35. Study 2 CLPM for Latino respondents’ POC identity and attitudes toward the 
number of immigrants who should be allowed into the U.S., without covariates and with 
no stationarity constraints. Unstandardized coefficients with standard errors (in 
parentheses) and standardized coefficients are shown. Statistical significance is indicated 
as follows: *** p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05, † p < .10 (marginally significant). 
 
By contrast, American identity related to Latino respondents’ immigration 
attitudes in ways that are consistent with Hypothesis 13. In the CLPM (without 
stationarity), American identity had a significant negative cross-lagged effect over at least 
one time lag on preference for allowing more immigrants (W2-W3 b = -.124, SE = .054, 
p = .021) and support for ending criminal penalties for immigration (W1-W2 b = -.209, 
SE = .088, p = .017) (Figure 36). And American identity had a significant negative trait-
level covariance with both immigration items in the RI-CLPM (number of immigrants: c 
= -.023, SE = .005, p < .001; ending criminal penalties: c = -.013, SE = .005, p = .014, 
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both models without stationarity), though none of the cross-lagged coefficients were 






Figure 36. Study 2 CLPM for Latino respondents’ American identity and attitudes 
toward the number of immigrants who should be allowed into the U.S. (a) and ending 
criminal penalties for illegal immigration (b). Models do not include covariates or 
stationarity constraints. Unstandardized coefficients with standard errors (in parentheses) 
and standardized coefficients are shown. Statistical significance is indicated as follows: 
*** p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05, † p < .10 (marginally significant). 
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Black respondents. CLPM models once again showed adequate fit based on 
SRMR (.025-.058) but not CFI (.894-.946) or RMSEA (.116-.266). Stationarity did not 
significantly affect model fit except for the model with American identity and ending 
criminal penalties, without covariates (𝜒4
2 = 128.758, 𝜒8
2 = 139.285, Δ𝜒4
2 =
10.527, 𝑝 = .032); for the model with covariates, stationarity marginally significantly 
worsened fit (𝜒4
2 = 119.093, 𝜒8
2 = 127.641, Δ𝜒4
2 = 8.548, 𝑝 = .073). RI-CLPM 
improved model fit across the board, and all RI-CLPM models met the Hu and Bentler 
(1999) fit criteria. Stationarity did not significantly affect RI-CLPM model fit. Fit 
statistics are presented in Tables 35 and 36. Parameter estimates reported below are from 




Study 2 Panel Model Fit Statistics: Immigration Attitudes (Number of Immigrants), Black 
Respondents 
 
 CFI RMSEA SRMR 2 (df) 2 (df) 
Racial ID      
CLPM no covariates .899 .256 .055 176.318 
(4)*** 
 
CLPM no cov w/ 
stationarity 
.900 .180 .056 178.936 
(8)*** 
2.618 (4) 
CLPM w/ covariates .921 .252 .027 171.106 
(4)*** 
 
CLPM w/ cov w/ 
stationarity 
.922 .177 .028 173.075 
(8)*** 
1.969 (4) 
RI-CLPM 1.000 .000 .005 0.367 (1) 175.951 
(3)*** 
RI-CLPM w/ stationarity 1.000 .012 .017 5.466 (5) 5.079 (4) 
POC ID      
CLPM no covariates .921 .226 .050 138.417 
(4)*** 
 
CLPM no cov w/ 
stationarity 
.919 .161 .053 144.891 
(8)*** 
6.474 (4) 
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CLPM w/ covariates .936 .226 .025 138.103 
(4)*** 
 
CLPM w/ cov w/ 
stationarity 
.936 .160 .026 142.769 
(8)*** 
4.666 (4) 
RI-CLPM 1.000 .000 .007 0.881 (1) 137.536 
(3)*** 
RI-CLPM w/ stationarity .998 .031 .023 8.258 (5) 7.377 (4) 
American ID      
CLPM no covariates .897 .266 .055 190.770 
(4)*** 
 
CLPM no cov w/ 
stationarity 
.895 .190 .058 197.786 
(8)*** 
7.016 (4) 
CLPM w/ covariates .924 .254 .026 173.710 
(4)*** 
 
CLPM w/ cov w/ 
stationarity 
.923 .181 .027 180.208 
(8)*** 
6.498 (4) 
RI-CLPM 1.000 .000 .001 0.021 (1) 190.749 
(3)*** 
RI-CLPM w/ stationarity 1.000 .000 .014 3.987 (5) 3.966 (4) 
 
Note: N = 658 for all models. 
 
Note: 2 for RI-CLPM without stationarity is vs. CLPM Model 1 without stationarity. 





Study 2 Panel Model Fit Statistics: Immigration Attitudes (Ending Criminal Penalties for 
Illegal Immigration), Black Respondents 
 
 CFI RMSEA SRMR 2 (df) 2 (df) 
Racial ID      
CLPM no covariates .901 .203 .054 112.131 
(4)*** 
 
CLPM no cov w/ 
stationarity 
.901 .143 .055 115.836 
(8)*** 
3.705 (4) 
CLPM w/ covariates .926 .203 .028 112.127 
(4)*** 
 
CLPM w/ cov w/ 
stationarity 
.925 .144 .028 116.768 
(8)*** 
4.641 (4) 
RI-CLPM 1.000 .019 .013 1.237 (1) 110.894 
(3)*** 
RI-CLPM w/ stationarity 1.000 .000 .015 3.867 (5) 2.630 (4) 
POC ID      
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CLPM no covariates .931 .167 .049 77.277 (4)***  
CLPM no cov w/ 
stationarity 
.933 .116 .050 79.217 (8)*** 1.940 (4) 
CLPM w/ covariates .946 .172 .026 82.186 (4)***  
CLPM w/ cov w/ 
stationarity 
.946 .122 .026 85.900 (8)*** 3.714 (4) 
RI-CLPM 1.000 .000 .002 0.057 (1) 77.220 (3)*** 
RI-CLPM w/ stationarity 1.000 .000 .013 2.736 (5) 2.679 (4) 
American ID      
CLPM no covariates .899 .218 .052 128.758 
(4)*** 
 
CLPM no cov w/ 
stationarity 
.894 .158 .056 139.285 
(8)*** 
10.527 (4)* 
CLPM w/ covariates .929 .209 .026 119.093 
(4)*** 
 
CLPM w/ cov w/ 
stationarity 
.926 .151 .027 127.641 
(8)*** 
8.548 (4)† 
RI-CLPM 1.000 .000 .007 0.347 (1) 128.411 
(3)*** 
RI-CLPM w/ stationarity 1.000 .000 .018 4.271 (5) 3.924 (4) 
 
Note: N = 658 for all models. 
 
Note: 2 for RI-CLPM without stationarity is vs. CLPM Model 1 without stationarity. 
Otherwise, 2 is for stationarity vs. no stationarity. 
 
Consistent with Hypothesis 19, POC identity had significant positive cross-lagged 
effects on preference for allowing more immigrants in the CLPM (b = .072, SE = .023, p 
= .002) and marginally significant positive cross-lagged effects in the RI-CLPM (b = 
.158, SE = .093, p = .090) (Figure 41). However, the reverse effect, from preference for 
allowing more immigrants to POC identity, was also significant in the CLPM (b = .065, 
SE = .022, p = .003). POC identity had a significant positive trait-level covariance, in the 
RI-CLPM, with both preference for allowing more immigrants (c = .014, SE = .003, p < 
.001) and support for ending criminal penalties for immigration (c = .006, SE = .003, p = 
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.048). None of the cross-lagged effects were significant in the models with POC identity 






Figure 37. Study 2 CLPM (without covariates) (a) and RI-CLPM (b) for Black 
respondents’ POC identity and attitudes toward the number of immigrants who should be 
allowed into the U.S. Models include stationarity constraints on lagged and cross-lagged 
effects. Unstandardized coefficients with standard errors (in parentheses) and 
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standardized coefficients are shown. Statistical significance is indicated as follows: *** p 
< .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05, † p < .10 (marginally significant). 
 
Not only was POC identity associated with more liberal immigration attitudes 
among Black respondents, however, but so was racial identity, which I did not expect to 
be associated with attitudes toward an other-group issue. Like POC identity, racial 
identity had a significant positive trait-level covariance with both immigration items 
(number of immigrants: c = .013, SE = .003, p < .001; ending criminal penalties: c = .007, 
SE = .003, p = .007). In the CLPM (Figure 42), racial identity and preference for allowing 
more immigrants had significant positive cross-lagged effects on each other (ID-attitude: 
b = .049, SE = .024, p = .037; attitude-ID: b = .082, SE = .021, p < .001). These effects 




Figure 38. Study 2 CLPM for Black respondents’ racial identity and attitudes toward the 
number of immigrants who should be allowed into the U.S. Model does not include 
COMMON INGROUP IDENTITY AND POLITICAL SOLIDARITY 224 
covariates and does include stationarity constraints on lagged and cross-lagged effects. 
Unstandardized coefficients with standard errors (in parentheses) and standardized 
coefficients are shown. Statistical significance is indicated as follows: *** p < .001, ** p 
< .01, * p < .05, † p < .10 (marginally significant). 
 
Consistent with Hypothesis 13, American identity had a significant negative trait 
covariance with support for ending criminal penalties for immigration (c = -.006, SE = 
.003, p = .043) and a marginally significant negative (within-person) cross-lagged effect 
on responses to that item (b = -.200, SE = .119, p = .093) in the RI-CLPM (Figure 39). 
The cross-lagged effects were not significant in the CLPM without stationarity, however, 
and stationarity significantly worsened CLPM model fit. Contrary to Hypothesis 13, 
American identity showed no significant relationship with preference for allowing more 
immigrants into the U.S. Thus, support for Hypothesis 13 was mixed among Black 
respondents. 
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Figure 39. Study 2 RI-CLPM for Black respondents’ American identity and support for 
ending criminal penalties for illegal immigration, with stationarity constraints on lagged 
and cross-lagged coefficients. Unstandardized coefficients with standard errors (in 
parentheses) and standardized coefficients are shown. Statistical significance is indicated 
as follows: *** p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05, † p < .10 (marginally significant). 
 
 b. Criminal justice reform. Considering the focus on African Americans in the 
current discourse on criminal justice reform, I expected this to be an own-group issue for 
Black respondents and an other-group issue for Latino respondents (even though some 
evidence suggests that the criminal justice system might also be biased against Latinos). 
Accordingly, I expected racial identity to predict more support for criminal justice reform 
among Black respondents (Hypothesis 18), POC identity to predict more support for 
criminal justice reform among Latino respondents (Hypothesis 20), and American 
identity to predict less support for criminal justice reform among both respondent groups 
(Hypothesis 13). 
 Support for criminal justice reform was operationalized as higher scores on the 
Black Lives Matter/George Floyd protests composite variable (indicating more support 
for BLM and the protests) or choosing the response that a judge should have the freedom 
to give a shorter sentence than the mandatory minimum. I initially treated the mandatory 
minimum sentence item as a categorical variable in the CLPM. However, model 
specifications for the RI-CLPM would not accommodate a categorical variable; thus, I re-
ran the CLPM, treating the mandatory minimum sentence variable as continuous, to 
enable comparisons between the CLPM and RI-CLPM. 
COMMON INGROUP IDENTITY AND POLITICAL SOLIDARITY 226 
 Black respondents. Fit statistics are presented in Tables 37 and 38. CLPM models 
for the BLM/protests composite variable met the fit criteria for SRMR (.015-.040) and 
met or nearly met the fit criteria for CFI (.936-.966) but did not meet the criteria for 
RMSEA (.143-.251). Models treating the mandatory minimum sentence model as 
continuous met the fit criteria for SRMR (.028-.068) but not CFI (.884-.940) or RMSEA 
(.140-.237); models treating this variable as categorical, on the other hand, met the 
criterion for CFI based on the non-robust version (CFI = .964-.984) but not the robust 
version (CFI = .860-.937), met the criterion for SRMR only when covariates were 
included (with covariates: SRMR = .066-.073; without covariates: SRMR = .157-.162), 
and still did not meet the criterion for RMSEA (non-robust RMSEA = .064-.109; robust 
RMSEA = .104-.174). Stationarity did not significantly affect CLPM model fit in models 
with the BLM/protests variable, but it did significantly reduce model fit in the racial 
identity (without covariates: 𝜒4
2 = 144.466, 𝜒8
2 = 154.033, Δ𝜒4
2 = 9.567, 𝑝 = .048; with 
covariates: 𝜒4
2 = 139.064, 𝜒8
2 = 147.458, Δ𝜒4
2 = 8.394, 𝑝 = .078) and American 
identity (without covariates: 𝜒4
2 = 151.595, 𝜒8
2 = 168.325, Δ𝜒4
2 = 16.730, 𝑝 = .002; 
with covariates: 𝜒4
2 = 137.654, 𝜒8
2 = 147.598, Δ𝜒4
2 = 9.944, 𝑝 = .041) models with the 
mandatory minimum sentence variable treated as continuous. 
 RI-CLPM significantly improved model fit over CLPM, and fit statistics indicated 
good fit for all RI-CLPM models. Stationarity marginally significantly worsened RI-
CLPM model fit for the BLM/protests variable and racial (𝜒1
2 = 0.113, 𝜒5
2 =
9.390, Δ𝜒4
2 = 9.277, 𝑝 = .055) and American (𝜒1
2 = 0.099, 𝜒5
2 = 8.476, Δ𝜒4
2 =
8.377, 𝑝 = .079) identities and the mandatory minimum sentence variable and POC 
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(𝜒1
2 = 0.086, 𝜒5
2 = 7.966, Δ𝜒4
2 = 7.880, 𝑝 = .096) and American (𝜒1
2 = 0.017, 𝜒5
2 =
9.312, Δ𝜒4




Study 2 Panel Model Fit Statistics: Criminal Justice Attitudes (BLM/Protests), Black 
Respondents 
 
 CFI RMSEA SRMR 2 (df) 2 (df) 
Racial ID      
CLPM no covariates .949 .229 .035 142.442 
(4)*** 
 
CLPM no cov w/ 
stationarity 
.949 .162 .038 146.607 
(8)*** 
4.165 (4) 
CLPM w/ covariates .959 .223 .018 134.309 
(4)*** 
 
CLPM w/ cov w/ 
stationarity 
.958 .159 .020 140.701 
(8)*** 
6.392 (4) 
RI-CLPM 1.000 .000 .002 0.113 (1) 142.329 
(3)*** 
RI-CLPM w/ stationarity .998 .037 .022 9.390 (5)† 9.277 (4)† 
POC ID      
CLPM no covariates .958 .205 .030 114.341 
(4)*** 
 
CLPM no cov w/ 
stationarity 
.958 .146 .031 119.808 
(8)*** 
5.467 (4) 
CLPM w/ covariates .966 .201 .015 110.400 
(4)*** 
 
CLPM w/ cov w/ 
stationarity 
.966 .143 .016 115.391 
(8)*** 
4.991 (4) 
RI-CLPM 1.000 .000 .001 0.007 (1) 114.334 
(3)*** 
RI-CLPM w/ stationarity 1.000 .010 .015 5.345 (5) 5.338 (4) 
American ID      
CLPM no covariates .937 .251 .036 169.780 
(4)*** 
 
CLPM no cov w/ 
stationarity 
.936 .179 .040 176.056 
(8)*** 
6.276 (4) 
CLPM w/ covariates .954 .237 .017 151.926 
(4)*** 
 
CLPM w/ cov w/ 
stationarity 
.954 .168 .018 156.129 
(8)*** 
4.203 (4) 
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RI-CLPM 1.000 .000 .002 0.099 (1) 169.681 
(3)*** 
RI-CLPM w/ stationarity .999 .033 .019 8.476 (5) 8.377 (4)† 
 
Note: N = 658 for all models. 
 
Note: 2 for RI-CLPM without stationarity is vs. CLPM Model 1 without stationarity. 





Study 2 Panel Model Fit Statistics: Criminal Justice Attitudes (Mandatory Minimum 
Sentence), Black Respondents 
 
 CFI RMSEA SRMR 2 (df) 2 (df) 
Racial ID, continuous 
DV 
     
CLPM no covariates .888 .231 .064 144.466 
(4)*** 
 
CLPM no cov w/ 
stationarity 
.884 .167 .068 154.033 
(8)*** 
9.567 (4)* 
CLPM w/ covariates .919 .227 .031 139.064 
(4)*** 
 
CLPM w/ cov w/ 
stationarity 
.916 .163 .033 147.458 
(8)*** 
8.394 (4)† 




.998 .024 .024 6.966 (5) 6.719 (4) 
Racial ID, categorical 
DV 
     
CLPM no covariates .967/.865 .109/.174 .157 35.374 
(4)*** 
 
CLPM no cov w/ 
stationarity 
.968/.893 .075/.109 .157 37.799 
(8)*** 
2.425 (4) 
CLPM w/ covariates .983/.924 .095/.165 .072 27.492 
(4)*** 
 
CLPM w/ cov w/ 
stationarity 
.984/.935 .066/.108 .068 31.186 
(8)*** 
3.694 (4) 
      
POC ID      
CLPM no covariates .918 .196 .059 105.009 
(4)*** 
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CLPM no cov w/ 
stationarity 
.916 .140 .063 111.882 
(8)*** 
6.873 (4) 
CLPM w/ covariates .940 .194 .028 102.972 
(4)*** 
 
CLPM w/ cov w/ 
stationarity 
.938 .140 .030 110.554 
(8)*** 
7.582 (4) 




.998 .030 .024 7.966 (5) 7.880 (4)† 
POC ID, categorical 
DV 
     
CLPM no covariates .967/.865 .108/.173 .159 34.432 
(4)*** 
 
CLPM no cov w/ 
stationarity 
.970/.899 .073/.106 .158 35.832 
(8)*** 
1.400 (4) 
CLPM w/ covariates .984/.925 .093/.163 .073 26.513 
(4)*** 
 
CLPM w/ cov w/ 
stationarity 
.984/.937 .064/.106 .069 29.865 
(8)*** 
3.352 (4) 
      
American ID      
CLPM no covariates .894 .237 .059 151.595 
(4)*** 
 
CLPM no cov w/ 
stationarity 




CLPM w/ covariates .926 .225 .028 137.654 
(4)*** 
 
CLPM w/ cov w/ 
stationarity 
.923 .163 .031 147.598 
(8)*** 
9.944 (4)* 




.997 .036 .025 9.312 (5)† 9.295 (4)† 
American ID, 
categorical DV 
     
CLPM no covariates .967/.860 .106/.173 .160 33.304 
(4)*** 
 
CLPM no cov w/ 
stationarity 
.964/.887 .078/.110 .162 39.898 
(8)*** 
6.594 (4) 
CLPM w/ covariates .984/.928 .089/.156 .070 24.641 
(4)*** 
 
CLPM w/ cov w/ 
stationarity 
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Note: N = 658 for all models. 
 
Note: 2 for RI-CLPM without stationarity is vs. CLPM Model 1 without stationarity. 
Otherwise, 2 is for stationarity vs. no stationarity. 
 
 Racial identity had a significant positive trait-level covariance with support for 
BLM and the George Floyd protests (c = .032, SE = .003, p < .001, without stationarity) 
and with support for judicial discretion to give sentences below the mandatory minimum 
(c = .019, SE = .004, p < .001, with stationarity) in the RI-CLPM, consistent with 
Hypothesis 18. However, with the BLM/protests variable, significant cross-lagged effects 
appeared in both directions in the CLPM (with stationarity) (ID-attitude: b = .060, SE = 
.018, p = .001; attitude-ID: b = .145, SE = .024, p < .001), and only the reverse effect 
from Wave 2 attitude to Wave 3 identity was significant in the RI-CLPM (b = .356, SE = 
.150, p = .018) (Figure 40). In follow-up analyses, constraining identity-attitude and 
attitude-identity cross-lagged coefficients to be equal resulted in poorer model fit for the 
CLPM (𝜒8
2 = 146.607, 𝜒9
2 = 154.201, Δ𝜒1
2 = 7.594, 𝑝 = .006), and constraining the 
Wave 2 to Wave 3 identity-attitude and attitude-identity cross-lagged coefficients to be 
equal resulted in poorer model fit for the RI-CLPM (𝜒1
2 = 0.113, 𝜒2
2 = 5.144, Δ𝜒1
2 =
5.031, 𝑝 = .025). Thus, attitudes toward Black Lives Matter and the George Floyd 
protests appear to predict Black respondents’ racial identity more strongly and 
consistently than racial identity predicts these attitudes, at both the between-person and 
within-person levels. 
 






Figure 40. Study 2 CLPM (without covariates) with stationarity constraints on lagged 
and cross-lagged coefficients (a) and RI-CLPM with no stationarity constraints (b) for 
Black respondents’ racial identity and support for Black Lives Matter and the George 
Floyd protests. Unstandardized coefficients with standard errors (in parentheses) and 
standardized coefficients are shown. Statistical significance is indicated as follows: *** p 
< .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05, † p < .10 (marginally significant). 
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With the mandatory minimum sentence variable, cross-lagged effects varied by 
model. When the mandatory minimum sentence variable was treated as continuous, the 
stationarity assumption was not met, and the CLPM without stationarity showed a 
significant cross-lagged effect of Wave 1 identity on Wave 2 attitude (b = .170, SE = 
.066, p = .010) but a marginally significant cross-lagged effect of Wave 2 attitude on 
Wave 3 identity (b = .034, SE = .018, p = .057). When the variable was treated as 
categorical, the stationarity assumption was met, and the CLPM with stationarity showed 
significant cross-lagged effects in both directions (ID-attitude: b = .365, SE = .146, p = 
.012; attitude-ID: b = .014, SE = .007, p = .036). However, at the within-person level, the 
RI-CLPM (with stationarity) showed significant negative cross-lagged effects in both 
directions (ID-attitude: b = -.469, SE = .185, p = .011; attitude-ID: b = -.079, SE = .026, p 
= .002). These models are presented in Figures 41 (CLPM) and 42 (RI-CLPM). Thus, 
although at the between-person level Black respondents who identified more strongly as 
Black appeared more likely to support judicial discretion to depart from mandatory 
minimum sentences, the RI-CLPM results suggest that at the within-person level, an 
increase in identification as Black might predict a decrease in support for discretion to 
depart from mandatory minimum sentences, and vice versa. 






Figure 41. Study 2 CLPM for Black respondents’ racial identity and support for judicial 
discretion to depart from mandatory minimum sentences, with the mandatory minimum 
sentence item treated as continuous, with no stationarity constraints (a), and with the 
mandatory minimum sentence item treated as categorical, with stationarity constraints on 
lagged and cross-lagged coefficients (b). Unstandardized coefficients with standard errors 
(in parentheses) and standardized coefficients are shown. Statistical significance is 
indicated as follows: *** p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05, † p < .10 (marginally 
significant). 
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Figure 42. Study 2 RI-CLPM for Black respondents’ racial identity and support for 
judicial discretion to depart from mandatory minimum sentences, with stationarity 
constraints on lagged and cross-lagged coefficients. Unstandardized coefficients with 
standard errors (in parentheses) and standardized coefficients are shown. Statistical 
significance is indicated as follows: *** p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05, † p < .10 
(marginally significant). 
 
 Unexpectedly, POC identity was also significantly positively associated with 
criminal justice reform attitudes among Black respondents. For the BLM/protest item, the 
pattern of effects with POC identity was similar to that for racial identity: POC identity 
also had a significant positive trait level covariance with BLM/protest support (c = .030, 
SE = .003, p < .001) in the RI-CLPM (with stationarity). Cross-lagged effects were 
significant and positive in both directions in both the CLPM (ID-attitude: b = .064, SE = 
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.017, p < .001; attitude-ID: b = .136, SE = .024, p < .001) and the RI-CLPM (ID-attitude: 
b = .115, SE = .056, p = .039; attitude-ID: b = .260, SE = .106, p = .014) (both models 
with stationarity). (Results from these models are illustrated in Figure 43.) Setting the 
identity-attitude and attitude-identity cross-lagged coefficients to be equal significantly or 
marginally significantly reduced model fit for both the CLPM (𝜒8
2 = 119.808, 𝜒9
2 =
125.465, Δ𝜒1
2 = 5.657, 𝑝 = .017) and the RI-CLPM (𝜒5
2 = 5.345, 𝜒6
2 = 8.737, Δ𝜒1
2 =
3.392, 𝑝 = .066). For the mandatory minimum sentence item, the only significant effect 
was a positive trait-level covariance (c = .014, SE = .005, p = .002) in the RI-CLPM (with 
stationarity).  






Figure 43. Study 2 CLPM (without covariates) (a) and RI-CLPM (b) for Black 
respondents’ POC identity and support for Black Lives Matter and the George Floyd 
protests. Models include stationarity constraints on lagged and cross-lagged coefficients. 
Unstandardized coefficients with standard errors (in parentheses) and standardized 
coefficients are shown. Statistical significance is indicated as follows: *** p < .001, ** p 
< .01, * p < .05, † p < .10 (marginally significant). 
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 Evidence for Hypothesis 13 was again mixed. Black respondents’ identification as 
American was not significantly related to their attitudes toward Black Lives Matter and 
the George Floyd protests. On the other hand, American identity did show a significant 
negative trait-level covariance with support for judicial discretion to give sentences 
below the mandatory minimum (c = -.009, SE = .004, p = .032, without stationarity). 
Without stationarity, which significantly worsened model fit when the mandatory 
minimum sentence variable was treated as continuous, the CLPM showed a negative 
attitude-identity effect from Wave 1 to Wave 2 (continuous variable model: b = -.043, SE 
= .017, p = .012; categorical variable model: b = -.039, SE = .013, p = .002) but a 
negative identity-attitude effect from Wave 2 to Wave 3 (continuous variable model: b = 
-.104, SE = .060, p = .083; categorical variable model: b = -.486, SE = .219, p = .026). 
With stationarity, the model treating the mandatory minimum sentence variable as 
categorical showed marginally significant negative cross-lagged effects in both directions 
(ID-attitude: b = -.216, SE = .127, p = .090; attitude-ID: b = -.012, SE = .007, p = .095). 
(The continuous variable CLPM model without stationarity and categorical variable 
CLPM with stationarity are presented in Figure 44.) But no significant cross-lagged 
effects appeared in the RI-CLPM, suggesting that, among African Americans, to the 
extent that higher American identity predicts decreased support for departures from 
mandatory minimum sentences, it does so primarily at the between-person level. 






Figure 44. Study 2 CLPM for Black respondents’ American identity and support for 
judicial discretion to depart from mandatory minimum sentences, treating the mandatory 
minimum sentence variable as continuous, with no stationarity constraints (a), and 
treating the mandatory minimum sentence variable as categorical, with stationarity 
constraints (b). Unstandardized coefficients with standard errors (in parentheses) and 
standardized coefficients are shown. Statistical significance is indicated as follows: *** p 
< .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05, † p < .10 (marginally significant). 
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 Latino respondents. Fit statistics are presented in Tables 39 and 40. Again, CLPM 
models for the BLM/protests composite variable met the fit criteria for SRMR (.012-
.073) but did not meet the criteria for RMSEA (.159-.295). CFI met or nearly met the fit 
criterion in the racial identity (CFI = .932-.958) and American identity (CFI = .923-.945, 
except no covariates + stationarity, CFI = .905) models but not in the POC identity model 
(CFI = .892-.931). Models treating the mandatory minimum sentence model as 
continuous met the fit criterion for SRMR (.019-.075), and the racial identity models met 
the criterion for CFI (.964-.977), as did the American identity model with covariates and 
without stationarity (CFI = .950); but the remaining models did not meet criterion for CFI 
(.844-.942), and none of the models met the criterion for RMSEA (.080-.211). Models 
treating this variable as categorical met or nearly met the criterion for CFI (non-robust 
CFI = .993-1.000; robust CFI = .930-.970), met the criterion for RMSEA with the non-
robust statistic (RMSEA = .000-.043) but not consistently with the robust statistic 
(RMSEA = .056-.118), and met or nearly met the criterion for SRMR only when 
covariates were included (with covariates: SRMR = .067-.081; without covariates: 
SRMR = .153-.165). Stationarity significantly worsened CLPM model fit in the 
BLM/protest models with racial identity without covariates (𝜒4
2 = 65.556, 𝜒8
2 =
75.511, Δ𝜒4
2 = 9.955, 𝑝 = .041), POC identity (without covariates: 𝜒4
2 = 98.933, 𝜒8
2 =
113.801, Δ𝜒4
2 = 14.868, 𝑝 = .005; with covariates: 𝜒4
2 = 92.768, 𝜒8
2 = 101.054, Δ𝜒4
2 =
8.286, 𝑝 = .082), and American identity (without covariates: 𝜒4
2 = 87.068, 𝜒8
2 =
110.606, Δ𝜒4
2 = 23.538, 𝑝 < .001; with covariates: 𝜒4
2 = 83.205, 𝜒8
2 = 99.086, Δ𝜒4
2 =
15.881, 𝑝 = .003), as well as the models with American identity and the mandatory 
minimum variable treated as continuous (without covariates: 𝜒4
2 = 40.356, 𝜒8
2 =
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52.891, Δ𝜒4
2 = 12.535, 𝑝 = .014; with covariates: 𝜒4
2 = 41.072, 𝜒8
2 = 50.384, Δ𝜒4
2 =
9.312, 𝑝 = .054). 
Table 39 
 
Study 2 Panel Model Fit Statistics: Criminal Justice Attitudes (BLM/Protests), Latino 
Respondents 
 
 CFI RMSEA SRMR 2 (df) 2 (df) 
Racial ID      
CLPM no covariates .938 .238 .024 65.556 (4)***  
CLPM no cov w/ 
stationarity 
.932 .176 .047 75.511 (8)*** 9.955 (4)* 
CLPM w/ covariates .958 .224 .012 58.473 (4)***  
CLPM w/ cov w/ 
stationarity 
.958 .159 .018 63.284 (8)*** 4.811 (4) 
RI-CLPM 1.000 .000 .001 0.009 (1) 65.547 
(3)*** 
RI-CLPM w/ stationarity 1.000 .000 .017 2.270 (5) 2.261 (4) 
POC ID      
CLPM no covariates .903 .295 .050 98.933 (4)***  
CLPM no cov w/ 
stationarity 
.892 .221 .073 113.801 
(8)*** 
14.868 (4)** 
CLPM w/ covariates .931 .286 .026 92.768 (4)***  
CLPM w/ cov w/ 
stationarity 
.928 .207 .032 101.054 
(8)*** 
8.286 (4)† 
RI-CLPM .998 .093 .027 3.371 (1)† 95.562 
(3)*** 
RI-CLPM w/ stationarity 1.000 .000 .036 4.688 (5) 1.317 (4) 
American ID      
CLPM no covariates .923 .276 .027 87.068 (4)***  
CLPM no cov w/ 
stationarity 




CLPM w/ covariates .945 .270 .015 83.205 (4)***  
CLPM w/ cov w/ 
stationarity 
.937 .205 .023 99.086 (8)*** 15.881 (4)** 
RI-CLPM .999 .047 .013 1.606 (1) 85.462 
(3)*** 
RI-CLPM w/ stationarity 1.000 .000 .016 2.555 (5) 0.949 (4) 
 
Note: N = 272 for all models. 
 
Note: 2 for RI-CLPM without stationarity is vs. CLPM Model 1 without stationarity. 
Otherwise, 2 is for stationarity vs. no stationarity. 
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Table 40 
 
Study 2 Panel Model Fit Statistics: Criminal Justice Attitudes (Mandatory Minimum 
Sentence), Latino Respondents 
 
 CFI RMSEA SRMR 2 (df) 2 (df) 
Racial ID, continuous 
DV 
     
CLPM no covariates .964 .115 .040 18.288 
(4)** 
 
CLPM no cov w/ 
stationarity 
.966 .080 .051 21.848 
(8)** 
3.560 (4) 
CLPM w/ covariates .977 .113 .019 17.884 
(4)** 
 
CLPM w/ cov w/ 
stationarity 
.976 .081 .024 22.207 
(8)** 
4.323 (4) 




1.000 .000 .023 1.910 (5) 1.446 (4) 
Racial ID, categorical 
DV 
     
CLPM no covariates .996/.946 .037/.105 .155 5.450 (4)  
CLPM no cov w/ 
stationarity 
1.000/.970 .000/.056 .153 7.766 (8) 2.316 (4) 
CLPM w/ covariates .999/.951 .016/.119 .079 4.295 (4)  
CLPM w/ cov w/ 
stationarity 
1.000/.963 .005/.073 .067 8.050 (8) 3.755 (4) 
      
POC ID      
CLPM no covariates .853 .211 .059 52.532 
(4)*** 
 
CLPM no cov w/ 
stationarity 
.844 .154 .075 59.731 
(8)*** 
7.199 (4) 
CLPM w/ covariates .914 .211 .030 52.377 
(4)*** 
 
CLPM w/ cov w/ 
stationarity 
.912 .151 .037 57.402 
(8)*** 
5.025 (4) 




.995 .036 .046 6.784 (5) 6.234 (4) 
POC ID, categorical 
DV 
     
CLPM no covariates .993/.930 .043/.105 .162 5.988 (4)  
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CLPM no cov w/ 
stationarity 
.994/.941 .028/.068 .165 9.757 (8) 3.769 (4) 
CLPM w/ covariates .998/.949 .027/.118 .081 4.778 (4)  
CLPM w/ cov w/ 
stationarity 
1.000/.956 .008/.078 .071 8.135 (8) 3.357 (4) 
      
American ID      
CLPM no covariates .923 .183 .041 40.356 
(4)*** 
 
CLPM no cov w/ 
stationarity 
.905 .144 .064 52.891 
(8)*** 
12.535 (4)* 
CLPM w/ covariates .950 .185 .022 41.072 
(4)*** 
 
CLPM w/ cov w/ 
stationarity 
.942 .140 .027 50.384 
(8)*** 
9.312 (4)† 




1.000 .000 .033 4.547 (5) 4.544 (4) 
American ID, 
categorical DV 
     
CLPM no covariates 1.000/.956 .000/.091 .153 3.760 (4)  
CLPM no cov w/ 
stationarity 
.999/.961 .009/.060 .146 8.192 (8) 4.432 (4) 
CLPM w/ covariates 1.000/.963 .010/.110 .073 4.099 (4)  
CLPM w/ cov w/ 
stationarity 
1.000/.962 .000/.079 .062 7.180 (8) 3.081 (4) 
 
Note: N = 272 for all models. 
 
Note: 2 for RI-CLPM without stationarity is vs. CLPM Model 1 without stationarity. 
Otherwise, 2 is for stationarity vs. no stationarity. 
 
 RI-CLPM significantly improved model fit over CLPM for all identity-criminal 
justice attitude combinations, and fit statistics indicated good model fit for all RI-CLPM 
models except POC identity and the BLM/protests variable without stationarity, which 
failed to meet the RMSEA criterion (RMSEA = .093). Again, however, the relatively 
small sample size of Latino respondents in this study cautions against interpreting cross-
lagged effects in the RI-CLPM. Furthermore, although stationarity did not significantly 
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affect RI-CLPM model fit, the RI-CLPM models with stationarity for the BLM/protests 
variable included a negative residual variance estimate for the Wave 2 attitude variable. 
Thus, RI-CLPM coefficients reported below are from the BLM/protest models without 
stationarity and the mandatory minimum sentence models with stationarity. 
 Evidence for Hypothesis 20 was mixed. Consistent with the hypothesis, POC 
identity had a significant positive trait-level covariance with attitudes toward Black Lives 
Matter and the George Floyd protests (c = .046, SE = .008, p < .001) in the RI-CLPM 
(without stationarity). Cross-lagged coefficients in the CLPM (again, without 
stationarity) were positive, though they suggested different directions of effects across 
time lags: Support for BLM and the protests in Wave 1 predicted POC identity in Wave 2 
(b = .116, SE = .057, p = .043), but POC identity in Wave 2 predicted support for BLM 
and the protests in Wave 3 (b = .081, SE = .031, p = .009) (Figure 45). No significant 
cross-lagged effects appeared in the RI-CLPM, however. And POC identity did not 
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Figure 45. Study 2 CLPM for Latino respondents’ POC identity and support for Black 
Lives Matter and the George Floyd protests, without covariates and with no stationarity 
constraints. Unstandardized coefficients with standard errors (in parentheses) and 
standardized coefficients are shown. Statistical significance is indicated as follows: *** p 
< .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05, † p < .10 (marginally significant). 
 
 Consistent with Hypothesis 13, American identity had a significant negative trait-
level covariance with attitudes toward both BLM/protests (c = -.033, SE = .006, p < .001, 
without stationarity) and departures from mandatory minimum sentences (c = -.020, SE = 
.008, p = .012, with stationarity). CLPM (without stationarity) showed significant 
negative cross-lagged effects from American identity to support for BLM and the protests 
and vice versa, but only from Wave 1 to Wave 2 (ID-attitude: b = -.096, SE = .036, p = 
.008; attitude-ID: b = -.120, SE = .036, p = .001). CLPM (with stationarity) with the 
mandatory minimum sentence variable treated as categorical showed a significant 
negative cross-lagged effect from American identity to support for departures from 
mandatory minimum sentences (b = -.568, SE = .277, p = .040), though this effect 
appeared only inconsistently in the models that treat the mandatory minimum sentence 
variable as continuous. (The CLPM models with the BLM/protests variable and with the 
categorical mandatory minimum sentence variable are presented in Figure 46.) No 
significant cross-lagged effects appeared in the RI-CLPM for either criminal justice 
reform variable. Thus, among Latino respondents, higher American identity appears to 
predict decreased support for criminal justice reform primarily at the between-person 
level. 






Figure 46. Study 2 CLPM for Latino respondents’ American identity and support for 
Black Lives Matter and the George Floyd Protests, with no stationarity constraints (a), 
and support for judicial discretion to depart from mandatory minimum sentences (treated 
as categorical), with stationarity constraints (b). Models do not include covariates. 
Unstandardized coefficients with standard errors (in parentheses) and standardized 
coefficients are shown. Statistical significance is indicated as follows: *** p < .001, ** p 
< .01, * p < .05, † p < .10 (marginally significant). 
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 Like POC identity, racial identity had a significant positive trait-level covariance 
(in the RI-CLPM without stationarity) with BLM/protest attitudes (c = .020, SE = .006, p 
= .002), though I predicted this association only for POC identity. But consistent with 
expectations, none of the cross-lagged effects with racial identity were significant in 
either the CLPM or the RI-CLPM. 
 On the other hand, racial identity had unexpected negative cross-lagged effects on 
support for judicial discretion to impose shorter sentences than the mandatory minimum. 
This effect is significant in the CLPM treating the mandatory minimum sentence variable 
as continuous (b = -.201, SE = .083, p = .015), marginally significant in the CLPM 
treating this variable as categorical (b = -.472, SE = .261, p = .070), and significant in the 
RI-CLPM (b = -.810, SE = .297, p = .006).2 CLPM results (with stationarity) are 
presented in Figure 47; RI-CLPM results (with stationarity) are presented in Figure 48. 
Thus, it appears that not only does higher racial identification not increase Latino 
Americans’ support for reducing the impact of mandatory minimum sentences, but it 
might in fact decrease their support for this aspect of criminal justice reform. 
  
 
2 Coefficients are from the models with stationarity. 






Figure 47. Study 2 CLPM for Latino respondents’ racial identity and support for judicial 
discretion to depart from mandatory minimum sentences, treating the mandatory 
minimum sentence variable as continuous (a) and treating the mandatory minimum 
sentence as categorical (b). Models include stationarity constraints on lagged and cross-
lagged coefficients. Unstandardized coefficients with standard errors (in parentheses) and 
standardized coefficients are shown. Statistical significance is indicated as follows: *** p 
< .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05, † p < .10 (marginally significant). 
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Figure 48. Study 2 RI-CLPM for Latino respondents’ racial identity and support for 
judicial discretion to depart from mandatory minimum sentences, with stationarity 
constraints on lagged and cross-lagged effects. Unstandardized coefficients with standard 
errors (in parentheses) and standardized coefficients are shown. Statistical significance is 
indicated as follows: *** p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05, † p < .10 (marginally 
significant). 
 
4. Identity-Policy Attitude Indirect Effects 
 I examined whether linked fate (the only potential mediator measured in Study 2) 
mediated the effects of each identity on each policy attitude item. As discussed in 
Chapter 1, I expected linked fate to connect racial and POC identities, but not American 
identity, with policy attitudes (Hypotheses 21-24). Additionally, because linked fate and 
group consciousness might be more closely related for African Americans than for other 
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racial groups, linked fate could potentially pick up the effects of other, unmeasured, 
group consciousness variables among Black respondents but not Latino respondents; 
thus, indirect effects through linked fate seemed more likely to appear for Black 
respondents than for Latino respondents, and Hypotheses 23 and 24 (addressing 
mediation effects for Latino respondents) were tentative.  
As with the Study 1 data, I fit full models (with lagged or cross-lagged paths from 
each variable to every variable in the next wave and covariances or residual covariances 
among all three variables within each wave), models with stationarity across time lags, 
and directional models (with only forward structural paths). For immigration attitudes, 
CFI varied greatly for Latino respondents (.855-.961) but was generally just below 
acceptable for Black respondents (.909-.942), SRMR generally indicated good fit for both 
groups (SRMR ≤ .079), and RMSEA indicated poor fit except for Latinos on the ending 
criminal penalties item (RMSEA = .065-.099; Latino respondents, all other models 
RMSEA = .097-.192; Black respondents RMSEA = .096-.189). For criminal justice 
reform, continuous variable models had a similar pattern of fit statistics (Black 
respondents: CFI = .906-.957, RMSEA = .109-184, SRMR = .028-.061; Latino 
respondents: CFI = .875-.956, RMSEA = .071-.201, SRMR = .029-.092). In contrast to 
Study 1, models with stationarity and/or directionality typically did not fit significantly 
worse than the full models. (Fit statistics are presented in Tables 41-44.) Where one 
model did not significantly worsen fit but the other did, I report results from the model 
that did not significantly affect fit; where neither model significantly worsened fit, I 
report results from the model with better fit statistics (i.e., CFI, RMSEA, and SRMR), 
which was generally the model with stationarity.
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Table 41 
 
Study 2 Mediation Model Fit Statistics: Immigration Attitudes (Black Respondents) 
 
  CFI RMSEA SRMR 2 (df) 2 (df) 
IV: Racial ID       
Number of immigrants full .919 .185 .042 211.419 (9)***  
stationarity .919 .130 .045 219.030 (18)*** 7.611 (9) 
directional .909 .152 .062 242.544 (15) 31.125 (6)*** 
Ending criminal penalties full .924 .154 .043 149.597 (9)***  
stationarity .924 .109 .046 159.756 (18)*** 10.159 (9) 
directional .918 .124 .050 167.909 (15)*** 18.312 (6)** 
IV: POC ID       
Number of immigrants full .933 .167 .039 174.808 (9)***  
stationarity .931 .120 .043 187.552 (18)*** 12.744 (9) 
directional .925 .137 .059 200.334 (15)*** 25.526 (6)*** 
Ending criminal penalties full .942 .134 .040 115.554 (9)***  
stationarity .941 .096 .043 126.029 (18)*** 10.475 (9) 
directional .938 .107 .046 128.798 (15)*** 13.244 (6)* 
IV: American ID       
Number of immigrants full .914 .189 .042 219.927 (9)***  
stationarity .913 .134 .046 231.186 (18)*** 11.259 (9) 
directional .910 .150 .053 237.240 (15)*** 17.313 (6)** 
Ending criminal penalties full .917 .162 .042 163.646 (9)***  
stationarity .913 .116 .047 178.407 (18)*** 14.761 (9)† 
directional .915 .126 .044 172.252 (15)*** 8.606 (6) 
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Table 42 
 
Study 2 Mediation Model Fit Statistics: Immigration Attitudes (Latino Respondents) 
 
  CFI RMSEA SRMR 2 (df) 2 (df) 
IV: Racial ID       
Number of immigrants full .922 .158 .044 70.434 (9)***  
stationarity .919 .114 .053 81.374 (18)*** 10.940 (9) 
directional .916 .127 .062 80.886 (15)*** 10.452 (6) 
Ending criminal penalties full .954 .099 .041 33.110 (9)***  
stationarity .961 .065 .051 38.536 (18)** 5.426 (9) 
directional .958 .073 .051 36.953 (15)** 3.843 (6) 
IV: POC ID       
Number of immigrants full .883 .192 .055 98.938 (9)***  
stationarity .876 .140 .064 113.746 (18)*** 14.808 (9)† 
directional .876 .153 .079 110.502 (15)*** 11.564 (6)† 
Ending criminal penalties full .861 .171 .056 80.656 (9)***  
stationarity .855 .124 .067 92.775 (18)*** 12.119 (9) 
directional .864 .131 .067 85.205 (15)*** 4.549 (6) 
IV: American ID       
Number of immigrants full .914 .173 .044 82.083 (9)***  
stationarity .889 .139 .076 112.582 (18)*** 30.499 (9)*** 
directional .902 .143 .074 98.516 (15)*** 16.433 (6)* 
Ending criminal penalties full .938 .120 .043 44.103 (9)***  
stationarity .907 .103 .071 70.352 (18)*** 26.249 (9)** 
directional .932 .097 .056 53.410 (15)*** 9.307 (6) 
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Table 43 
 
Study 2 Mediation Model Fit Statistics: Criminal Justice Attitudes (Black Respondents) 
 
  CFI RMSEA SRMR 2 (df) 2 (df) 
IV: Racial ID       
BLM/protests full .949 .174 .030 188.828 (9)***  
stationarity .949 .123 .034 198.338 (18)*** 9.510 (9) 
directional .935 .153 .073 246.529 (15)*** 57.701 (6)*** 
Mandatory minimum sentence (continuous) full .914 .172 .049 183.346 (9)***  
stationarity .911 .123 .053 198.538 (18)*** 15.192 (9)† 
directional .907 .138 .061 203.537 (15)*** 20.191 (6)** 
Mandatory minimum sentence (categorical) full .984/.848 .064/.135 .108 32.856 (9)***  
stationarity .984/.907 .045/.075 .108 41.946 (18)** 9.090 (9) 
directional .982/.848 .052/.104 .111 41.913 (15)*** 9.057 (6) 
IV: POC ID       
BLM/protests full .957 .160 .028 159.946 (9)***  
stationarity .956 .114 .030 171.940 (18)*** 11.994 (9) 
directional .943 .142 .070 214.682 (15)*** 54.736 (6)*** 
Mandatory minimum sentence (continuous) full .933 .151 .047 143.649 (9)***  
stationarity .929 .109 .050 159.252 (18)*** 15.603 (9)† 
directional .928 .121 .056 158.921 (15)*** 15.272 (6)* 
Mandatory minimum sentence (categorical) full .985/.852 .061/.132 .110 31.218 (9)***  
stationarity .985/.910 .043/.073 .108 39.639 (18)** 8.421 (9) 
directional .984/.862 .049/.098 .111 38.574 (15)** 7.356 (6) 
IV: American ID       
BLM/protests full .942 .184 .031 208.943 (9)***  
stationarity .942 .130 .034 217.324 (18)*** 8.381 (9) 
directional .933 .153 .059 244.950 (15)*** 36.007 (6)*** 
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Mandatory minimum sentence (continuous) full .911 .174 .047 187.881 (9)***  
stationarity .906 .126 .053 207.081 (18)*** 19.200 (9)* 
directional .908 .137 .053 200.799 (15) 12.918 (6)* 
Mandatory minimum sentence (categorical) full .981/.851 .060/.125 .107 30.088 (9)***  
stationarity .978/.888 .045/.077 .107 42.432 (18)** 12.344 (9) 







Study 2 Mediation Model Fit Statistics: Criminal Justice Attitudes (Latino Respondents) 
 
  CFI RMSEA SRMR 2 (df) 2 (df) 
IV: Racial ID       
BLM/protests full .946 .163 .029 73.931 (9)***  
stationarity .942 .119 .045 87.913 (18)*** 13.982 (9) 
directional .937 .136 .080 90.790 (15)*** 16.859 (6)** 
Mandatory minimum sentence (continuous) full .954 .103 .043 34.841 (9)***  
stationarity .956 .071 .055 42.767 (18)** 7.926 (9) 
directional .956 .078 .056 39.734 (15)*** 4.893 (6) 
Mandatory minimum sentence (categorical) full 1.000/.932 .000/.081 .109 5.294 (9)  
stationarity 1.000/.984 .000/.028 .104 9.896 (18) 4.602 (9) 
directional 1.000/.957 .000/.050 .114 10.388 (15) 5.094 (6) 
IV: POC ID       
BLM/protests full .918 .201 .043 108.330 (9)***  
stationarity .907 .152 .062 130.828 (18)*** 22.498 (9)** 
directional .913 .161 .080 120.957 (15)*** 12.627 (6)* 
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Mandatory minimum sentence (continuous) full .890 .156 .055 68.857 (9)***  
stationarity .875 .118 .070 85.743 (18)*** 16.886 (9)† 
directional .888 .122 .070 75.896 (15)*** 7.039 (6) 
Mandatory minimum sentence (categorical) full 1.000/.912 .000/.088 .116 6.572 (9)  
stationarity 1.000/.966 .000/.039 .113 12.111 (18) 5.539 (9) 
directional 1.000/.945 .000/.054 .120 10.652 (15) 4.080 (6) 
IV: American ID       
BLM/protests full .936 .183 .030 90.762 (9)***  
stationarity .914 .149 .059 127.221 (18)*** 36.459 (9)*** 
directional .918 .160 .092 119.965 (15)*** 29.203 (6)*** 
Mandatory minimum sentence (continuous) full .930 .131 .044 51.139 (9)***  
stationarity .898 .112 .073 79.564 (18)*** 28.425 (9)*** 
directional .924 .106 .059 60.756 (15)*** 9.617 (6) 
Mandatory minimum sentence (categorical) full 1.000/.941 .000/.073 .109 5.060 (9)  
stationarity 1.000/.954 .000/.046 .107 13.437 (18) 8.377 (9) 
directional 1.000/.931 .000/.061 .116 11.803 (15) 6.743 (6) 
COMMON INGROUP IDENTITY AND POLITICAL SOLIDARITY 255 
 Indirect and total effects were defined and estimated as they were in Study 1. In 
this study, indirect effects were marginally significant at best. Linked fate appeared to 
mediate the effect of racial identity on Black respondents’ preference for allowing more 
immigrants into the U.S. (ab = .005, SE = .003, p = .083; 95% CI: [.000, .012])3 and 
support for Black Lives Matter and the George Floyd protests (ab = .003, SE = .002, p = 
.071; 95% CI: [.000, .007]).4 The total effect was also significant (and positive) for the 
latter (t = .074, SE = .035, p = .037; 95% CI: [.003, .141])5 but not for the former. These 
two mediation models are presented in Figures 51 (number of immigrants) and 52 
(BLM/protests). As can be seen, racial identity significantly predicted linked fate in both 
models (number of immigrants: b = .159, SE = .039, p < .001; BLM/protests: b = .088, 
SE = .043, p = .039). Linked fate, in turn, significantly predicted BLM/protest attitudes (b 
= .037, SE = .012, p = .003) but only marginally significantly predicted preference for 
number of immigrants (b = .034, SE = .018, p = .058). 
 
 
3 Model with stationarity. 
4 Model with stationarity. 
5 Model with stationarity. 
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Figure 49. Study 2 longitudinal mediation model, with stationarity constraints, of the 
effect of Black respondents’ racial identity on attitudes toward the number of immigrants 
who should be allowed into the U.S., via linked fate. Reverse effects are shown in gray 
and italics. Within-wave covariances are omitted for readability. Standard errors and 
confidence intervals for indirect and total effects were estimated using the se = 
“bootstrap” option in lavaan with the default number of bootstrap samples. Indirect effect 
ab = .005 (.003), p = .083, 95% CI: [.000, .012]. Total effect from Wave 1 racial identity 
to Wave 3 attitude (xc + cy + ab) = .047 (.037), p = .200, 95% CI: [-.024, .118]. 
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Figure 50. Study 2 longitudinal mediation model, with stationarity constraints, for Black 
respondents’ racial identity and support for Black Lives Matter and the George Floyd 
protests, via linked fate. Reverse effects are shown in gray and italics. Within-wave 
covariances are omitted for readability. Indirect effect ab = .003 (.002), p = .071; 95% 
CI: [.000, .007]. Total effect from Wave 1 racial identity to Wave 3 attitude (xc + cy + 
ab) = .074 (.035), p = .037, 95% CI: [.003, .141]. 
 
A number of other total effects were significant in the mediation models. Similar 
to the CLPM, POC identity in the mediation models had a significant (positive) total 
effect on Black respondents’ preference for allowing more immigrants (t = .086, SE = 
.039, p = .028; 95% CI: [.007, .158])6 and Latino respondents’ support for ending 
criminal penalties for immigration (t = .162, SE = .075, p = .030; 95% CI: [.005, .302]).7 
 
6 Model with stationarity. 
7 Directional model. 
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American identity had a marginally significant (negative) total effect on Latino 
respondents’ support for ending criminal penalties for immigration (t = -.165, SE = .099, 
p = .095; 95% CI: [-.376, .012]).8 Black respondents’ racial identity had a marginally 
significant total effect on support for discretion to depart from mandatory minimum 
sentences (continuous variable model: t = .106, SE = .061, p = .083; 95% CI: [-.021, 
.221]; categorical variable model: t = .401, SE = .224, p = .074; 95% CI: [-.056, .820]).9 
Again, however, Black respondents’ POC identity (in addition to their racial identity) had 
a significant total effect on BLM/protest support (t = .083, SE = .032, p = .009; 95% CI: 
[.020, .146]),10 and Latino respondents’ racial identity had a marginally significant total 
effect on this variable (t = .071, SE = .037, p = .058; 95% CI: [-.002, .141])11 while their 
POC identity did not. But as was the case in the CLPM, Latino respondents’ racial 
identity had a marginally significant to significant negative total effect on support for 
discretion to depart from mandatory minimum sentences (continuous variable model: t = 
-.301, SE = .102, p = .003; 95% CI: [-.005, -.101]; categorical variable model: t = -.911, 
SE = .515, p = .077; 95% CI: [-2.246, -.178]).12 American identity had a marginally 
significant to significant total effect on support for discretion on mandatory minimum 
sentences for Black respondents (continuous variable model: t = -.107, SE = .047, p = 
.023; 95% CI: [-.198, -.009]; categorical variable model: t = -.357, SE = .201, p = .076; 
 
8 Directional model. 
9 Both models with stationarity. 
10 Model with stationarity. 
11 Model with stationarity. 
12 Both models with stationarity. 
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95% CI: [-.760, .021])13 and for Latino respondents when the mandatory minimum 
sentence variable was treated as categorical (t = -.825, SE = .387, p = .033; 95% CI: [-
1.580, -.084]).14 
 Overall, the results of Study 2 provide limited support for linked fate as a 
mediator of the effects of racial or POC identity on Black (Hypotheses 21-22) or Latino 
(Hypotheses 23-24) respondents’ policy attitudes. 
C. Discussion 
 As was the case in Study 1, the results of Study 2 are consistent with most of my 
hypotheses at the trait level but do not consistently support the hypotheses, which are 
directional. The fact that I found mainly trait-level covariances could be due in part to 
high variable stability, as in Study 1. However, stability was not as high for at least the 
policy variables in Study 2 as it was in Study 1. Nonetheless, the pattern of significant 
trait-level covariances and inconsistent cross-lagged effects held across studies. 
At the trait level, POC identity was associated with more positive attitudes toward 
other racial minority groups (who are included in this common ingroup identity) among 
both Black and Latino respondents, consistent with Hypothesis 2. However, cross-lagged 
effects were only significant in the CLPM for Black respondents between Wave 2 and 
Wave 3. Thus, Study 2 provides little evidence that POC identity predicts changes in 
attitudes toward other racial minorities and no evidence that changing POC identification 
can change Black or Latino individuals’ attitudes toward other racial minorities. 
 
13 The model treating the mandatory minimum sentence variable as continuous is the full 
model. The model treating this variable as categorical is the model with stationarity. 
14 Model with stationarity. 
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For Black respondents, American identity was associated at the trait level with 
more positive attitudes toward both other racial minority groups and Whites (all of whom 
should in theory be included in this common ingroup identity), consistent with 
Hypothesis 1. Significant cross-lagged effects in the CLPM provide evidence that, at the 
between-person level, African Americans who identify more strongly as American tend 
to show improvements in their attitudes toward both other minorities and Whites. But a 
marginally significant negative cross-lagged effect in the RI-CLPM suggests that 
increases in American identity at the within-person level might have the opposite effect 
on attitudes toward other racial minorities. Thus, although individual differences in 
American identity do seem to predict changes in racial attitudes among African 
Americans, Study 2 does not support the idea that increasing individuals’ identification as 
American would improve their attitudes toward other groups as predicted by the common 
ingroup identity model. 
For Latino respondents, at the trait level, American identity was associated with 
more positive attitudes toward Whites but not associated with attitudes toward other 
racial minorities. Together with the stronger effects of American identity on attitudes 
toward Whites than on attitudes toward other minorities among Asian Americans in 
Study 1, this finding for Latino respondents suggests that Americanness might have some 
association with whiteness for members of some minority groups. However, positive 
cross-lagged effects from Wave 1 to Wave 2 in this study suggest that increases in 
American identity could possibly predict improvements in attitudes toward other 
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minorities as well as Whites, at both the between-person and within-person levels,15 
though negative coefficients (albeit generally non-significant) from Wave 2 to Wave 3 
caution against giving too much weight to the positive effects. Overall, Study 2 provides 
inconsistent evidence that American identity functions as a common ingroup identity in 
predicting Latino Americans’ racial attitudes. 
Consistent with Hypothesis 19 and the collective action literature, Black 
respondents’ racial identity was associated at the trait level with more support for 
criminal justice reform, the policy area more closely tied to their own group. However, 
the pattern of cross-lagged effects provides mixed evidence at best: Support for Black 
Lives Matter and the George Floyd protests appears to predict African Americans’ racial 
identification more than racial identification predicts support for BLM and the protests, 
and racial identification appears to predict more support for departures from mandatory 
minimum sentences at the between-person level (i.e., trait-level covariance in the RI-
CLPM and to some extent, cross-lagged effects in the CLPM) but less support at the 
within-person level (i.e., cross-lagged effects in the RI-CLPM). At the same time, Black 
respondents’ racial identity was also associated at the trait level with more liberal 
immigration attitudes (a policy area more closely tied to Latinos), and Latino 
respondents’ racial identity was not significantly associated with their immigration 
 
15 At the within-person level, the cross-lagged effect of American identity on nonwhite 
FTs among Latino respondents despite the lack of trait-level covariance is consistent with 
the Study 1 finding of a positive cross-lagged effect of Asian respondents’ American 
identity on nonwhite FTs despite the lack of trait-level covariance and between-person 
cross-lagged effects. However, if this is a true effect despite the low statistical power in 
this study, it is unclear how to interpret it in light of the inconsistency across time lags for 
Latino respondents and the inconsistency across racial attitude measures for Asian 
American respondents. 
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attitudes (in terms of trait-level covariances or cross-lagged effects in either the CLPM or 
RI-CLPM) but was associated with more positive attitudes toward Black Lives Matter 
and the George Floyd protests at the trait level. Thus, Study 2 does not show that racial 
identity either consistently or exclusively predicts own-group policy attitudes 
(Hypotheses 5, 17, & 18); the connection between racial identity and policy attitudes 
appears to be both broader and narrower than social identity-based collective action 
theories would predict. 
POC identity also appears to relate to policy attitudes both more broadly and more 
narrowly than I predicted. I expected that identification as POC would primarily make 
other-group issues self-relevant and would thus primarily be associated with increases in 
support for other-group policies (Hypotheses 6, 19, & 20). Consistent with these 
expectations, POC identity was associated at the trait level with more liberal immigration 
attitudes among Black respondents and more positive attitudes toward Black Lives 
Matter and the George Floyd protests among Latino respondents. However, cross-lagged 
coefficients from POC identity to immigration attitudes were not significant for Black 
respondents, and Latino respondents’ identification as POC appeared to predict support 
for BLM and the protests inconsistently and only in the CLPM. Thus, the evidence is 
mixed at best as to whether POC identity predicts support for other-group policies. 
Similar relationships between these policy items and racial identity further suggest that 
POC identity is not necessary to make these issues self-relevant. At the same time, POC 
identity, but not racial identity, was associated with Latino respondents’ immigration 
attitudes, and results from the CLPM and RI-CLPM suggest that increases in Latinos’ 
POC identification predict increases in support for ending criminal penalties for illegal 
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immigration at both the between- and within-person levels. Additionally, POC identity 
was associated with support for discretion to depart from mandatory minimum sentences 
among Black respondents (though only at the trait level). These two findings, along with 
the fact that POC identity but not racial identity had cross-lagged effects on Asian 
Americans’ immigration attitudes in Study 1, suggest that POC identity might play a role 
in attitudes toward own-group policies. 
Consistent with the paradoxical effects literature, American identity was 
associated with less liberal immigration attitudes and less support for criminal justice 
reform at the trait level for Latino respondents (Hypothesis 13). Cross-lagged effects 
were inconsistent across models and time lags, however, and were only significant in the 
CLPM. For Black respondents, the trait-level covariances were significant for only one of 
the immigration items (ending criminal penalties) and one of the criminal justice items 
(mandatory minimum sentences). Cross-lagged effects of identity on attitude were only 
marginally significant and relied on the stationarity assumption for the immigration item 
and were inconsistent across waves and only present in the CLPM for the criminal justice 
item. That the trait-level covariances were negative and significant across the board for 
Latino respondents but not for Black respondents suggests that the association between 
this particular common ingroup identity and support for the racial status quo might be 
stronger for some racial minority groups than for others. And in theory, this association 
could make Latino Americans particularly susceptible to the paradoxical effects of 
identifying as American. But because of the inconsistent cross-lagged effects, especially 
in the RI-CLPM, this study does not demonstrate that these paradoxical effects actually 
occurred with either Black or Latino respondents. 
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A specific limitation of this study is the smaller sample size of Latino respondents 
(Wave 1 N = 272, Wave 2 N = 146, Wave 3 N = 120). This sample size is smaller than 
any of the potential sample sizes I used to estimate statistical power for RI-CLPM, and 
thus, the RI-CLPM models, especially without stationarity, are likely underpowered for 
detecting cross-lagged effects. As a result, one should be cautious in drawing any 
conclusions about the presence or absence of within-person effects among Latino 
respondents. 
Another limitation is that the panel models in this study focus on one identity at a 
time without controlling for the other identities. In Study 1, correlations among the 
identities of interest were accounted for in the factor scores, which were generated from 
CFAs that included all three identities. The composite scores I used in this study do not 
account for these correlations. Not accounting for correlations among identities is most 
likely to have had an impact on the results for Black respondents, who had the highest 
racial identity-POC identity correlation out of the three respondent groups (r = .83-.88). 
And high correlations between these two identities could explain why the effects of racial 
and POC identities often appear to be similar (though this explanation does not provide 
insight into which identity is actually driving the effect). 
Additionally, the negative cross-lagged effects of Latino respondents’ racial 
identity on support for judicial discretion on mandatory minimum sentences raise 
questions about how respondents interpreted that item, especially because Latino 
respondents’ racial identity predicted more positive attitudes on the other criminal justice 
variable. Were respondents reading judicial discretion to impose less harsh sentences as 
somehow unfair to Latino Americans? It is not readily apparent from the aggregate data 
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what respondents’ interpretations were or how those might have affected the relationships 
between the mandatory minimum sentence variable and POC and American identities. 
Finally, the only potential mediator included in Study 2 was linked fate. Thus, 
Study 2 could not fully test the mechanisms of identity effects on policy attitudes 
suggested by the collective action, group consciousness, and paradoxical effects 
literatures. Although I did find marginally significant indirect effects of Black 
respondents’ racial identity on one own-group policy item and one other-group policy 
item, these were two marginally significant effects across several combinations of 
identity and policy attitude and thus do not constitute strong evidence of a linked fate 
mechanism. I found no evidence that linked fate connects identity and policy attitudes for 
Latinos. 
Overall, Study 2 provides evidence consistent with but not supporting the idea 
that POC and American identities serve the prejudice reduction function of a common 
ingroup identity (Hypotheses 1 & 2) for Black and Latino Americans. It provides 
evidence consistent with the idea that racial identity increases support for policies that 
benefit minority groups and some evidence (with Latino respondents and ending criminal 
penalties for immigration) supporting the idea that POC identity increases support for 
such policies. However, my distinction between own-group and other-group issues (i.e., 
the distinction between Hypothesis 5 and Hypothesis 6) was not supported, as racial 
identity was associated with some other-group issues and POC identity was associated 
with some own-group issues. What implications this lack of a distinction between own-
group and other-group issues has for the group-identity-based self-relevance process 
described by van Zomeren et al. (2012) is potentially a topic for future research. Study 2 
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also provides evidence consistent with but not supporting the idea that American identity 
has a paradoxical effect of reducing support for policies that benefit racial minority 
groups (Hypotheses 7 & 13). And like Study 1, Study 2 provides little evidence for the 
proposed mechanisms behind identity effects on policy attitudes (Hypotheses 21-24). 
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Chapter 5: Discussion & Conclusions 
 Using two 3-wave panel studies, I explored 1) whether common ingroup identity 
has the same prejudice reduction effects on minority group members’ attitudes toward 
other minority groups as have been found consistently for majority group members and 
2) whether common ingroup identity has the same prejudice reduction and paradoxical 
effects on minority group members when it does and does not include the majority group. 
Through these studies, I attempted to bridge gaps between social psychology research on 
common ingroup identity, social and political psychology research on collective action, 
and political psychology research on racial identity and political attitudes. 
A. Common Ingroup Identity and Racial Attitudes 
 First, I expected to replicate the finding that common ingroup identity reduces 
prejudice (Gaertner et al., 2005). That is, for Asian, Black, and Latino Americans, 
identifying with a common ingroup should predict more positive attitudes toward other 
racial groups that are included in the common ingroup. And whether the majority group 
(Whites) is included in the common ingroup or not should not make a difference with 
regard to attitudes toward other minority groups that are part of both versions of the 
common ingroup. Furthermore, finding that changes in group identification precede 
changes in racial attitudes or vice versa in a longitudinal study would challenge the 
common practice in political psychology of treating identity and/or racial attitudes as 
exogenous variables (Lee, 2008) or as causally prior to other attitudes of interest 
(Englehardt, 2020). 
 My studies provide evidence at the trait level that POC identity is associated with 
more positive attitudes toward other racial minority groups among Black, Latino, and 
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Asian Americans, but evidence of effects over time was inconsistent. For Asian 
Americans (Study 1), POC identification, at both the between- and within-person levels, 
appears to predict changes in stereotype ratings of other minority groups but not changes 
in feeling thermometer ratings of those same groups. POC identification also did not 
consistently predict changes in feeling thermometer ratings of other minority groups 
among African Americans and Latinos in Study 2. Thus, POC identification is associated 
with more positive attitudes toward other minority groups, consistent with it being a 
common ingroup identity, but whether it predicts improvements in racial attitudes as 
predicted by the CIIM might depend on the racial attitude measure in question. 
 The relationship between American identity and attitudes toward other minority 
groups was more complicated. American identity was only associated with more positive 
attitudes toward other racial minority groups at the trait level among Black respondents 
(Study 2). However, Black and Latino respondents showed some positive cross-lagged 
effects of American identification on feeling thermometer ratings of other minorities in 
the CLPM (Study 2), and Latino (Study 2) and Asian (Study 1) respondents showed these 
effects at the within-person level (in the RI-CLPM). On the other hand, Black 
respondents showed a marginally significant negative cross-lagged effect at the within-
person level (Study 2), in contrast to their positive between-person (trait-level) effects, 
and Asian respondents showed no significant effects at the between-person level (Study 
1), suggesting that individual differences in American identification among Asian 
Americans might not matter in the trajectories of their attitudes toward other racial 
minorities. 
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 But American identity was consistently associated with more positive attitudes 
toward Whites at the trait level and predicted improvements in attitudes toward Whites 
for all three groups, albeit somewhat inconsistently for Latino respondents. These effects 
generally did not hold at the within-person level,1 however, with increases in Asian 
Americans’ American identification actually predicting worsening stereotype ratings. 
Taken together with the inconsistent results for attitudes toward other minorities, 
American identity appears to behave like a common ingroup identity that includes Whites 
for all three racial groups, though this might be primarily at the between-person level, but 
it is less clear whether American identity includes other minority groups, especially for 
Latino and Asian Americans.  
B. Paradoxical Effects of American Identity 
 Second, I expected to find support for so-called paradoxical effects of prejudice 
reduction on minority group members (e.g., Dixon, Durrheim, et al., 2010), but only with 
a common ingroup identity that includes the majority group (American identity). Thus, I 
expected Asian, Black, and Latino respondents who identify more strongly as American 
to express less support for social change that might reduce racial inequality, which I 
operationalized as support for more liberal immigration policies, criminal justice reform 
(and relatedly, Black Lives Matter and the George Floyd protests), and affirmative action. 
This hypothesis follows from social identity theory, which suggests that the same 
processes of social comparison and social competition underlie prejudice and minority 
 
1 As discussed in Chapter 4, although Latino respondents in Study 2 showed a significant 
positive cross-lagged effect between Waves 1 and 2, low statistical power cautions 
against relying on this result. 
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group members’ motivations to improve their group’s status (Tajfel & Turner, 1979), and 
collective action theory, which proposes relative deprivation as an important pathway 
connecting group identity and collective action (e.g., van Zomeren et al., 2008). A 
common ingroup identity that includes the majority group removes the majority group as 
a relevant comparison group and thus removes a prerequisite for social competition and 
relative deprivation. 
 Furthermore, I expected American identity to reduce support for not only policies 
that benefit one’s own racial group but also policies that benefit other minority groups. 
The paradoxical effects literature has not addressed the effects of common ingroup 
identity or intergroup contact involving the dominant group on policies that benefit other 
disadvantaged groups and thus has not made predictions about attitudes toward these 
policies. But this effect would be consistent with the finding that liking the majority 
group and perceiving them as fair decreases support for collective action (Saguy et al., 
2009): If common ingroup identity leads one to trust the majority group on policies that 
affect one’s own group, that trust can reasonably be expected to extend to policies that 
affect other minority groups. 
 My results were consistent with the existence of paradoxical effects primarily at 
the trait level, and this negative trait-level covariance was consistent among Asian and 
Latino respondents but not among Black respondents. Additionally, consistent with my 
expectations, negative trait-level covariances were found for both own-group and other-
group policy areas. Cross-lagged effects in the CLPM (which reflect a combination of 
between- and within-person effects) were found only for Latino and Black respondents 
and were inconsistent across time lags and (for Black respondents) across items in each 
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policy area, though again, these effects arose for both own-group and other-group policy 
areas. The only significant within-person effect, however, was a positive effect of 
American identity on Asian Americans’ attitudes toward affirmative action, contrary to 
the negative trait-level covariance and what I expected based on the paradoxical effects 
literature. Without consistent cross-lagged effects, my studies do not provide strong 
evidence to support the prediction (based on the paradoxical effects literature) that 
common ingroup identity predicts changes in support for change.  
Moreover, the fact that American identity was only inconsistently related to Black 
respondents’ policy attitudes even at the trait level suggests that it might not be merely 
the common ingroup nature of a national identity like “American” that accounts for 
paradoxical effects. As with its inconsistent effects on attitudes toward other minority 
groups, the content of American identity might play a role. For Latino and Asian 
Americans, “American” might have connotations related to whiteness that are less 
prevalent among African Americans. And those connotations might lead higher 
identifiers to 1) exclude other minority groups from or at least perceive them as less 
prototypical of the common ingroup and 2) align their policy interests more with Whites 
than with other minorities (i.e., going beyond seeing White authorities as fair or not 
seeing Whites as a relevant social comparison group). As a result, American identity 
would 1) not reduce prejudice against other racial minority groups and 2) move policy 
attitudes in the direction of White Americans’ attitudes rather than merely reducing 
support for policies that benefit minority groups. However, more research is needed to 
distinguish between paradoxical effects of common ingroup identity and effects of an 
American identity that connotes whiteness. 
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C. Disadvantaged Group Identity and Policy Attitudes 
 Third, group identification is a key predictor of collective action on behalf of the 
group (e.g., van Zomeren et al., 2008), and both group consciousness and linked fate 
were developed to help explain the relationship between identity and either group-
oriented political behavior (e.g., Miller et al., 1981) or political behavior that is unusually 
uniform across the group (Dawson, 1994). Consistent with these literatures, I expected to 
find that racial identification predicts minority group members’ support for change in 
areas that benefit their own racial group: immigration for Asian and Latino respondents 
and criminal justice reform for Black respondents. 
Extending these literatures, I expected a common minority ingroup identity 
(person of color) to function more like racial identity than American identity in predicting 
support for change; in other words, POC identity should, if anything, predict increased 
support for change. This is a proposed boundary condition on the paradoxical effects of 
prejudice reduction that has not yet been explored in that literature. Nevertheless, it 
would be consistent with the SIT explanation for why a common ingroup identity that 
includes the dominant group reduces support for change: Unlike American identity, POC 
identity does not remove Whites as a relevant comparison group and in fact might make 
them seem like a more relevant comparison group (cf. Dovidio et al., 2009). 
Moreover, I expected POC identity to increase support for change in policy areas 
that primarily affect other minority groups (criminal justice reform for Asian and Latino 
respondents, affirmative action for Asian respondents, immigration for Black 
respondents). These are precisely the policy areas where I did not expect racial identity to 
increase support for change. This pair of hypotheses follow from the concept of self-
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relevance appraisals in van Zomeren et al.’s (2012) dual-pathway model of collective 
action: If a policy affects people of color other than one’s racial group, racial identity 
would not necessarily make the policy self-relevant, but POC identity would. These 
hypotheses are also consistent with group consciousness models because POC identity 
should predict linked fate with people of color who are not necessarily part of one’s own 
racial group and make perceived discrimination against other people of color relevant to 
perceived ingroup interests; as a result, POC identity should predict support for policies 
that benefit other minority groups experiencing discrimination. Additionally, POC 
identity predicting support for policies that benefit other minority groups would be 
consistent with Dixon et al.’s (2015) finding that intergroup contact between 
disadvantaged groups can increase support for policies that benefit the other 
disadvantaged group. However, as discussed in Chapter 4 and below, I could not clearly 
distinguish between the effects of racial and POC identities, because these identities were 
highly correlated (especially for Black respondents in Study 2), and my panel models 
examined one identity at a time. Accordingly, more research is needed to fully test the 
hypothesis that it is specifically POC identity that predicts support for change that 
primarily benefits other minority groups. 
With regard to racial identity, I found positive trait-level associations with own-
group policy attitudes among Asian respondents (Study 1) and Black respondents (Study 
2) but not among Latino respondents (Study 2). However, I found positive trait-level 
associations with other-group policy attitudes among all three groups. On own-group 
issues, only Black respondents showed significant cross-lagged effects of racial identity, 
but the attitude-identity effect was stronger than the identity-attitude effect (in both the 
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CLPM and RI-CLPM) for one item, and the positive effect in the CLPM became a 
negative within-person effect in the RI-CLPM for the other item. Thus, my hypothesis 
that racial identity would predict increased support for own-group policies was partially 
supported for African Americans (at least at the between-person level), and the results for 
Asian Americans are consistent with this hypothesis. However, the results for Latinos are 
not consistent with this hypothesis. Furthermore, Black and Asian respondents showed at 
least marginally significant cross-lagged effects of racial identity on at least one other-
group policy item— number of immigrants (in the CLPM) for Black respondents and 
affirmative action (marginally significant in both the CLPM and RI-CLPM) for Asian 
respondents. The evidence of positive relationships between racial identity and other-
group policy attitudes could be an artifact of high correlations between racial and POC 
identities among Black respondents. But it could also indicate that some of these issues 
are self-relevant by way of something associated with racial identity, especially for Asian 
Americans, for whom racial and POC identities were less highly correlated. Again, 
identity content—in this case, possibly a racial justice activist component, might help 
explain these unexpected effects. 
With regard to POC identity, my results are again mostly consistent with my 
hypotheses at the trait level (though this is true for only one of the two other-group policy 
items among Latino respondents). But again, evidence for the directional effects I 
hypothesized is inconsistent at best. Black respondents showed no significant cross-
lagged effects of POC identity on other-group policy attitudes, and Latino respondents 
showed only inconsistent cross-lagged effects in the CLPM and only on one of the two 
relevant items. Asian respondents did show significant positive cross-lagged effects of 
COMMON INGROUP IDENTITY AND POLITICAL SOLIDARITY 275 
POC identity in one of the other-group policy areas (affirmative action), in both the 
CLPM and RI-CLPM, but the only significant cross-lagged effect in the other policy area 
(criminal justice reform) was a negative within-person effect (contrary to both my 
hypotheses and the positive trait-level covariance). Furthermore, POC identity was 
positively associated with some own-group policy attitudes. Both Asian and Latino 
respondents showed positive trait-level correlations between POC identity and 
immigration attitudes, and this was accompanied by a small cross-lagged effect in the 
CLPM for Asian respondents and cross-lagged effects in both the CLPM and RI-CLPM 
on one of the immigration items for Latino respondents. Black respondents also showed a 
positive association between POC identity and one criminal justice item, though only at 
the trait level. Again, my results are consistent with my hypotheses at the trait level, but 
in this case, Study 1 also provides evidence supporting my hypothesis for one respondent 
group and one policy area—Asian Americans and affirmative action—at both the 
between- and within-person levels. However, as with racial identity, the own-group 
versus other group policy area distinction was not supported, especially with regard to 
Latino and Asian Americans’ immigration attitudes, which were more consistently 
predicted by POC identity than racial identity. That POC identity might influence own-
group policy attitudes as well as other-group policy attitudes, though inconsistent with 
the strongest form of my hypotheses, is not entirely unexpected, considering Pérez’s 
(2021) finding that POC identity predicted Black, Latino, and Asian Americans’ support 
for Black Lives Matter. But that POC identity might have a stronger influence than racial 
identity on Latino and Asian Americans’ immigration attitudes is unexpected and raises 
questions about how these two groups think about immigration. 
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Finally, the collective action and group consciousness literatures propose 
mechanisms linking identity to collective action or political attitudes or behavior, though 
only the collective action literature explicitly calls these mechanisms mediators. I 
expected to find evidence that these mechanisms overlap, as this would be consistent with 
the fact that measures of perceived discrimination, perceived group inequality, and 
assessments of blame have been used to represent both relative deprivation and group 
consciousness. And I expected the set of mechanisms from both literatures—relative 
deprivation, perceived discrimination, or system blame; group efficacy; and linked fate—
to mediate the relationship between racial identity and support for change. To the extent 
that POC identity predicts support for change, I also expected these variables to mediate 
that relationship. And I expected a subset of these variables—namely relative 
deprivation, perceived discrimination, or system blame—to explain how American 
identity predicts decreased support for change. 
I tested this set of hypotheses primarily in Study 1, which included measures of 
group-based efficacy, linked fate, perceived discrimination, and relative deprivation. The 
pilot study and Study 1 indicated that group-based efficacy is distinct from the other 
collective action and group consciousness variables, at least among Asian Americans. 
But although the pilot study provided some evidence that the remaining items overlap, 
Study 1 indicated that linked fate, perceived discrimination, and relative deprivation are 
empirically distinct. Study 1 did not provide evidence that any of these variables mediate 
the effects of group identities on Asian Americans’ political attitudes. Study 2, which 
only included measures of linked fate, produced results suggestive of an indirect effect of 
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African Americans’ racial identity on their policy attitudes, but it did not otherwise 
support my mediation hypotheses. 
D. Limitations and Future Research Directions 
A major limitation of these studies is the stability of identity importance, racial 
attitudes, and at least some policy attitudes across the study time frames. Stability was 
particularly high in Study 1, despite the slightly longer time lags between waves (3-4 
weeks versus 1-2 weeks), and the difference was especially noticeable with regard to 
policy attitudes (and immigration policy attitudes in particular). The higher stability in 
Study 1 could be a result of aggregation (the number of items aggregated for each 
variable and the use of factor scores in Study 1) or, in the case of policy attitudes, the 
relatively high political sophistication of the participant pool from which Study 1 
respondents were recruited. Regardless of the source of stability, it might have 
contributed to the inconsistent cross-lagged effects found in Studies 1 and 2. As Bohrer et 
al. (2019) note in the context of CLPM, high stability leaves little variance in the 
variables of interest to be explained by cross-lagged effects. Indeed, the CLPM 
autoregressive coefficients for identity and racial attitudes in my studies spanned a 
similar range as those for positive intergroup contact and attitudes toward foreigners in 
Bohrer et al.’s (2019) study. As a result, it is not surprising that, like Kessler and 
Mummendey (2002), I found a pattern of trait-level covariances consistent with the 
relevant theories, but I did not find consistent evidence of a sequential process. 
The high stability in my studies could indicate a need for a longitudinal study with 
a longer time frame (e.g., lags of months or a year rather than a few weeks) or more 
waves. However, Bohrer et al. (2019) and Sengupta et al. (2020) found similar patterns of 
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stability and lack of change using RI-CLPM with more waves of longer-term longitudinal 
data—four waves over a year and a half and several waves at one-year intervals, 
respectively. Their results suggest that a longer time frame and more waves might not 
solve the stability problem. At the same time, considering that effects of interventions 
tend to be short-lived, it is unclear how effects that occur over many years in a 
longitudinal study could inform potential interventions, so a long-term longitudinal study 
might not be the most fruitful approach to the extent that one is interested in 
interventions. Furthermore, the high stability, high trait correlations, and lack of within-
person effects could indicate that both identity and racial and political attitudes are 
shaped by a common set of third variables that are not captured by my 2-variable cross-
lagged panel models (cf. Kessler & Mummendey, 2002, suggesting that stable individual 
or situational difference variables outside the model could underlie the high trait 
covariances among variables related to social identity theory and relative deprivation 
theory); if so, a longitudinal study over a longer time frame would not address this 
limitation.   
Alternatively, identity and racial attitudes could be more or less crystallized in 
adults but be more malleable in children, adolescents, and potentially college students, 
and thus, cross-lagged effects might be more reliably detected in a younger sample. For 
example, one longitudinal study that found evidence of paradoxical effects of intergroup 
contact was Tropp et al.’s (2012) study of ethnic minority undergraduates.  
Yet another future research direction is to shift to experiments that manipulate 
some aspect of identity (such as salience) that remains malleable in adults, as much of the 
early social identity research did, especially if the goal is to develop interventions to 
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increase solidarity between groups. This has not been done with minority group members 
and common ingroup identity in a way that systematically compares racial, POC, and 
American identities. Additionally, one could manipulate identity salience and measure a 
more stable aspect of identity in the same study, as Transue (2007) did with identity 
importance, to test whether the more stable aspect of identity moderates the effect of 
identity salience. A study like this involving POC identity would be particularly 
informative in light of relatively low POC identification among the Asian and Latino 
respondents in my studies: If making POC identity salient prompts less solidarity among 
low identifiers, then other intervention strategies might be better suited for these groups. 
Another limitation of my studies was the fact that the panel models only 
examined one identity at a time and thus could not account for cross-identity correlations. 
When cross-identity correlations are high, as they were particularly for Black 
respondents’ racial and POC identities in Study 2, it is unclear whether cross-lagged 
effects of either identity in the panel models actually reflect the effects of that identity or 
if they reflect the effects of the other, correlated identity. Thus, the effects of racial 
identity on other-group policy attitudes and the effects of POC identity on own-group 
policy attitudes could mean that the own-group versus other-group distinction is 
incorrect, but they could also be an artifact of the correlation between racial and POC 
identification, especially for Black respondents in Study 2. Future research could address 
this limitation by using models that control for these cross-identity correlations. 
As part of a larger study, Study 2 was also limited in the number of items that 
could be included. Thus, two policy areas—immigration and criminal justice reform—
were included instead of three, only linked fate was included out of the potential 
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mediators, and identity was measured by two-item versions of the four-item scale used in 
Study 1. As a result, I could not examine the relationship between identity and 
affirmative action attitudes among Black and Latino Americans or test mediation via 
group efficacy, perceived discrimination, or relative deprivation. Future studies could 
examine Black and Latino Americans’ affirmative action attitudes and/or test different 
potential mediators of identity-policy attitude effects in these groups  
Additionally, the number of Latino respondents in Study 2 was smaller than 
expected, leading to low statistical power, especially for RI-CLPM. Thus, at least the RI-
CLPM results for Latino respondents need to be replicated with a larger sample. 
Although I included different measures of identity in Study 1, I only used the 
identity scales in my panel analyses. That CFA models with the identity scales, ranks, 
and checklist fit poorly suggests that the rank and checklist items capture something 
slightly different from the scales. Thus, it is possible that they would show slightly 
different relationships with racial attitudes and policy attitudes than the identity scales 
showed. As a follow-up, I could substitute the rank and checklist variables for the identity 
scale factor scores in the Study 1 analyses. However, these follow-up analyses would 
involve the same highly stable racial attitude and policy attitude variables, likely leading 
to similarly unreliable cross-lagged effect estimates. 
Finally, my findings with American identity suggest that the content of this 
identity might be as important or more important than identity strength or centrality in 
predicting racial minorities’ attitudes. Notably, American identity was more consistently 
associated with attitudes toward Whites than with attitudes toward other minority groups 
among Asian and Latino respondents, and it was consistently associated with policy 
COMMON INGROUP IDENTITY AND POLITICAL SOLIDARITY 281 
attitudes among these two groups but not among Black respondents. Future research 
could examine associations between American identity and whiteness as an alternative 
explanation for when it does and does not predict racial and policy attitudes. For 
example, there is evidence that Asian and White Americans, but not African Americans, 
implicitly associate the concept of “American” with White faces compared to Black or 
Asian faces (Devos & Banaji, 2005), and future research could explore whether this 
association moderates the relationship between Asian Americans’ identification as 
American and their racial and policy attitudes. Similarly, identity content (e.g., 
associations with politics or activism) could help explain unexpected effects of racial and 
POC identity on other-group and own-group policy attitudes, respectively. 
E. Conclusions 
In summary, across two 3-wave longitudinal studies, I generally found trait-level 
correlations that were consistent with the literature on common ingroup identity, 
paradoxical effects, collective action, and group consciousness: Among Asian, Black, and 
Latino Americans, common ingroup identities (American and POC) were positively 
associated with attitudes toward other racial groups included in the common ingroup, 
American identity was generally negatively associated with attitudes toward policies that 
benefit other minority groups, and disadvantaged group identities (racial and POC) were 
generally positively associated with attitudes toward policies that benefit minority 
groups. But with few exceptions (namely, POC identity and Asian Americans’ stereotype 
ratings of other minority groups and support for affirmative action) my studies offer little 
support for the directional hypotheses that stem from these theories, i.e., that identity 
predicts attitude change. These findings further highlight the importance of longitudinal 
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studies and especially longitudinal studies that allow for analyses, such as RI-CLPM, that 
separate between- and within-person cross-lagged effects. My studies join recent 
longitudinal studies of intergroup contact (Bohrer et al., 2019; Sengupta et al., 2020) that 
failed to find cross-lagged effects on intergroup attitudes, particularly at the within-
person level. The emerging evidence seems to suggest that, to understand how identity 
and contact come to be related to intergroup attitudes, solidarity, and activism, 
researchers might be better served by focusing on populations for whom these variables 
have not stabilized (e.g., college students) or aspects of identity that are malleable enough 
to be experimentally manipulated. 
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Appendix A: Study Materials 
Pilot Study & Study 1 Items 
Identity 
• Please think about the ways in which you identify yourself, and rank the 
following identities from the one you identify most strongly with (1) to the one 
you identify least strongly with (5). (To rank items, drag and drop them into the 
order you want.) 
o Individual 
o Ethnic group (e.g., Chinese, Vietnamese, or Indian) 
o Asian American 
o Person of color 
o American 
 
• Which of the following identities do you consider important to who you are? 
o Individual 
o Ethnic group 
o Asian American 
o Person of color 
o American 
 
• How important is being Asian American to you? 
o Not important at all 
o Not very important 
o Very important 
o Extremely important 
• How well does the term Asian American describe you? 
o Not at all 
o Not very well 
o Very well 
o Extremely well 




o Some of the time 
o Most of the time 
o All of the time 
• To what extent do you think of yourself as being an Asian American? 
o Not at all 
o Very little 
o Somewhat 
o A great deal 
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• How important is being a person of color to you? 
o Not important at all 
o Not very important 
o Very important 
o Extremely important 
• How well does the term person of color describe you? 
o Not at all 
o Not very well 
o Very well 
o Extremely well 




o Some of the time 
o Most of the time 
o All of the time 
• To what extent do you think of yourself as being a person of color? 
o Not at all 
o Very little 
o Somewhat 
o A great deal 
 
• How important is being American to you? 
o Not important at all 
o Not very important 
o Very important 
o Extremely important 
• How well does the term American describe you? 
o Not at all 
o Not very well 
o Very well 
o Extremely well 
• When talking about Americans, how often do you use “we” instead of “they”? 
o Never 
o Rarely 
o Some of the time 
o Most of the time 
o All of the time 
• To what extent do you think of yourself as being an American? 
o Not at all 
o Very little 
o Somewhat 
o A great deal 
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Feeling Thermometers [Study 1; not included in pilot study] 
• We’d like to get your feelings toward some groups in the news these days. We’ll 
give you the name of a group, and we’d I'd like you to rate that group using 
something we call the feeling thermometer. Ratings between 50 degrees and 100 
degrees mean that you feel favorable toward the group. Ratings between 0 
degrees and 50 degrees mean that you don't feel favorable toward the group and 
that you don't care too much for that group. You would rate the group at the 50 
degree mark if you don't feel particularly favorable or unfavorable toward the 
group. 
 





Stereotype Items [Study 1 only; not included in pilot study] 
• Where would you rate African Americans in general on these scales? 
o Lazy 1  2 3 4 5 6 7 Hardworking 
o Unintelligent 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Intelligent 
• Where would you rate Whites in general on these scales? 
o Lazy 1  2 3 4 5 6 7 Hardworking 
o Unintelligent 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Intelligent 
• Where would you rate Hispanics in general on these scales? 
o Lazy 1  2 3 4 5 6 7 Hardworking 
o Unintelligent 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Intelligent 
 
Policy Items [All items in Study 1; only immigration & criminal justice items in pilot 
study] 
• Some people say that because of past discrimination, racial minorities should be 
given preference in hiring and promotion. Others say that such preference is 
wrong because it gives these groups advantages they haven't earned. What about 
your opinion -- do you favor or oppose preferential hiring and promotion of 
minorities? 
o Strongly favor 
o Favor 
o Neither favor nor oppose 
o Oppose 
o Strongly oppose 
• To increase the number of black and other underrepresented minority students at 
their schools, some colleges and universities consider race along with other 
factors when choosing students. Do you favor or oppose colleges and universities 
considering race in choosing students? 
o Strongly favor 
o Favor 
o Neither favor nor oppose 
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o Oppose 
o Strongly oppose 
 
• Do you think the number of immigrants from foreign countries who are allowed 
to come to the United States to live should be 
o Increased a lot 
o Increased a little 
o Left the same as it is now 
o Decreased a little 
o Decreased a lot 
• Do you think undocumented immigrants in the United States should be allowed to 
stay or be deported back to their native countries? 
o Strongly favor allowing them to stay 
o Favor allowing them to stay 
o Favor deportation 
o Strongly favor deportation 
• Do you favor or oppose detaining undocumented migrants at the border? 
o Strongly favor 
o Favor 
o Neither favor nor oppose 
o Oppose 
o Strongly oppose 
 
• Do you think there are too many people in prison in the United States, not enough 
people in prison, or is the number of people in prison about right? 
o Too many 
o About the right number 
o Not enough 
• There have been some proposals recently to cut the amount of funding police 
departments receive from state and local governments and using that money to 
pay for other kinds of first-responder services. Do you favor or oppose cutting the 
amount of government funding for police departments? 
o Strongly favor 
o Favor 
o Neither favor nor oppose 
o Oppose 
o Strongly oppose 
• There have been proposals to eliminate mandatory minimum sentences for certain 
crimes in order to reduce overly harsh prison sentences. Do you favor or oppose 
these kinds of proposals? 
o Strongly favor 
o Favor 
o Neither favor nor oppose 
o Oppose 
o Strongly oppose 
COMMON INGROUP IDENTITY AND POLITICAL SOLIDARITY 310 
 
Potential Mediators 
• Do you think what happens generally to other Asians in this country affects what 
happens in your life? 
o Yes 
o No 
• (if Y) Will it affect you a lot, some, or not very much? 
o A lot 
o Some 
o Not very much 
• Do you think what happens generally to other people of color in this country 
affects what happens in your life? 
o Yes 
o No 
• (if Y) Will it affect you a lot, some, or not very much? 
o A lot 
o Some 
o Not very much 
 
• Please indicate how much you agree or disagree with the following statements. (1 
= strongly disagree, 2 = disagree, 3 = neither agree nor disagree, 4 = agree, 5 = 
strongly agree) 
o Asians are socially and/or economically disadvantaged compared to 
Whites in the U.S. 
o People of color are socially and/or economically disadvantaged compared 
to Whites in the U.S. 
o I have less power than Whites do in the U.S. 
o I have fewer opportunities than Whites do in the U.S. 
o America is an open society where individuals of any ethnicity can achieve 
higher status. [dropped after pilot study] 
o Advancement in American society is possible for individuals of all ethnic 
groups. [dropped after pilot study] 
• How much discrimination or unfair treatment do you think Asians face in the 
U.S.? 
o None 
o A little 
o Some 
o A lot 
• How much discrimination or unfair treatment do you think people of color face in 
the U.S.? 
o None 
o A little 
o Some 
o A lot 
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• How much discrimination or unfair treatment do you think you have faced in the 
U.S. because of your race or ethnicity? 
o None 
o A little 
o Some 
o A lot 
 
• How much do public officials care about what Asian Americans think? 
o Not at all 
o A little 
o A moderate amount 
o A lot 
o A great deal 
• How much can Asian Americans affect what the government does? 
o Not at all 
o A little 
o A moderate amount 
o A lot 
o A great deal 
• How much do public officials care about what people of color think? 
o Not at all 
o A little 
o A moderate amount 
o A lot 
o A great deal 
• How much can people of color affect what the government does? 
o Not at all 
o A little 
o A moderate amount 
o A lot 
o A great deal 
 
• How worried are you about being treated poorly or unfairly because of COVID-
19? [not analyzed in Study 1] 
o Not at all worried 
o Somewhat worried 
o Very worried 
o Extremely worried 
 
Demographic/Control Items [pilot study & Study 1 Wave 1] 
• What is your self-identified race/ethnicity? (Please check all that apply.) 
o White 
o Hispanic or Latino 
o Black or African American 
o Asian 
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o American Indian or Alaska Native 
o Native Hawaiian and other Pacific Islander 
o Other ________ 



















o Sri Lankan 
o Taiwanese 
o Thai 
o Other Asian 
o None of the above/Not Asian 
 




• Were you born in the United States? 
o Yes 
o No 
• [if not born in U.S.] What year did you first come to live in the United States? ___ 
 




• Have you voted in a past election in the United States? 
o Yes 
o No 
o Don’t know 
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• Do you speak a language other than English on a regular basis? 
o I speak another language (not English) primarily. 
o I speak English and another language equally. 
o I speak English primarily but can speak another language. 
o I only speak English. 
 
• What is your gender? 
o Male 
o Female 
o Nonbinary or gender nonconforming 
o Other 
 
• How old are you? ___ 
 
• Which of the following is an estimate of your total household income in the past 
12 months before taxes? 
o Less than $10,000 
o $10,000 - $14,999 
o $15,000 - $19,999 
o $20,000 - $29,999 
o $30,000 - $39,999 
o $40,000 - $49,999 
o $50,000 - $59,999 
o $60,000 - $69,999 
o $70,000 - $79,999 
o $80,000 - $89,999 
o $90,000 - $99,999 
o $100,000 - $149,999 
o $150,000 - $199,999 
o More than $200,000 
 
• What is the highest level of education you have completed? 
o Less than high school 
o High school diploma or equivalent (GED) 
o Some college 
o 2 year Degree (Associate’s) 
o 4 year Degree (Bachelor’s) 
o Master’s Degree 
o Advanced Degree (PhD, DPHIL, JD, MD, DDS, etc.) 
 
• Below is a seven-point scale on which the political views that people might hold 
are arranged from extremely liberal to extremely conservative. Where would you 
place yourself on this scale? 
o Extremely liberal 
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o Liberal 
o Slightly liberal 
o Moderate; middle of the road 
o Slightly conservative 
o Conservative 
o Extremely conservative 
 
• Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Republican, a 




o Other party 
• (if Democrat) Would you call yourself a strong Democrat or a not very strong 
Democrat? 
o Strong Democrat 
o Not very strong Democrat 
• (if Republican) Would you call yourself a strong Republican or a not very strong 
Republican? 
o Strong Republican 
o Not very strong Republican 






[The political knowledge questions below were dropped after pilot study. Correct 
answers at the time of the study are in bold.] 
• Which party currently has the most members in the U.S. House of Representatives 
in Washington, D.C.? 
o Republican Party 
o Democratic Party 
• Would you say that one of the parties is more conservative than the other at the 
national level? 
o Republican Party 
o Democratic Party 
o Neither party is more conservative than the other 
• What job or political office is now held by John Roberts? 
o Chair of the Democratic National Committee 
o Senate Majority Leader 
o Chief Justice of the Supreme Court 
o Chair of the Republican National Committee 
• What job or political office is now held by Mike Pence? 
o House Minority Leader 
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o Vice President of the United States 
o Secretary of Defense 
o Secretary of State 
• How long is the term of office for a U.S. Senator? 
o 2 years 
o 4 years 
o 6 years 
o 8 years 
 
Study 2 Items 
 
Identity 
• How important is being [race (piped from demographics items)] to you? 
o Extremely important 
o Very important 
o Moderately important 
o Slightly important 
o Not at all important 
• To what extent do you think of yourself as being [race]? 
o A great deal 
o Quite a bit 
o Somewhat 
o Very little 
o Not at all 
 
• How important is being a person of color to you? 
o Extremely important 
o Very important 
o Moderately important 
o Slightly important 
o Not at all important 
• To what extent do you think of yourself as being a person of color? 
o A great deal 
o Quite a bit 
o Somewhat 
o Very little 
o Not at all 
 
• How important is being an American to you? 
o Extremely important 
o Very important 
o Moderately important 
o Slightly important 
o Not at all important 
• To what extent do you think of yourself as being an American? 
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o A great deal 
o Quite a bit 
o Somewhat 
o Very little 
o Not at all 
 




• Do you think the number of immigrants from foreign countries who are allowed 
to come to the United States to live should be increased, decreased, or kept the 
same as it is now? 
o Increased a lot 
o Increased a moderate amount 
o Increased a little 
o Kept the same as it is now 
o Decreased a little 
o Decreased a moderate amount 
o Decreased a lot 
• Do you support or oppose ending criminal penalties for people crossing the border 
illegally? 
o Strongly oppose 
o Oppose 
o Somewhat oppose 
o Neither support nor oppose 
o Somewhat support 
o Support 
o Strongly support 
 
• In general do you support or oppose the protests that have occurred in recent 
months in response to the death of George Floyd and others in the African 
American community? 
o Strongly support 
o Support 
o Somewhat support 
o Neither support nor oppose 
o Somewhat oppose 
o Oppose 
o Strongly oppose 
• How do you feel about Black Lives Matter? 
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o Very negative 
• If a criminal offense, even a drug offense, carries a "mandatory minimum" 
sentence, a judge must give the defendant at least the mandatory minimum 
sentence, even if the judge believes that the sentence is too long. Some people 
think that mandatory minimum sentences should be given in all cases where they 
apply, with no exceptions. Others say that a judge should be able to make an 
exception and give a shorter sentence (i.e., one below the mandatory minimum 
sentence) if the judge finds compelling circumstances. What do you think? 
o Mandatory minimum sentences should be given in all cases where they 
apply, with no exceptions. 
o Even where a mandatory minimum sentence applies, a judge should have 
the freedom to give a shorter sentence if the judge finds compelling 
circumstances. 
 
[Linked fate items were included for race (piped from demographics questions) and POC, 
as in Study 1.] 
 
Demographic/Control Items (Wave 1 only except partisan identity measure W1 & W3) 





o Native American 
o Middle Eastern 
o Other 
 




o Prefer not to say 
 
• We hear a lot of talk these days about liberals and conservatives. Here is a seven-
point scale on which the political views that people might hold are arranged from 
extremely liberal to extremely conservative. Where would you place yourself on 
this scale?  
o Extremely liberal 
o Liberal 
o Slightly liberal 
o Moderate; middle of the road 
o Slightly conservative 
o Conservative 
o Extremely conservative 
• [Partisan identity was measured as in Study 1.] 
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• Additional demographic information provided by YouGov 
o In what year were you born? 
o What is the highest level of education you have completed?  
▪ No HS 
▪ High school graduate 




o Which of these statements best describes you?  
▪ I am an immigrant to the USA and a naturalized citizen  
▪ I am an immigrant to the USA but not a citizen  
▪ I was born in the USA but at least one of my parents is an 
immigrant  
▪ My parents and I were born in the USA but at least one of my 
grandparents was an immigrant  
▪ My parents, grandparents and I were all born in the USA  
o Thinking back over the last year, what was your family’s annual income?  
▪ Less than $10,000 
▪ $10,000 - $19,999 
▪ $20,000 - $29,999 
▪ $30,000 - $39,999 
▪ $40,000 - $49,999 
▪ $50,000 - $59,999 
▪ $60,000 - $69,999 
▪ $70,000 - $79,999 
▪ $80,000 - $99,999 
▪ $100,000 - $119,999 
▪ $120,000 - $149,999 
▪ $150,000 - $199,999 
▪ $200,000 - $249,999 
▪ $250,000 - $349,999 
▪ $350,000 - $499,999 
▪ $500,000 or more 
▪ Prefer not to say 
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Appendix B: Panel Model Power Analyses 
To determine target sample sizes before beginning participant recruitment for 
Study 1, I did power analyses using Monte Carlo simulation in Mplus, following Muthén 
and Muthén’s (2002) guidelines and adapting code from Chapter 12 of the Mplus User’s 
Guide (Muthén and Muthén, 1998-2017). Because the CLPM is nested under the RI-
CLPM and has fewer parameters to estimate (Hamaker et al., 2015), it should not require 
as large of a sample as the RI-CLPM. Therefore, I did power analyses only for the RI-
CLPM and the longitudinal mediation model.  
For the RI-CLPM, I examined power to detect a cross-lagged effect of identity on 
attitudes of  = 0.2 when there is also a cross-lagged reverse effect of attitude on identity 
of  = 0.1. Across simulations, I assumed an intraclass correlation coefficient (ICC) of 
0.6 for group identification, based on Kessler and Mummendey’s (2002) finding that trait 
variance accounted for 58% of the variance in East Germans’ group identification over a 
year. (I used this number because it was the only available estimate of trait versus state 
variance in identification.) I varied the ICC for attitudes, which I expected to be lower for 
policy attitudes than for racial attitudes; the autoregression coefficients; and the between- 
and within-person identity-attitude covariances.  
For the longitudinal mediation model, I examined power to detect the identity-to-
mediator cross-lagged effects (a), the mediator-to-attitude cross-lagged effects (b), and 
the indirect effect of identity on attitudes (ab), adapting code from Muthén and 
Schultzberg (2017) and the chapter 12 examples from the Mplus User’s Guide to run the 
simulations. Across simulations, I set the variances of all observed variables to 1, the 
covariances among the variables in Wave 1 and the error covariances among the 
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variables in Waves 2 and 3 to 0.25, and the autoregression coefficients for identity and 
attitudes to 0.6 and 0.3, respectively. I also set the cross-lagged coefficients of identity on 
the mediator to a = 0.2 and the cross-lagged coefficients of identity on attitudes (the 
direct effect) to c = 0.1 across simulations. I varied the cross-lagged coefficient of the 
mediator on attitudes (b = 0.2 vs. b = 0.1), the existence of reverse paths (all set to b = 
0.1), the autoregression coefficient for the mediator (set at either 0.5 or 0.3), and whether 
the model assumed stationarity.  
All simulations for both models were run with 10,000 replications and sample 
sizes from 400 up to 600 or a sample size that gave approximately .80 power for the 
effect(s) of interest (i.e., the cross-lagged identity-to-attitude coefficients in the RI-CLPM 
and the a, b, and ab effects in the mediation model). For each type of model, I used two 
seeds across parameter and sample size combinations, and I set the seeds by rolling dice: 
a d6 for the number of digits (1-6) and then a d10 for the value of each digit (0-9). Details 
of the input and results are included in Tables SM1 (RI-CLPM) and SM2 (mediation 
model). 
Based on the RI-CLPM simulations, between 500 and 600 participants are needed 
to detect a cross-lagged effect of  = 0.2 with approximately power = .80. Further support 
for this sample size range comes from the fact that it is more than twice the sample size 
that Hamaker et al. (2015) used for simulations (N = 200, “which seems to be an 
acceptable sample size for a two-wave CLPM”, p. 109) and thus should be reasonable for 
my CLPM models. A sample size between 400 and 500 appears to be sufficient to detect 
a, b, and ab effects in the mediation model. As Cole and Maxwell (2003) note, however, 
there has not been much work on sample sizes and power for longitudinal mediation 
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analysis. But Wang & Xue’s (2016) simulations seem to suggest that N = 500 is 
reasonable for detecting mediation effects for 2- and 5-wave longitudinal studies that are 
more complex than my models, if the effects of X on M and M on Y are sufficiently 
large. Based on my analyses and the existing literature, I decided on a target sample size 
of 500-600 participants who complete all three waves of the study.
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Table A1 





































y n .203 .23 .663 .739 






y n .205 .243 .673 .732 




y y .244 .273 .757 .829 






y n .238 .276 .763 .821 




y y .26 .297 .793 .86 






y n .254 .301 .805 .854 




y n .292 .3 .59 .702 






y n .294 .314 .604 .694 




y n .349 .352 .682 .798 






y n .339 .358 .693 .787 




y n .279 .282 .588 .686 
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y n .282 .295 .602 .677 




y n .335 .337 .683 .786 




y n .327 .34 .697 .772 




y n .285 .29 .593 .695 






y n .288 .305 .605 .687 




y n .343 .343 .684 .792 






y n .334 .349 .698 .779 




y n .4 .39 .761 .859 






y n .391 .402 .773 .852 




y n .289 .297 .589 .701 






y n .29 .312 .601 .693 




y n .346 .35 .68 .794 






y n .335 .355 .692 .786 




y n .282 .28 .595 .692 






y n .282 .296 .608 .683 
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y n .34 .339 .689 .789 






y n .332 .344 .702 .777 




y n .291 .289 .547 .634 




y n .293 .304 .562 .624 




y y .349 .345 .638 .732 




y n .339 .349 .654 .723 




y y .406 .392 .717 .803 




y y .394 .404 .728 .801 




n n .256 .245 .557 .675 






n n .259 .258 .574 .668 




y y .308 .291 .647 .768 






y y .303 .296 .662 .762 




y y .362 .324 .724 .838 






y y .35 .335 .734 .829 




y n .38 .359 .541 .654 
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y n .384 .375 .556 .646 




y n .461 .424 .629 .751 




y n .447 .433 .643 .744 




y n .533 .485 .706 .822 




y n .512 .495 .719 .82 
 
Note: All simulations used ID-attitude cross-lagged coefficient = 0.2 (the parameter of interest), attitude-ID cross-lagged coefficient = 
0.1, identity ICC = .6. 
 
a Following Muthén and Muthén’s (2002) guidelines, the average estimate for each parameter should not differ from the actual 
parameter value by more than 10% of the actual parameter value. 
b Following Muthén and Muthén’s (2002) guidelines, the average standard error for each parameter estimate should not differ from the 
standard deviation of the estimates of that parameter over the set of replications by more than 10% of the standard deviation. For the 
parameters of interest (the cross-lagged coefficients from state identity to state attitude and vice versa), the standard error bias should 
not exceed 5% of the standard deviation. Note that most of these simulations do not meet the standard error bias criterion, and 
therefore, these power estimates might be less accurate than is ideal. 
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Table A2 
Mediation Model Power Analysis Details 


























y y 1 1 .83 1 




y y 1 1 .823 1 




y y 1 1 .823 .999 




y y .978 .974 .528 .894 




y y .978 .973 .542 .899 




y y 1 1 .826 1 
 
  




y y 1 .999 .825 .999 




y y 1 .832 .825 .809 




y y 1 .839 .825 .815 




y y 1 .806 .822 .783 




y y 1 .812 .825 .784 
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y y 1 .884 .897 .873 






y y 1 .886 .896 .873 




y y .978 .52 .53 .379 






y y .978 .518 .534 .387 




y y .993 .614 .622 .521 






y y .992 .613 .624 .529 




y y .998 .69 .704 .64 






y y .998 .688 .698 .643 




y y 1 .78 .826 .751 






y y 1 .779 .826 .752 




y y 1 .863 .897 .849 






y y 1 .862 .897 .85 




y y 1 .321 .824 .292 
 
a Following Muthén and Muthén’s (2002) guidelines, the average estimate for each parameter should not differ from the actual 
parameter value by more than 10% of the actual parameter value. 
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b Following Muthén and Muthén’s (2002) guidelines, the average standard error for each parameter estimate should not differ from the 
standard deviation of the estimates of that parameter over the set of replications by more than 10% of the standard deviation. For the 
parameters of interest (the cross-lagged coefficients from state identity to state attitude and vice versa), the standard error bias should 
not exceed 5% of the standard deviation. 
c When stationarity is assumed, average power is equal to power to detect the relevant effect from Wave 1 to Wave 2 and from Wave 2 
to Wave 3. When stationarity is not assumed, power to detect the effect from Wave 1 to Wave 2 and power to detect the effect from 
Wave 2 to Wave 3 were averaged. 
d When stationarity is assumed, ab is the product of a and b. When stationarity is not assumed, ab is the product of a from Wave 1 to 
Wave 2 and b from Wave 2 to Wave 3.  
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Appendix C: Additional Panel Model Results 
Table A3 
Study 1 Asian American Identity & Nonwhite FT Panel Model Results 
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params 17 17 149 149 149 149 20 20 
N 631 631 613 126 613 126 631 631 
CFI .962 .961 .973 .979 .972 .978 1.000 .998 
RMSEA .218 .156 .218 .204 .156 .146 .000 .046 















0.001 (1) 11.546 (5)* 
Chisq 
test 
 6.819 (4)   7.595 (4) 4.591 (4)  11.545 (4)* 
 
Note: In Study 1 tables, CLPM Model 1 = model without covariates; CLPM Model 2 = model with covariates, including foreign-born 
variable; CLPM Model 3 = model with covariates, including age of arrival in U.S. 
 
Note: Coefficients are reported as follows: unstandardized coefficient (SE)/standardized coefficient. 
 
Note: 2 for RI-CLPM without stationarity is vs. CLPM Model 1 without stationarity. Otherwise, 2 is for stationarity vs. no 
stationarity.  
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Table A4 
 
Study 1 POC Identity & Nonwhite FT Panel Model Results 







































































































































































































         
COMMON INGROUP IDENTITY AND POLITICAL SOLIDARITY 332 





































































         
params 17 17 149 149 149 149 20 20 
N 631 631 613 126 613 126 631 631 
CFI .971 .971 .978 .986 .978 .982 1.000 1.000 
RMSEA .203 .145 .206 .168 .145 .137 .000 .017 















0.144 (1) 5.951 (5) 
Chisq 
test 
 5.312 (4)   2.349 (4) 8.742 (4)+  5.807 (4) 
 
Note: Coefficients are reported as follows: unstandardized coefficient (SE)/standardized coefficient. 
 
Note: 2 for RI-CLPM without stationarity is vs. CLPM Model 1 without stationarity. Otherwise, 2 is for stationarity vs. no 
stationarity.  
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Table A5 
 
Study 1 American Identity & Nonwhite FT Panel Model Results 
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params 17 17 149 149 149 149 20 20 
N 631 631 613 126 613 126 631 631 
CFI .960 .958 .971 .977 .970 .973 1.000 1.000 
RMSEA .252 .182 .245 .237 .176 .179 .000 .000 















0.354 (1) 4.203 (5) 
Chisq 
test 
 10.928 (4)*   7.951 (4)+ 8.040 (4)+  3.849 (4) 
 
Note: Coefficients are reported as follows: unstandardized coefficient (SE)/standardized coefficient. 
 
Note: 2 for RI-CLPM without stationarity is vs. CLPM Model 1 without stationarity. Otherwise, 2 is for stationarity vs. no 
stationarity.  
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Table A6 
 
Study 1 Asian American Identity & Nonwhite Stereotypes Panel Model Results 
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params 17 17 149 149 149 149 20 20 
N 625 625 607 125 607 125 625 625 
CFI .912 .910 .936 .944 .935 .944 1.000 .995 
RMSEA .318 .227 .322 .320 .231 .225 .000 .065 
SRMR .053 .057 .019 .018 .021 .020 .004 .036 












0.390 (1) 18.267 
(5)** 
Chisq test  9.886 (4)*   11.557 (4)* 3.597 (4)  17.877 
(4)** 
 
Note: Coefficients are reported as follows: unstandardized coefficient (SE)/standardized coefficient. 
 
Note: 2 for RI-CLPM without stationarity is vs. CLPM Model 1 without stationarity. Otherwise, 2 is for stationarity vs. no 
stationarity.  
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Table A7 
 
Study 1 POC Identity & Nonwhite Stereotypes Panel Model Results 
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params 17 17 149 149 149 149 20 20 
N 625 625 607 125 607 125 625 625 
CFI .929 .928 .946 .956 .945 .955 1.000 .999 
RMSEA .306 .219 .313 .293 .224 .210 .000 .033 
SRMR .050 .052 .018 .016 .019 .019 .005 .020 












0.719 (1) 8.393 (5) 
Chisq test  8.891 (4)+   8.417 (4)+ 5.016 (4)  7.674 (4) 
 
Note: Coefficients are reported as follows: unstandardized coefficient (SE)/standardized coefficient. 
 
Note: 2 for RI-CLPM without stationarity is vs. CLPM Model 1 without stationarity. Otherwise, 2 is for stationarity vs. no 
stationarity.  
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Table A8 
 
Study 1 American Identity & Nonwhite Stereotypes Panel Model Results 
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params 17 17 149 149 149 149 20 20 
N 625 625 607 125 607 125 625 625 
CFI .921 .917 .941 .943 .939 .945 1.000 .997 
RMSEA .341 .248 .341 .360 .245 .250 .000 .063 
SRMR .050 .056 .018 .016 .020 .018 .001 .032 












0.017 (1) 17.445 
(5)** 
Chisq test  19.065 
(4)*** 
  13.570 
(4)** 
1.937 (4)  17.428 
(4)** 
 
Note: Coefficients are reported as follows: unstandardized coefficient (SE)/standardized coefficient. 
 
Note: 2 for RI-CLPM without stationarity is vs. CLPM Model 1 without stationarity. Otherwise, 2 is for stationarity vs. no 
stationarity.  
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Table A9 
 
Study 1 Asian American Identity & White FT Panel Model Results 
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params 17 17 149 149 149 149 20 20 
N 627 627 609 124 609 124 627 627 
CFI .937 .929 .956 .954 .952 .949 1.000 .993 
RMSEA .272 .204 .269 .284 .199 .213 .000 .079 





















  20.871 
(4)*** 
8.673 (4)+  24.318 
(4)*** 
 
Note: Coefficients are reported as follows: unstandardized coefficient (SE)/standardized coefficient. 
 
Note: 2 for RI-CLPM without stationarity is vs. CLPM Model 1 without stationarity. Otherwise, 2 is for stationarity vs. no 
stationarity.  
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Table A10 
 
Study 1 POC Identity & White FT Panel Model Results 





















































































































































































































         






































































         
params 17 17 149 149 149 149 20 20 
N 627 627 609 124 609 124 627 627 
CFI .945 .945 .960 .963 .960 .956 .999 1.000 
RMSEA .269 .190 .271 .262 .191 .203 .066 .023 















3.728 (1)+ 6.651 (5) 
Chisq 
test 
 3.574 (4)   3.762 (4) 10.962 (4)*  2.923 (4) 
 
Note: Coefficients are reported as follows: unstandardized coefficient (SE)/standardized coefficient. 
Note: 2 for RI-CLPM without stationarity is vs. CLPM Model 1 without stationarity. Otherwise, 2 is for stationarity vs. no 
stationarity.  
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Table A11 
 
Study 1 American Identity & White FT Panel Model Results 
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params 17 17 149 149 149 149 20 20 
N 627 627 609 124 609 124 627 987 
CFI .944 .944 .960 .960 .959 .959 1.000 1.000 
RMSEA .293 .208 .285 .302 .203 .216 .000 .007 















0.110 (1) 5.156 (5) 
Chisq 
test 
 7.050 (4)   6.616 (4) 5.069 (4)  5.046 (4) 
 
Note: Coefficients are reported as follows: unstandardized coefficient (SE)/standardized coefficient. 
 
Note: 2 for RI-CLPM without stationarity is vs. CLPM Model 1 without stationarity. Otherwise, 2 is for stationarity vs. no 
stationarity.  
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Table A12 
 
Study 1 Asian American Identity & White Stereotypes Panel Model Results 













































































































































































































         






























































         
params 17 17 149 149 149 149 20 20 
N 632 632 614 126 614 126 632 632 
CFI .939 .936 .959 .967 .958 .967 1.000 .996 
RMSEA .242 .175 .240 .232 .172 .163 .000 .054 
SRMR .048 .051 .017 .014 .018 .018 .004 .033 












0.257 (1) 14.349 (5)* 
Chisq test  10.677 (4)*   9.024 (4)+ 3.645 (4)  14.092 
(4)** 
 
Note: Coefficients are reported as follows: unstandardized coefficient (SE)/standardized coefficient. 
 
Note: 2 for RI-CLPM without stationarity is vs. CLPM Model 1 without stationarity. Otherwise, 2 is for stationarity vs. no 
stationarity.  
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Table A13 
 
Study 1 POC Identity & White Stereotypes Panel Model Results 
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params 17 17 149 149 149 149 20 20 
N 632 632 614 126 614 126 632 632 
CFI .950 .950 .965 .975 .965 .973 .999 .997 
RMSEA .235 .166 .235 .208 .165 .153 .054 .049 
SRMR .045 .046 .016 .013 .017 .017 .014 .028 












2.874 (1)+ 12.616 (5)* 
Chisq test  3.902 (4)   2.393 (4) 5.681 (4)  9.742 (4)* 
 
Note: Coefficients are reported as follows: unstandardized coefficient (SE)/standardized coefficient. 
 
Note: 2 for RI-CLPM without stationarity is vs. CLPM Model 1 without stationarity. Otherwise, 2 is for stationarity vs. no 
stationarity.  
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Table A14 
 
Study 1 American Identity & White Stereotypes Panel Model Results 















































































































































































































         



































































         
params 17 17 149 149 149 149 20 20 
N 632 632 614 126 614 126 632 632 
CFI .946 .945 .962 .974 .963 .971 1.000 1.000 
RMSEA .266 .189 .258 .234 .181 .174 .026 .012 
SRMR .043 .045 .016 .010 .016 .017 .011 .020 












1.427 (1) 5.476 (5) 
Chisq test  6.398 (4)   2.743 (4) 6.825 (4)  5.049 (4) 
 
Note: Coefficients are reported as follows: unstandardized coefficient (SE)/standardized coefficient. 
 
Note: 2 for RI-CLPM without stationarity is vs. CLPM Model 1 without stationarity. Otherwise, 2 is for stationarity vs. no 
stationarity.  
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Table A15 
 
Study 1 Asian American Identity & Immigration Attitudes Panel Model Results 





















































































































































































































         





































































         
params 17 17 149 149 149 149 20 20 
N 630 630 612 124 612 124 630 630 
CFI .812 .811 .839 .841 .839 .839 1.000 .999 
RMSEA .787 .557 .790 .808 .560 .574 .000 .048 
SRMR .021 .026 .008 .007 .010 .013 .002 .026 












0.103 (1) 12.244 (5)* 
Chisq test  7.983 (4)+   7.706 (4) 7.408 (4)  12.141 (4)* 
 
Note: Coefficients are reported as follows: unstandardized coefficient (SE)/standardized coefficient. 
 
Note: 2 for RI-CLPM without stationarity is vs. CLPM Model 1 without stationarity. Otherwise, 2 is for stationarity vs. no 
stationarity. 
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a Starting values from OLS. 
b Starting values from failed CLPM w/ stationarity (W1-W2 estimates). 
c Starting values from OLS (all coefficients, both time lags) 
d Starting values from OLS (all coefficients, both time lags). 
e Starting values from failed CLPM w/ stationarity (a1, b1, a2, & b2, both time lags). 
f Starting values from failed CLPM w/ stationarity (a1, b1, a2, & b2, both time lags). 
g Negative variance (cimmig_w3 var = -.000, SE = .000, n.s.). No longer converges if fix negative variance to 0. 
h Negative variance (cimmig_w3 var = -.000, SE = .000, n.s.). If fix negative variance to 0, warning that covariance matrix of latent 
variables is not positive definite. Estimates from model with negative variance (to be comparable to model without stationarity).  
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Table A16 
 
Study 1 POC Identity & Immigration Attitudes Panel Model Results 
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params 17 17 149 149 149 149 20 20 
N 630 630 612 124 612 124 630 630 
CFI .824 .824 .848 .847 .848 .847 1.000 1.000 
RMSEA .783 .553 .787 .800 .556 .565 .000 .022 
SRMR .014 .017 .005 .005 .006 .007 .006 .012 












0.910 (1) 6.471 (5) 




Note: Coefficients are reported as follows: unstandardized coefficient (SE)/standardized coefficient. 
Note: 2 for RI-CLPM without stationarity is vs. CLPM Model 1 without stationarity. Otherwise, 2 is for stationarity vs. no 
stationarity. 
 
a Starting values from OLS (all coefficients, W1-W2). 
b Starting values from failed CLPM w/ stationarity (a1, b1, a2, & b2, both time lags). 
c Negative variance (cimmig_w3 var = -.000, SE = .000, n.s.). No longer converges if fix negative variance to 0.  
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Table A17 
 
Study 1 American Identity & Immigration Attitudes Panel Model Results 
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params 17 17 149 149 149 149 20 20 
N 630 630 612 124 612 124 630 630 
CFI .825 .825 .850 .850 .850 .850 1.000 1.000 
RMSEA .797 .563 .797 .827 .564 .584 .019 .000 
SRMR .014 .016 .005 .004 .005 .006 .005 .006 












1.227 (1) 2.276 (5) 




Note: Coefficients are reported as follows: unstandardized coefficient (SE)/standardized coefficient. 
 
Note: 2 for RI-CLPM without stationarity is vs. CLPM Model 1 without stationarity. Otherwise, 2 is for stationarity vs. no 
stationarity. 
 
a Starting values from failed CLPM w/ stationarity (a1, b1, a2, & b2, W1-W2 only). 
b Negative variance (cimmig_w3 var = -.000, SE = .000, n.s.). If fix negative variance to 0, warning that covariance matrix of latent 
variables is not positive definite. Estimates from model with negative variance (to be comparable to model without stationarity).  
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Table A18 
 
Study 1 Asian American Identity & Criminal Justice Attitudes (continuous indicators) Panel Model Results 
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params 17 17 149 149 149 149 20 20 
N 628 628 610 125 610 125 628 628 
CFI .969 .968 .976 .975 .976 .976 1.000 .998 
RMSEA .263 .188 .255 .275 .182 .192 .000 .052 
SRMR .021 .026 .008 .007 .010 .011 .003 .026 












0.204 (1) 13.622 (5)* 
Chisq test  6.806 (4)   6.743 (4) 3.201 (4)  13.418 
(4)** 
 
Note: Coefficients are reported as follows: unstandardized coefficient (SE)/standardized coefficient. 
 
Note: 2 for RI-CLPM without stationarity is vs. CLPM Model 1 without stationarity. Otherwise, 2 is for stationarity vs. no 
stationarity.  
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Table A19 
 
Study 1 Asian American Identity & Criminal Justice Attitudes (categorical indicator) Panel Model Results 
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params 17 17 149 149 149 149 19 20 
N 628 628 610 125 610 125 628 628 
CFI .981 .980 .985 .986 .985 .987 1.000 .999 
RMSEA .231 .165 .225 .224 .160 .154 .000 .052 
SRMR .021 .026 .008 .007 .009 .011 .006 .026 












1.328 (2) 16.088 (6)* 
Chisq test  6.967 (4)   5.897 (4) 2.825 (4)  14.760 (4)** 
 
Note: Coefficients are reported as follows: unstandardized coefficient (SE)/standardized coefficient. 
 
Note: 2 for RI-CLPM without stationarity is vs. CLPM Model 1 without stationarity. Otherwise, 2 is for stationarity vs. no 
stationarity. 
 
a Did not converge initially. Converges if set ccrim2_w2 var = 0, but warning: covariance matrix of latent variables is not positive 
definite. Estimates from model fixing negative variance to 0. 
b Negative variance (ccrim2_w2 var = -.000, SE = .000, n.s.). If fix negative variance to 0, warning that covariance matrix of latent 
variables is not positive definite. Estimates from model fixing negative variance to 0.  
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Table A20 
 
Study 1 POC Identity & Criminal Justice Attitudes (continuous indicators) Panel Model Results 
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params 17 17 149 149 149 149 20 20 
N 628 628 610 125 610 125 628 628 
CFI .973 .973 .979 .980 .980 .982 1.000 1.000 
RMSEA .253 .179 .245 .248 .173 .168 .021 .000 
SRMR .015 .017 .005 .005 .006 .007 .006 .011 












1.265 (1) 4.548 (5) 
Chisq test  4.081 (4)   2.940 (4) 1.501 (4)  3.283 (4) 
 
 
Note: Coefficients are reported as follows: unstandardized coefficient (SE)/standardized coefficient. 
 
Note: 2 for RI-CLPM without stationarity is vs. CLPM Model 1 without stationarity. Otherwise, 2 is for stationarity vs. no 
stationarity.  
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Table A21 
 
Study 1 POC Identity & Criminal Justice Attitudes (categorical indicator) Panel Model Results 











































































































































































































         































































         
params 17 17 149 149 149 149 19 20 
N 628 628 610 125 610 125 628 628 
CFI .984 .984 .987 .991 .987 .992 1.000 1.000 
RMSEA .220 .155 .214 .182 .150 .118 .012 .013 
SRMR .014 .016 .005 .005 .006 .007 .006 .009 












2.196 (2) 6.615 (6) 
Chisq test  3.452 (4)   1.888 (4) 1.508 (4)  4.419 (4) 
 
Note: Coefficients are reported as follows: unstandardized coefficient (SE)/standardized coefficient. 
Note: 2 for RI-CLPM without stationarity is vs. CLPM Model 1 without stationarity. Otherwise, 2 is for stationarity vs. no 
stationarity. 
 
a Starting values from OLS (lagged & cross-lagged coefficients, both lags). 
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b Did not converge initially. Converges if set ccrim2_w2 var = 0, but warning: covariance matrix of latent variables is not positive 
definite. Estimates from model fixing negative variance to 0. 
c Negative variance (ccrim2_w2 var = -.000, SE = .000, n.s.). If fix negative variance to 0, warning that covariance matrix of latent 
variables is not positive definite. Estimates from model fixing negative variance to 0.  
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Table A22 
 
Study 1 American Identity & Criminal Justice Attitudes (continuous indicators) Panel Model Results 
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params 17 17 149 149 149 149 20 20 
N 628 628 610 125 610 125 628 628 
CFI .966 .966 .975 .973 .975 .974 1.000 1.000 
RMSEA .293 .208 .278 .307 .196 .215 .000 .000 
SRMR .014 .018 .005 .004 .005 .006 .001 .005 












0.037 (1) 1.980 (5) 
Chisq test  6.356 (4)   2.527 (4) 3.119 (4)  1.943 (4) 
 
Note: Coefficients are reported as follows: unstandardized coefficient (SE)/standardized coefficient. 
 
Note: 2 for RI-CLPM without stationarity is vs. CLPM Model 1 without stationarity. Otherwise, 2 is for stationarity vs. no 
stationarity.  
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Table A23 
 
Study 1 American Identity & Criminal Justice Attitudes (categorical indicator) Panel Model Results 
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params 17 17 149 149 149 149 20 20 
N 628 628 610 125 610 125 628 628 
CFI .978 .978 .983 .983 .983 .984  1.000 
RMSEA .264 .187 .250 .260 .176 .179  .000 
SRMR .014 .017 .005 .004 .005 .005  .006 












 5.043 (6) 
Chisq test  4.990 (4)   1.915 (4) 2.262 (4)   
 
Note: Coefficients are reported as follows: unstandardized coefficient (SE)/standardized coefficient. 
Note: 2 for RI-CLPM without stationarity is vs. CLPM Model 1 without stationarity. Otherwise, 2 is for stationarity vs. no 
stationarity. 
 
a Starting values from OLS (lagged & cross-lagged coefficients, both lags). 
b Did not converge initially. Constraining ccrim2_w2 var = 0 converged with a different negative residual variance. Estimates are from 
original model. 
c Negative variance (ccrim2_w2 var = -.000, SE = .000, n.s.). If fix negative variance to 0, warning that covariance matrix of latent 
variables is not positive definite. Estimates from model fixing negative variance to 0.  
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Table A24 
 
Study 1 Asian American Identity & Affirmative Action Attitudes Panel Model Results 
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params 17 17 149 149 149 149 20 20 
N 632 632 614 126 614 126 632 632 
CFI .936 .934 .960 .959 .959 .959 1.000 .997 
RMSEA .289 .206 .270 .273 .193 .194 .000 .054 















0.766 (1) 14.321 (5)* 
Chisq 
test 
 7.863 (4)+   8.251 (4)+ 4.321 (4)  13.555 
(4)** 
 
Note: Coefficients are reported as follows: unstandardized coefficient (SE)/standardized coefficient. 
 
Note: 2 for RI-CLPM without stationarity is vs. CLPM Model 1 without stationarity. Otherwise, 2 is for stationarity vs. no 
stationarity.  
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Table A25 
 
Study 1 POC Identity & Affirmative Action Attitudes Panel Model Results 












































































































































































































         




































































         
params 17 17 149 149 149 149 20 20 
N 632 632 614 126 614 126 632 632 
CFI .949 .946 .966 .967 .964 .968 .999 .999 
RMSEA .277 .201 .261 .253 .189 .177 .055 .028 




















  13.297 
(4)** 
3.299 (4)  4.554 (4) 
 
Note: Coefficients are reported as follows: unstandardized coefficient (SE)/standardized coefficient. 
 
Note: 2 for RI-CLPM without stationarity is vs. CLPM Model 1 without stationarity. Otherwise, 2 is for stationarity vs. no 
stationarity.  
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Table A26 
 
Study 1 American Identity & Affirmative Action Attitudes Panel Model Results 
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params 17 17 149 149 149 149 20 20 
N 632 632 614 126 614 126 632 632 
CFI .940 .939 .962 .965 .962 .965 1.000 .999 
RMSEA .311 .223 .287 .284 .203 .200 .033 .026 















1.700 (1) 7.171 (5) 
Chisq 
test 
 11.326 (4)*   4.790 (4) 3.460 (4)  5.471 (4) 
 
Note: Coefficients are reported as follows: unstandardized coefficient (SE)/standardized coefficient. 
 
Note: 2 for RI-CLPM without stationarity is vs. CLPM Model 1 without stationarity. Otherwise, 2 is for stationarity vs. no 
stationarity.
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Table A27 
 
Study 2 Racial Identity & Nonwhite FT Panel Model Results, Black Participants 






















































































































































































       
CFI .930 .928 .943 .942 1.000 1.000 
RMSEA .231 .165 .227 .162 .030 .000 
SRMR .040 .047 .020 .023 .010 .015 








1.576 (1) 4.234 (5) 
Chisq test  7.325 (4)  6.462 (4)  2.658 (4) 
 
Note: N = 658 for all models.  
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Table A28 
 
Study 2 Racial Identity & Nonwhite FT Panel Model Results, Latino Participants 














































































































































































       
CFI .926 .927 .945 .944 1.000 .995 
RMSEA .203 .143 .200 .143 .030 .047 
SRMR .044 .050 .023 .026 .015 .034 








1.252 (1) 7.957 (5) 
Chisq test  3.528 (4)  4.825 (4)  6.705 (4) 
 
Note: N = 272 for all models.  
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Table A29 
 
Study 2 POC Identity & Nonwhite FT Panel Model Results, Black Participants 






















































































































































































       
CFI .947 .943 .955 .953 .999 .997 
RMSEA .201 .147 .201 .146 .046 .042 
SRMR .035 .042 .018 .021 .011 .023 








2.399 (1) 10.708 
(5)+ 







Note: N = 658 for all models.  
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Table A30 
 
Study 2 POC Identity & Nonwhite FT Panel Model Results, Latino Participants 






















































































































































































       
CFI .854 .849 .898 .893 1.000 .993 
RMSEA .272 .195 .267 .194 .000 .052 
SRMR .063 .076 .032 .039 .009 .042 








0.412 (1) 8.617 (5) 





Note: N = 272 for all models  
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Table A31 
 
Study 2 American Identity & Nonwhite FT Panel Model Results, Black Participants 
















































































































































































       
CFI .930 .926 .946 .945 .997 .998 
RMSEA .241 .175 .229 .164 .101 .035 
SRMR .039 .050 .018 .022 .021 .022 











Chisq test  12.911 
(4)* 
 7.244 (4)  1.375 (4) 
 
Note: N = 658 for all models.  
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Table A32 
 
Study 2 American Identity & Nonwhite FT Panel Model Results, Latino Participants 
































































































































































       
CFI .896 .875 .924 .906 1.000 .993 
RMSEA .254 .197 .255 .201 .000 .061 
SRMR .050 .076 .027 .037 .004 .045 



















Note: N = 272 for all models.  
COMMON INGROUP IDENTITY AND POLITICAL SOLIDARITY 385 
Table A33 
 
Study 2 Racial Identity & White FT Panel Model Results, Black Participants 






































































































































































       
CFI .910 .910 .928 .929 .999 1.000 
RMSEA .243 .171 .240 .169 .055 .000 
SRMR .049 .051 .025 .026 .013 .018 












Chisq test  2.803 (4)  3.539 (4)  1.870 
(4) 
 
Note: N = 658 for all models.  
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Table A34 
 
Study 2 Racial Identity & White FT Panel Model Results, Latino Participants 






































































































































































       
CFI .973 .973 .982 .982 1.000 1.000 
RMSEA .114 .081 .108 .077 .000 .000 
SRMR .032 .044 .015 .020 .004 .025 











Chisq test  3.931 (4)  4.169 (4)  3.798 (4) 
 
Note: N = 272 for all models.  
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Table A35 
 
Study 2 POC Identity & White FT Panel Model Results, Black Participants 






































































































































































       
CFI .928 .929 .941 .942 .998 .998 
RMSEA .217 .152 .217 .152 .079 .034 
SRMR .045 .046 .023 .024 .016 .022 












Chisq test  1.679 (4)  2.292 (4)  3.751 
(4) 
 
Note: N = 658 for all models.  
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Table A36 
 
Study 2 POC Identity & White FT Panel Model Results, Latino Participants 






































































































































































       
CFI .883 .881 .927 .926 1.000 1.000 
RMSEA .218 .156 .212 .151 .000 .000 
SRMR .056 .070 .028 .035 .003 .024 











Chisq test  5.085 (4)  4.865 (4)  2.176 (4) 
 
Note: N = 272 for all models.   
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Table A37 
 
Study 2 American Identity & White FT Panel Model Results, Black Participants 
















































































































































































       
CFI .918 .916 .936 .936 .999 .999 
RMSEA .247 .177 .239 .168 .052 .029 
SRMR .047 .051 .023 .024 .013 .021 











Chisq test  7.027(4)  2.952 (4)  4.927 (4) 
 
Note: N = 658 for all models.  
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Table A38 
 
Study 2 American Identity & White FT Panel Model Results, Latino Participants 
















































































































































































       
CFI .938 .913 .956 .934 1.000 .994 
RMSEA .187 .157 .187 .161 .000 .052 
SRMR .041 .071 .020 .033 .008 .040 


















Note: N = 272 for all models.  
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Table A39 
 
Study 2 Racial Identity & Immigration Attitudes (number of immigrants) Panel Model 
Results, Black Participants 
 





































































































































































































       
CFI .899 .900 .921 .922 1.000 1.000 
RMSEA .256 .180 .252 .177 .000 .012 
SRMR .055 .056 .027 .028 .005 .017 
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0.367 (1) 5.466 (5) 
Chisq test  2.618 (4)  1.969 (4)  5.079 (4) 
 
Note: N = 658 for all models.  
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Table A40 
 
Study 2 Racial Identity & Immigration Attitudes (number of immigrants) Panel Model 
Results, Latino Participants 
 












































































































































































       
CFI .908 .901 .931 .922 1.000 .991 
RMSEA .226 .165 .233 .175 .000 .064 
SRMR .049 .061 .025 .033 .003 .046 

















Note: N = 272 for all models.  
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Table A41 
 
Study 2 Racial Identity & Immigration Attitudes (ending criminal penalties) Panel Model 
Results, Black Participants 
 












































































































































































       
CFI .901 .901 .926 .925 1.000 1.000 
RMSEA .203 .143 .203 .144 .019 .000 
SRMR .054 .055 .028 .028 .013 .015 












Chisq test  3.705 (4)  4.641 (4)  2.630 
(4) 
 
Note: N = 658 for all models.  
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Table A42 
 
Study 2 Racial Identity & Immigration Attitudes (ending criminal penalties) Panel Model 
Results, Latino Participants 






























































































































































































CFI .952 .956 .966 .968 1.000 1.000 
RMSEA .127 .086 .129 .089 .000 .000 
SRMR .042 .050 .022 .026 .019 .025 












Chisq test  2.535 (4)  2.930 (4)  1.391 
(4) 
 
Note: N = 272 for all models.  
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Table A43 
 
Study 2 POC Identity & Immigration Attitudes (number of immigrants) Panel Model 
Results, Black Participants 


































































































































































































       
CFI .921 .919 .936 .936 1.000 .998 
RMSEA .226 .161 .226 .160 .000 .031 
SRMR .050 .053 .025 .026 .007 .023 








0.881 (1) 8.258 (5) 
Chisq test  6.474 (4)  4.666 (4)  7.377 (4) 
Note: N = 658 for all models.  
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Table A44 
 
Study 2 POC Identity & Immigration Attitudes (number of immigrants) Panel Model 
Results, Latino Participants 


















































































































































































       
CFI .850 .843 .893 .882 1.000 .994 
RMSEA .275 .200 .284 .211 .009 .050 
SRMR .065 .077 .033 .042 .014 .041 











Chisq test  8.265 (4)+  13.124 (4)*  7.427 (4) 
Note: N = 272 for all models.  
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Table A45 
 
Study 2 POC Identity & Immigration Attitudes (ending criminal penalties) Panel Model 
Results, Black Participants 
 












































































































































































       
CFI .931 .933 .946 .946 1.000 1.000 
RMSEA .167 .116 .172 .122 .000 .000 
SRMR .049 .050 .026 .026 .002 .013 












Chisq test  1.940 (4)  3.714 (4)  2.679 
(4) 
 
Note: N = 658 for all models.  
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Table A46 
 
Study 2 POC Identity & Immigration Attitudes (ending criminal penalties) Panel Model 
Results, Latino Participants 
 












































































































































































       
CFI .810 .806 .880 .874 1.000 1.000 
RMSEA .231 .165 .238 .172 .000 .000 
SRMR .063 .075 .033 .040 .014 .034 












Chisq test  4.969 (4)  6.807 (4)  4.460 
(4) 
 
Note: N = 272 for all models.  
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Table A47 
 
Study 2 American Identity & Immigration Attitudes (number of immigrants) Panel Model 
Results, Black Participants 
 












































































































































































       
CFI .897 .895 .924 .923 1.000 1.000 
RMSEA .266 .190 .254 .181 .000 .000 
SRMR .055 .058 .026 .027 .001 .014 












Chisq test  7.016 (4)  6.498 (4)  3.966 
(4) 
 
Note: N = 658 for all models.  
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Table A48 
 
Study 2 American Identity & Immigration Attitudes (number of immigrants) Panel Model 
Results, Latino Participants 
































































































































































































       
CFI .895 .884 .917 .902 1.000 .991 
RMSEA .257 .192 .275 .211 .000 .067 
SRMR .053 .087 .028 .044 .012 .043 








0.867 (1) 11.122 
(5)* 






Note: N = 272 for all models.  
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Table A49 
 
Study 2 American Identity & Immigration Attitudes (ending criminal penalties) Panel 
Model Results, Black Participants 
 












































































































































































       
CFI .899 .894 .929 .926 1.000 1.000 
RMSEA .218 .158 .209 .151 .000 .000 
SRMR .052 .056 .026 .027 .007 .018 



















Note: N = 658 for all models.  
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Table A50 
 
Study 2 American Identity & Immigration Attitudes (ending criminal penalties) Panel 
Model Results, Latino Participants 
 












































































































































































       
CFI .925 .913 .946 .941 1.000 1.000 
RMSEA .172 .131 .181 .134 .000 .001 
SRMR .045 .064 .025 .029 .010 .039 












Chisq test  9.167 
(4)+ 
 7.535 (4)  4.797 
(4) 
 
Note: N = 272 for all models  
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Table A51 
 
Study 2 Racial Identity & Criminal Justice Attitudes (BLM/protests) Panel Model Results, 
Black Participants 
 





















































































































































































       
CFI .949 .949 .959 .958 1.000 .998 
RMSEA .229 .162 .223 .159 .000 .037 
SRMR .035 .038 .018 .020 .002 .022 








0.113 (1) 9.390 
(5)+ 
Chisq test  4.165 (4)  6.392 (4)  9.277 
(4)+ 
 
Note: N = 658 for all models  
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Table A52 
 
Study 2 Racial Identity & Criminal Justice Attitudes (BLM/protests) Panel Model Results, 
Latino Participants 













































































































































































       
CFI .938 .932 .958 .958 1.000 1.000 
RMSEA .238 .176 .224 .159 .000 .000 
SRMR .024 .047 .012 .018 .001 .017 











Chisq test  9.955 (4)*  4.811 (4)  2.261 (4) 
 
Note: N = 272 for all models. 
 
a Warning: some estimated lv variances are negative (fcrimcompw2).  
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Table A53 
 
Study 2 Racial Identity & Criminal Justice Attitudes (mandatory minimum sentence, 
continuous) Panel Model Results, Black Participants 
 





















































































































































































       
CFI .888 .884 .919 .916 1.000 .998 
RMSEA .231 .167 .227 .163 .000 .024 
SRMR .064 .068 .031 .033 .005 .024 








0.247 (1) 6.966 (5) 




 6.719 (4) 
 
Note: N = 658 for all models.  
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Table A54 
 
Study 2 Racial Identity & Criminal Justice Attitudes (mandatory minimum sentence, 
categorical) Panel Model Results, Black Participants 
 
  CLPM CLPM stat CLPM w/ 
cont 
CLPM w/ 
cont stata, b 
racial ID 
w2 








crim1 w1 .002 (.011) .014 (.007)* .007 (.012) .016 (.007)* 
crim1 w2 ID w1 .286 (.216) .365 (.146)* .249 (.225) .275 (.158)+ 


















crim1 w2 .021 
(.008)** 
.014 (.007)* .020 (.008)* .016 (.007)* 
crim1 w3 ID w2 .411 (.228)+ .365 (.146)* .266 (.246) .275 (.158)+ 










    
W1 ID-attitude 
covariance 
.034 (.014)* .027 (.013)* .033 (.014)* .030 (.013)* 
W2 ID-attitude 
covariance 
-.014 (.011) -.019 (.013) -.013 (.011) -.014 (.012) 
W3 ID-attitude 
covariance 
-.010 (.009) -.003 (.010) -.006 (.009) -.005 (.009) 
     
CFI .967/.865 .968/ .893 .983/.924 .984/ .935 
RMSEA .109/.174 .075/ .109 .095/.165 .066/ .108 
SRMR .157 .157 .072 .068 
















Chisq test  2.425 (4)  3.694 (4) 
 
Note: N = 658 for all models. 
 
Note: Reported CFI, RMSEA, and 2 values are non-robust/robust. 
 
a Warning: trouble constructing W matrix. 
b Warning: variance-covariance matrix of estimated parameters doesn’t appear to be 
positive definite. Smallest eigenvalue close to 0.  
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Table A55 
 
Study 2 Racial Identity & Criminal Justice Attitudes (mandatory minimum sentence, 
continuous) Panel Model Results, Latino Participants 
 













































































































































































       
CFI .964 .966 .977 .976 1.000 1.000 
RMSEA .115 .080 .113 .081 .000 .000 
SRMR .040 .051 .019 .024 .013 .023 











Chisq test  3.560 (4)  4.323 (4)  1.446 (4) 
 
Note: N = 272 for all models.  
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Table A56 
 
Study 2 Racial Identity & Criminal Justice Attitudes (mandatory minimum sentence, 
categorical) Panel Model Results, Latino Participants 
 






ID w1 .799 (.071)*** .854 
(.051)*** 




-.032 (.028) -.016 (.017) -.063 (.032)+ -.029 (.018) 
crim1 
w2 
ID w1 -.675 (.405)+ -.472 (.261)+ -.754 (.428)+ -.593 (.281)* 
crim1 
w1 
.714 (.089)*** .613 
(.038)*** 




ID w2 .926 (.087)*** .854 
(.051)*** 




.000 (.021) -.016 (.017) -.002 (.020) -.029 (.018) 
crim1 
w3 
ID w2 -.461 (.449) -.472 (.261)+ -.773 (.470) -.593 (.281)* 
crim1 
w2 
.529 (.063)*** .613 
(.038)*** 




    
W1 ID-attitude 
covariance 
.013 (.024) .005 (.024) .014 (.024) .002 (.024) 
W2 ID-attitude 
covariance 
-.005 (.029) -.015 (.032) .007 (.029) -.007 (.029) 
W3 ID-attitude 
covariance 
-.016 (.020) -.005 (.026) -.020 (.019) -.012 (.023) 
     
CFI .996/.946 1.000/ .970 .999/.951 1.000/ .963 
RMSEA .037/.105 .000/ .056 .016/.119 .005/ .073 
SRMR .155 .153 .079 .067 








Chisq test  2.316 (4)  3.755 (4) 
 
Note: N = 272 for all models. 
 
Note: Reported CFI, RMSEA, and 2 values are non-robust/robust. 
 
a Warning: trouble constructing W matrix.  
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Table A57 
 
Study 2 POC Identity & Criminal Justice Attitudes (BLM/protests) Panel Model Results, 
Black Participants 
 





















































































































































































       
CFI .958 .958 .966 .966 1.000 1.000 
RMSEA .205 .146 .201 .143 .000 .010 
SRMR .030 .031 .015 .016 .001 .015 








0.007 (1) 5.345 (5) 
Chisq test  5.467 (4)  4.991 (4)  5.338 (4) 
 
Note: N = 658 for all models.  
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Table A58 
 
Study 2 POC Identity & Criminal Justice Attitudes (BLM/protests) Panel Model Results, 
Latino Participants 
 





















































































































































































       
CFI .903 .892 .931 .928 .998 1.000 
RMSEA .295 .221 .286 .207 .093 .000 
SRMR .050 .073 .026 .032 .027 .036 















 1.317 (4) 
 
Note: N = 272 for all models. 
 
a Warning: some estimated lv variances are negative (fcrimcompw2).  
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Table A59 
 
Study 2 POC Identity & Criminal Justice Attitudes (mandatory minimum sentence, 
continuous) Panel Model Results, Black Participants 
 













































































































































































       
CFI .918 .916 .940 .938 1.000 .998 
RMSEA .196 .140 .194 .140 .000 .030 
SRMR .059 .063 .028 .030 .003 .024 








0.086 (1) 7.966 
(5) 
Chisq test  6.873 (4)  7.582 (4)  7.880 
(4)+ 
 
Note: N = 658 for all models.  
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Table A60 
 
Study 2 POC Identity & Criminal Justice Attitudes (mandatory minimum sentence, 
categorical) Panel Model Results, Black Participants 
 
  CLPM CLPM stat CLPM w/ 
cont 
CLPM w/ 
cont stata, b 
POC 
ID w2 
ID w1 .793 (.033)*** .833 (.024)*** .757 (.030)*** .819 (.023)*** 
crim1 
w1 
.001 (.012) .005 (.007) .003 (.013) .008 (.008) 
crim1 
w2 
ID w1 .104 (.219) .184 (.141) .053 (.226) .084 (.151) 
crim1 
w1 
.659 (.060)*** .618 (.023)*** .687 (.071)*** .592 (.028)*** 
POC 
ID w3 
ID w2 .867 (.043)*** .833 (.024)*** .874 (.043)*** .819 (.023)*** 
crim1 
w2 
.008 (.009) .005 (.007) .009 (.009) .008 (.008) 
crim1 
w3 
ID w2 .253 (.216) .184 (.141) .082 (.232) .084 (.151) 
crim1 
w2 
.584 (.037)*** .618 (.023)*** .530 (.039)*** .592 (.028)*** 
ID-attitude trait 
covariance 
    
W1 ID-attitude 
covariance 
.036 (.014)* .033 (.013)* .035 (.014)* .034 (.014)* 
W2 ID-attitude 
covariance 
.006 (.012) .003 (.013) .005 (.012) .005 (.012) 
W3 ID-attitude 
covariance 
-.006 (.009) -.001 (.011) -.000 (.009) -.000 (.010) 
     
CFI .967/.865 .970/ .899 .984/.925 .984/ .937 
RMSEA .108/.173 .073/ .106 .093/.163 .064/ .106 
SRMR .159 .158 .073 .069 








Chisq test  1.400 (4)  3.352 (4) 
 
Note: N = 658 for all models. 
 
Note: Reported CFI, RMSEA, and 2 values are non-robust/robust. 
 
a Warning: trouble constructing W matrix. 
b Warning: variance-covariance matrix of estimated parameters doesn’t appear to be 
positive definite. Smallest eigenvalue close to 0.  
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Table A61 
 
Study 2 POC Identity & Criminal Justice Attitudes (mandatory minimum sentence, 
continuous) Panel Model Results, Latino Participants 
 













































































































































































       
CFI .853 .844 .914 .912 1.000 .995 
RMSEA .211 .154 .211 .151 .000 .036 
SRMR .059 .075 .030 .037 .014 .046 












Chisq test  7.199 (4)  5.025 (4)  6.234 
(4) 
 
Note: N = 272 for all models.  
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Table A62 
 
Study 2 POC Identity & Criminal Justice Attitudes (mandatory minimum sentence, 
categorical) Panel Model Results, Latino Participants 
 






ID w1 .717 (.070)*** .847 
(.068)*** 
.654 (.064)*** .805 (.060)*** 
crim1 
w1 
-.009 (.029) -.015 (.019) -.054 (.034) -.035 (.021)+ 
crim1 
w2 
ID w1 -.514 (.282)+ -.215 (.206) -.307 (.298) -.305 (.219) 
crim1 
w1 
.714 (.092)*** .624 
(.036)*** 
.774 (.114)*** .605 (.044)*** 
POC ID 
w3 







-.011 (.025) -.015 (.019) -.011 (.025) -.035 (.021)+ 
crim1 
w3 
ID w2 .112 (.359) -.215 (.206) -.340 (.386) -.305 (.219) 
crim1 
w2 
.555 (.064)*** .624 
(.036)*** 
.494 (.072)*** .605 (.044)*** 
ID-attitude trait 
covariance 
    
W1 ID-attitude 
covariance 
.019 (.026) .013 (.025) .020 (.026) .015 (.026) 
W2 ID-attitude 
covariance 
-.001 (.027) -.007 (.029) .012 (.028) .011 (.028) 
W3 ID-attitude 
covariance 
-.013 (.023) .011 (.028) -.010 (.023) -.002 (.025) 
     
CFI .993/.930 .994/ .941 .998/.949 1.000/ .956 
RMSEA .043/.105 .028/ .068 .027/.118 .008/ .078 
SRMR .162 .165 .081 .071 








Chisq test  3.769 (4)  3.357 (4) 
 
Note: N = 272 for all models.  
 
Note: Reported CFI, RMSEA, and 2 values are non-robust/robust. 
 
a Warning: trouble constructing W matrix.  
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Table A63 
 
Study 2 American Identity & Criminal Justice Attitudes (BLM/protests) Panel Model 
Results, Black Participants 
 





















































































































































































       
CFI .937 .936 .954 .954 1.000 .999 
RMSEA .251 .179 .237 .168 .000 .033 
SRMR .036 .040 .017 .018 .002 .019 








0.099 (1) 8.476 (5) 
Chisq test  6.276 (4)  4.203 (4)  8.377 
(4)+ 
 
Note: N = 658 for all models.  
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Table A64 
 
Study 2 American Identity & Criminal Justice Attitudes (BLM/protests) Panel Model 
Results, Latino Participants 
 





















































































































































































       
CFI .923 .905 .945 .937 .999 1.000 
RMSEA .276 .217 .270 .205 .047 .000 
SRMR .027 .056 .015 .023 .013 .016 








1.606 (1) 2.555 (5) 




 0.949 (4) 
 
Note: N = 272 for all models. 
 
a Warning: some estimated lv variances are negative (fcrimcompw2).  
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Table A65 
 
Study 2 American Identity & Criminal Justice Attitudes (mandatory minimum sentence, 
continuous) Panel Model Results, Black Participants 
 








































































































































































       
CFI .894 .885 .926 .923 1.000 .997 
RMSEA .237 .175 .225 .163 .000 .036 
SRMR .059 .067 .028 .031 .001 .025 



















Note: N = 658 for all models.  
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Table A66 
 
Study 2 American Identity & Criminal Justice Attitudes (mandatory minimum sentence, 
categorical) Panel Model Results, Black Participants 
 
  CLPM CLPM stat CLPM w/ 
cont 
CLPM w/ 
cont stata, b 
American 
ID w2 










-.039 (.013)** -.012 (.007)+ -.041 (.015)** -.014 (.008)+ 























.005 (.009) -.012 (.007)+ .001 (.009) -.014 (.008)+ 













    
W1 ID-attitude 
covariance 
-.006 (.016) -.014 (.015) -.006 (.016) -.012 (.015) 
W2 ID-attitude 
covariance 
.004 (.012) .003 (.014) .007 (.012) .006 (.013) 
W3 ID-attitude 
covariance 
.015 (.009) .008 (.012) .017 (.010)+ .011 (.011) 
     
CFI .967/.860 .964/ .887 .984/.928 .983/ .937 
RMSEA .106/.173 .078/ .110 .089/.156 .065/ .104 
SRMR .160 .162 .070 .066 












Chisq test  6.594 (4)  5.753 (4) 
 
Note: N = 658 for all models. 
 
Note: Reported CFI, RMSEA, and 2 values are non-robust/robust. 
 
a Warning: trouble constructing W matrix 
b Warning: variance-covariance matrix of estimated parameters doesn’t appear to be 
positive definite. Smallest eigenvalue close to 0.  
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Table A67 
 
Study 2 American Identity & Criminal Justice Attitudes (mandatory minimum sentence, 
continuous) Panel Model Results, Latino Participants 
 
















































































































































































       
CFI .923 .905 .950 .942 1.000 1.000 
RMSEA .183 .144 .185 .140 .000 .000 
SRMR .041 .064 .022 .027 .001 .033 



















Note: N = 272 for all models.  
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Table A68 
 
Study 2 American Identity & Criminal Justice Attitudes (mandatory minimum sentence, 
categorical) Panel Model Results, Latino Participants 
 
















-.038 (.024) -.018 (.015) -.026 (.026) -.007 (.015) 
























-.003 (.018) -.018 (.015) .006 (.017) -.007 (.015) 
crim1 w3 ID w2 -1.103 
(.487)* 














    
W1 ID-attitude 
covariance 
-.054 (.023)* -.055 (.023)* -.055 (.023)* -.059 (.023)* 
W2 ID-attitude 
covariance 
.033 (.021) .053 (.027)* .017 (.020) .028 (.021) 
W3 ID-attitude 
covariance 
.023 (.017) -.003 (.024) .017 (.018) .001 (.019) 
     
CFI 1.000/.956 .999/ .961 1.000/.963 1.000/ .962 
RMSEA .000/.091 .009/ .060 .010/.110 .000/ .079 
SRMR .153 .146 .073 .062 








Chisq test  4.432 (4)  3.081 (4) 
 
Note: N = 272 for all models. 
 
Note: Reported CFI, RMSEA, and 2 values are non-robust/robust. 
 
a Warning: trouble constructing W matrix. 
